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1. Introduction 
1.1. The world’s most neglected humanitarian crisis?  
The conflict in northern Uganda is the biggest forgotten, neglected humanitarian 
emergency in the world today… We have to increase our support. We will do things. 
We the United Nations have also done too little. The donors have done too little. The 
government has done too little, we have all done too little… I was shocked, it is a moral 
outrage what has happened and is happening. (Jan Egeland in November 2003, as 
quoted in AFM 2003).  
The flight from the international airport in Entebbe, near Kampala, to the airstrip in 
Kitgum, near the Sudanese border, is illustrative of the globalised nature of northern 
Uganda’s conflict. On board the flight are some few Ugandans who work for 
international agencies, and a much larger group of munu (the plural Acholi term for 
white foreigners): staff of international humanitarian and development organisations, 
some journalists, and one or two development researchers on their way to conduct 
fieldwork.  
Most probably, the underlying reason for each of the muno (the singular form of munu) 
to be on board the flight to Kitgum is the same: for 20 years the district has been part of 
the stage of a fierce conflict between the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and the 
Government of Uganda. The rebels’ brutal attacks, which have included mutilations and 
the large-scale abduction of children, combined with the government’s anti-insurgency 
campaigns, have over the past two decades led to massive population displacement and 
varying levels of humanitarian crisis. Yet three years before my own flight to the 
district, not many weekly flights were operated – not as many munu had an interest in 
reaching Kitgum. The conflict was there, the human suffering was there, the munu were 
not. Why not then, why now? 
In November 2003 the UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Jan 
Egeland, made a trip to northern Uganda, after which he made the statement quoted at 
the beginning of this chapter, coining the situation the world’s worst forgotten 
humanitarian emergency. Three years later – if international presence is taken as a 
measure – the statement no longer stands. Kitgum, a town that hosted hardly any 
international agencies even in 2004, is now a hub of the international humanitarian and 
development industry. Entrance roads to the town centre are lined with rows of 
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signposts pointing to the offices of international agencies and local NGO’s (see picture 
on page 7). Daily, the driveway to the town’s best hotel, Bomah, is lined with a 
handsome row of four-wheel drives bearing the logos of international agencies. A list of 
organisation field contacts in August 2006 includes a total of 44 organisations working 
in Kitgum (UNOCHA 2006c). These include the ICRC, eight UN organisations and 18 
international NGOs. In addition, there are agencies in Kitgum that prefer not to take part 
in coordination meetings, which are therefore not included in UNOCHA’s list. In 
comparison, in 2003 coordination happened in face-to-face meetings at the office of an 
INGO (Interview in Kitgum, 16 August 2006). 
In July–August 2006, when I conducted fieldwork for this study in Kitgum, the security 
situation in all LRA-affected areas in northern Uganda was substantially improved from 
that in 2003. Although small groups of rebels were sited almost daily, they were not 
harassing people, and as a result, night-commuter shelters, in which children had been 
spending their nights in fear of abduction, were being shut down. Yet despite the 
improved security situation and the change in the scale of humanitarian presence, many 
of those I interviewed in Kitgum felt that Jan Egeland’s statement was still valid. A 
situation where over a million people are displaced from their homes, with inadequate 
water, food, sanitation, health and education facilities, and with few or no livelihood 
opportunities, is a humanitarian crisis. For the people living in abominable conditions in 
displacement camps, it was of little consolation that mortality rates had started to drop, 
and food security was improving. Displaced people were still suffering, and they were 
still terribly frightened.  
Despite recent improvements, international donors and other humanitarian and 
development actors have been fiercely criticised for their inaction in northern Uganda. 
The statement by Jan Egeland, quoted at the beginning of this chapter, has become the 
most oft repeated (self-) critique. More specifically, critics have characterised 
intervention in the area as not only insufficient and thinly spread, but also poorly carried 
out and badly coordinated (See for instance Brown 2006, ICVA 2006a).  
Although the continuation of the crisis in northern Uganda is certainly to some extent 
due to the inadequacy of humanitarian assistance, I wish to show in this study that 
reasons for the persistence of crisis conditions in the region are more complex. Yet 
whatever the reasons, it is clear that human suffering in the region has been immense. 
For instance, in 2004 the under-five mortality rate (U5MR) in new displacement camps 
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in Pader and Lira districts was 5.4 (deaths/10 000 children/day), and as high as 10.46 in 
a specific camp (MSF-Holland (Médecins Sans Frontierès) 2004, quoted in Allen 2006: 
54). As a comparison, the emergency threshold U5MR for Sub-Saharan Africa is 2.3 
(The Sphere Project 2004: 261). 1  
Grim though statistical descriptors of the life and death conditions of victims to the 
northern Uganda conflict may be, numbers are an inadequate measure of suffering, as 
will be discussed in subsequent chapters. In addition to violence and the physical 
consequences of displacement, the population in northern Uganda is also subjected to 
suffering at social and existential levels. Anthropologist Sverker Finnström (2003) uses 
the Acholi term piny marac, or “bad surroundings”, to describe a holistic view of 
suffering, in which everything, including humanitarian intervention, becomes part of the 
bad surroundings in which the displaced are forced to live. These “bad surroundings”, 
the complex networks that entwine conflict, human suffering and development 
intervention in northern Uganda to global arenas of politics and discourse, form the 
research setting for this study.  
1.2. Research question and limitations 
The aim of this study is to analyse interactions of development intervention and conflict 
in northern Uganda.2 Particularly, the study will attempt to pinpoint dynamics that have 
contributed towards the massive increase in development intervention to the region 
since the afore-quoted statement by Jan Egeland in 2003, and to discuss the effects of 
this increase. For reasons that will be elaborated on later in this study, I have focused 
my attention particularly on the unintended or negative effects of development 
intervention in northern Uganda. A broader aim for the study is to discuss some of the 
theoretical and methodological challenges to studying development interventions, and 
to comment on the potentiality and feasibility of analysing the impacts of development 
interventions in situations of conflict. 
                                                
1 The emergency threshold is calculated by doubling the regional average U5MR rate in non-
crisis conditions. For Sub-Saharan Africa, this rate in 2004 was 1.14 (The Sphere Project 2004: 
261).  
2 By development intervention I mean the sum of humanitarian relief and development 
assistance, implemented by intergovernmental organisations, bilateral donor agencies, the 
ICRC and INGOs, partially through or in partnership with local NGOs, with varying levels of 
co-operation with the Government of Uganda, its relevant ministries, and local authorities. 
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As the term interaction holds such a central place in defining the interests and goals of 
this study, a few words are in place on what I mean by the term. Interaction can be seen 
as a rather unspecific, and thus weak analytical concept. Partially it was this very 
vagueness that originally drew me to the concept, and I argue that the very vagueness of 
the notion is what makes it useful for this study. Rather than artificially defining and 
pinpointing a very specific area of research, I wish to keep the field open for all the 
ambiguities surrounding the interactions of development intervention and conflict in 
northern Uganda. To further articulate my understanding of interaction, I wish to draw a 
parallel to the notion of interface, which will later be introduced as an analytical tool for 
this study: “Although the term ‘interface’ tends to convey the image of some kind of 
two-sided articulation or face-to-face confrontation, social interface situations are more 
complex and multiple in nature, containing within them many different interests, 
relationships and modes of rationality and power” (Long 2004: 28). Similarly, I suggest 
that the interactions of conflict and development do not have mechanistic, easily 
identifiable and quantifiable impacts on one another. It is the complexity of the relations 
of conflict and intervention that I wish to capture with the notion interaction.  
The theoretical framework for this study is founded on the notion of development 
intervention. In chapter two, I will investigate the nature of development intervention, 
and introduce and discuss ways of studying intervention in development studies. As a 
core conceptual tool for the research task, I introduce Norman Long’s (2004) notion of 
social interface. Central to the concept of social interface is the idea that interventions 
are embedded in complex frameworks that lie beyond the immediate scope of interface 
situations. The entire study is underpinned by this idea, and the structure of the study 
reflects this underpinning: before attempting to analyse the actual interactions of 
intervention and conflict, the frameworks and arenas surrounding intervention in 
northern Uganda will be analysed. 
In part II of this study I will introduce the frameworks and arenas that I have identified 
as central to analysing intervention in northern Uganda. First I will argue that 
intervention and conflict in northern Uganda are embedded in a normative and 
conceptual framework, the core element of which is the post Cold War transformation 
of humanitarianism. Second, intervention and conflict in northern Uganda are 
embedded in a complex, multilayered arena of conflict that spans the global as well as 
the local (Finnström 2006b). This multilayered reality will be introduced in chapter 
four. The history of the conflict will first be traced, after which the conflict context will 
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be analysed at different levels, from the local to the international. The objective of this 
analysis will be to highlight the complexity of the reality into which development 
interventions in northern Uganda are targeted, and into which interventions become 
entangled.  
After the frameworks surrounding the interaction of development intervention and 
conflict in northern Uganda have been analysed, it will be possible to analyse the 
interaction itself. I will suggest that this interaction occurs at both a “macro” and a 
“micro” level: at the level of regional conflict dynamics and donor policies, but also “on 
the ground”, in interactions between individuals involved in intervention processes. Part 
III is thus divided into these two levels of investigation. In chapter five I will argue that 
the broad-scale dynamics of conflict and intervention between the years 2001 and 2006 
provide keys to understanding Jan Egeland’s statement in 2003 and the increase in 
intervention that followed. In chapter six I will zoom in to the micro-level of the 
intervention interface by focusing more closely on Kitgum and on the views of the aid 
workers and displaced women I interviewed during my fieldwork.  
In chapter seven it will then be possible to reflect on what can be said about the 
interactions of development intervention and conflict in northern Uganda in light of the 
preceding analysis. I will then turn back to the study’s broader research question, that is, 
how can the impacts of development intervention on conflict be analysed, and what 
limitations exist for such an analysis. 
Whether intervention and conflict in northern Uganda interact is not a question in this 
study – they do. The relevant question is what these interactions are, and particularly, 
how intervention impacts on local realities, including conflict. On both the macro and 
the micro level, I focus on the unintended impacts of development intervention. 
Particularly attention is focused on the idea that intervention may have exacerbated 
and/or prolonged conflict in northern Uganda. I will argue that intervention has had 
unintended impacts on the conflict and more broadly on life for the displaced Acholi, 
and that these impacts are relatively unacknowledged among humanitarian and 
development actors in Kitgum. 
Two “limiting clauses” to my central arguments must, however, be identified. First of 
all, I do not suggest that development intervention has been the most important reason 
for the protraction of conflict in northern Uganda. Latham (2001: 86) cautions that 
although transnational deployments such as development intervention do affect local 
 
 
 
13 
contexts, they do not order them. A good analysis of the effect of development 
intervention would require that local government structures, for instance, were 
incorporated into the analysis, and as will be discussed in section 1.3, this study lacks 
such analysis. Related to this, an important word of caution is given by Hendrickson 
(1998: 285), who notes that “in the absence of durable solutions to protracted 
humanitarian crises, blaming relief aid for failing to solve problems is effectively to 
miss the point.” Indeed, development intervention in Kitgum (such as food handouts, 
emergency medical care, education projects or HIV-awareness campaigns) and the 
effect this intervention has on the conflict, is only one part of a much larger complex. 
Aid on the ground is perhaps not even the most important piece in this puzzle, but as I 
will show, it is nonetheless consequential.  
Secondly, to say that development intervention has played a role in exacerbating or 
prolonging conflict in northern Uganda is not to say that contrary processes, or what 
Anderson (1999) refers to as aid’s potential to support capacities for peace, have not 
occurred simultaneously. However, the possible conflict-reducing or peace-building 
effects of development intervention in northern Uganda do not receive much attention 
in this paper. The reason for this is simply that, to me, peace-building effects of 
interventions in Kitgum were not apparent in anything other than those interventions 
that were specifically targeted at reducing conflict. Nor were such effects identified 
during the interviews I conducted with development or humanitarian professionals.3 
Some did suggest that agencies that had to date failed to incorporate peace building into 
their work, should attempt to do so more in the future.  
1.3. Methodology 
Fieldwork was conducted for this study over a 9-week period in Uganda in June–
August 2006. Of this time, two and a half weeks were spent in Kitgum district in 
northern Uganda (see appendix 1). The objective of fieldwork was to gain insight into 
what would be a relevant research question for this study by becoming acquainted with 
the discussion surrounding conflict and intervention in northern Uganda. This was done 
by following the local (English) media discussion on the conflict, by using every 
                                                
3 An exception to this trend was made by one organisation that saw all its interventions in 
relation to the conflict, and which partook in interventions geared explicitly at “making a 
contribution to providing a peaceful and enabling environment in northern Uganda” (Interview 
in Kitgum, 9 August 2006).  
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opportunity to discuss the conflict and related issues with anyone who showed an 
interest in such a discussion, and by gathering qualitative research material in Kitgum.  
My reason for being in Uganda, in addition to studying the northern conflict, was a 
voluntary internship at the Lutheran World Federation (LWF) World Service Uganda 
country programme. I was under a cooperation agreement with LWF also during my 
fieldwork in Kitgum. However, I had no assigned duties during this time, and I covered 
my own travel and board expenses to and in Kitgum. Access to displacement camps was 
facilitated by the LWF, the staff of which I joined in their work-related visits to the 
camps. In Kitgum I visited five camps for internally displaced people (Akwang, Kitgum 
Matidi, Labuje, Lagoro and Palagek Gem, see appendix 2), conducted altogether 25 
interviews, and took part in one coordination meeting at the office of the United Nations 
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA).  
I interviewed the representatives of 12 different organisations operating in Kitgum. 
These included local and international NGOs, the ICRC and UN organisations (see 
appendix 3). The interviewed humanitarian and development staff in Kitgum occupied 
managerial positions in their organisations. The organisations were selected so as to 
provide a comprehensive picture of intervention in the district. In addition I held 
interviews and had unofficial discussions on the research topic with a number of people 
who wished not to speak as representatives of the organisations they worked for. All but 
four of the interviews in Kitgum were recorded and transcribed. Because of the political 
sensitivity of the topics under discussion, the interviews are referred to without 
reference to specific organisations.  
I also conducted, with the assistance of an Acholi-speaking research assistant, six focus 
group interviews with groups of women at four different displacement camps around 
Kitgum district (all those mentioned above with the exception of Labuje, at which I did 
not receive permission to interview residents). One interview was also conducted near 
Kitgum town with a group of displaced women who were living under the jurisdiction 
of the town council and not in an official displacement settlement. At the displacement 
camps, my co-intern at LWF, an undergraduate student of Development Studies, 
Pamella, acted as my research assistant. Herself Acholi, Pamella arranged the 
interviews with camp officials and the interviewed women, and translated the group 
discussions. To my knowledge Pamella had not acted as a research assistant before. I 
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myself failed in discussing my requirements with her carefully, with the result that some 
translation problems occurred during the group discussions.  
On arrival to the camps, Pamella and I split from the LWF team, and conducted our 
interviews in a different part of the camp. I told the interviewed displaced women I was 
a student. I explained as my reason for talking to them that I wished to find out how the 
women experienced the development and humanitarian organisations working among 
them, so that I could discuss these issues with the organisations, as I then did in later 
interviews with NGO staff. I did not mention LWF when introducing myself, though it 
is possible that the women were somehow aware of the link Pamella and I had to the 
organisation. If that was the case, it could have had a bearing on how the women 
responded, in at least two ways.  
First of all, our being in the camp as representatives of an aid organisation would likely 
have provoked certain types of requests and demands from the interviewed women. 
This became apparent in those group discussions in which new women joined the group 
after introductions had been made. The women who had not heard my introduction 
apparently took the situations for NGO assessments, and embarked on long lists of 
things that they needed to have brought for them. A second way in which our 
association with LWF may have impacted the discussion relates to the organisation’s 
name and status. Although the LWF adopts a strictly neutral and non-evangelising stand 
in its work, its faith-based status may in one way or another affect the way it is seen by 
the displaced Acholi.  
An important point to bear in mind throughout this study is that as my interest is in an 
on-going conflict, some of the information I have received may be skewed, for instance, 
because of interests in portraying a certain type of image of the conflict. Many of the 
interviewed aid workers were hesitant, or simply refused to discuss certain issues, as 
they either said their organisations deliberately avoided taking a stand, or because they 
did not feel safe in airing their views on controversial topics. Allen (2006: 110) notes 
how some of the Acholi people he interviewed explicitly demanded that he not record 
the interviews, since they were afraid that the interviews would end up on the radio, and 
get the people into trouble. In my fieldwork, I asked and was granted permission to 
record all the interviews at displacement camps, yet it is possible that the recording has 
affected on how freely the women felt they could talk.  
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More important than the presence of the recorder, however, was that I only knew a few 
words of Acholi, and thus had no chance to communicate with anyone who did not 
speak English. The lack of language skills, combined with my short stay in Kitgum, 
meant that I could not achieve a deep understanding of the complexity of the situation in 
northern Uganda. To elucidate this point, I wish to introduce a concept used by 
Finnström (2006b). His account of the conflict in northern Uganda is centred on how 
displaced people living in the war zone understand the conflict and the fact that the 
international community – most forcibly present in their lives as their survival is 
dependant on humanitarian assistance – is entangled with the local reality of war. In this 
approach, Finnström emphasises meanings in use: 
Such meanings are never fixed but are negotiated in an interactive socio-cultural and 
political process of interpretation and counter-interpretation, involving not only the 
most influential agents such as the rebel movement, the Ugandan government and 
international relief organizations, but also ordinary people with direct experience of 
war. These interpretations and explanations are essential to any understanding, 
academic or popular, of the conflict. (Finnström 2006b: 12, emphasis added) 
As I will later show in detail, staff of international relief and development organisations 
in Kitgum were greatly lacking in knowledge of these interpretations and explanations. 
Of the 17 senior NGO field staff I interviewed, only 6 were Acholi themselves; none of 
the others spoke any meaningful amount of Acholi – neither did I. This should be kept 
in mind throughout this study, particularly in that my own understanding of the situation 
in Kitgum is to a large extent based on views I gathered from well-educated English 
speaking humanitarian and development staff, many of whom were expatriates. 
1.4. The ethics of research and development intervention 
amidst displacement and suffering 
Before launching into the research tasks outlined in section 1.2, I wish to reflect on 
some of the more existential aspects of the issues under discussion in this study, by 
bringing to the fore the point of view of those Acholi displaced by the conflict, and thus 
targeted by development interventions. I also wish to reflect on some ethical questions 
that my fieldwork experience in Kitgum evoked, since I believe that the personal 
experiences of the researcher cannot and should not be insulated from the research 
process.  
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Mortality rates and other statistical measures are often used to characterise the extent of 
suffering in humanitarian emergency situations, whereas the psychological, social and 
existential aspects of suffering, and the affected people’s ways of conceptualising and 
coping with their suffering, are often overlooked. The description of an LRA attack to a 
displacement camp, which Allen (2006) witnessed in 2005, opens avenues to 
understanding the situation from the point of view of the displaced Acholi. The UPDF 
(Uganda People’s Defence Force) soldiers that were stationed at the camp responded to 
the rebels’ attack, and both sides had casualties. Once the LRA had left, the soldiers 
forced camp residents to put out all lights, and people who ventured to move outside 
were beaten.  
In the morning, the body of an LRA combatant who had been killed was still lying in 
the road. No one had been allowed to cover him with leaves, as is the custom, and his 
body was being eaten by the local pigs. Many Acholi believe in cen (a polluting 
spiritual force), which afflicts those exposed to violent death with nightmares and 
illnesses. So in this way, it seemed, the camp population were being terrorized and 
punished for what had happened. (Allen 2006: 55, emphasis added) 
As Allen describes, the displaced Acholi experienced that they were being punished for 
what was beyond their control – punished for their bad surroundings. Importantly, as I 
will later discuss in detail, it is not only the LRA rebels that bring on such forms of 
suffering, but also the UPDF and international organisations, which have specifically 
been mandated with the protection and assistance of the displaced. Allen’s informants’ 
interpretation of the situation, of being punished for their bad surroundings, was 
mirrored in how some displaced women in Kitgum talked to me about food aid:  
Sometimes they bring rotten stuff for us… What they distribute is not enough… The 
people who come to distribute food, they are rude to us, where if you get like something 
is wrong, if you complain to them, they tell you…  that if you are coming to the 
distribution because you can’t get [food] for yourself, you should not complain. 
(Interview in Palabek Gem camp, 10 August 2006) 
Although the focus of humanitarian and development programmes in northern Uganda 
has been on immediate material assistance, interventions have also been targeted at 
alleviating more than just physical suffering. A number of psychosocial support 
programs have been put in place particularly to assist with the reintegration of formerly 
abducted children. Psychosocial support is indeed desperately needed, as is indicated by 
a survey by MSF-Holland in Pader district: “79 percent of people had witnessed torture, 
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40 percent had witnessed killing and 5 percent had been forced to physically harm 
someone; 62 percent of women interviewed think about committing suicide” (Quoted in 
Allen 2006: 58). Handling psychosocial issues as a separate component of assistance is 
arguably, however, not a sufficient response to the complexity of the existential conflict 
reality. Particularly I argue in this study that ignorance of the broader impacts of 
intervention on the non-physical wellbeing of the displaced population can lead well-
intended relief efforts to cause unacknowledged suffering.  
In measuring suffering only through the logistical exercise of counting individual cases 
of death, sickness, abduction, malnutrition or rape, development interveners have 
approached suffering through an individualistic Western viewpoint, thus contradicting 
the way in which suffering is conceptualised by the Acholi: “[U]nderstanding of 
affliction, including illness symptoms, is often interpreted in terms of interpersonal 
causes or relations with the spirit world. This does not mean that understanding of 
empirical causality is absent, but that explanations of misfortunes tend to be pluralistic” 
(Allen 2006: 31).  
I suggest that a reason for why such aspects of suffering are ignored by development 
intervention is that they cannot be grasped by statistics, and thus are beyond the 
methods of rationalisation and control on which rigidly organised relief efforts are 
grounded. Becoming acquainted with these existential realities would also require a 
type of engagement with those who are suffering that is contrary to the logic and ideals 
of supposedly neutral “rapid deployment humanitarianism”, in which emotional 
distance is mistakenly equated with neutrality: “For the international humanitarian 
organisations… to maintain such a social barrier seems to be their naïve way of keeping 
the image of neutrality alive” (Finnström 2003: 234). I will return to reflect on these 
questions in chapter six, but throughout study, I hope to respect the experiences and the 
dignity of the displaced people. One practical way of showing this is that I have chosen 
to refer to the displaced as people or the displaced, not as “IDPs”, which is the acronym 
generally used by both practitioners and researchers when referring to internally 
displaced people (see Finnström 2003). 
My discussions with displaced people in Kitgum were regrettably few and brief due to 
the limited amount of time I could stay in the district. Time, however, was not my only 
constraint – the other was my capacity to deal with what I saw and heard in the camps 
in which my displaced informants lived. The numerous documents and studies that I 
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head read on displacement in northern Uganda had not prepared me for my encounter 
with the displaced and the abominable surroundings they were forced to call their 
homes. My first fieldtrip plunged me into deep shock. The trip took place within hours 
of my arrival in Kitgum, to Labuje camp near Kitgum town.  
Afterwards I heard that Labuje was one of the most congested camps in the district, and 
thus provided me with the worst possible first impression of displacement in Kitgum. 
The day was scorching hot, the camp was crowded and incredibly noisy, children were 
dirty and many looked gravely ill, and my over-all impression was of beyond inhuman 
living conditions and utter despair. Later fieldtrips were psychologically much less 
straining, as I was more prepared, and preoccupied with my research. Yet Labuje made 
a lasting impression on my mind, for which I am grateful. The initial shock, I believe, 
related to me something of the horror of displacement, a reality that as an outsider with 
plane tickets in my pocket (as Finnström (2003) succinctly puts it), I could never fully 
grasp. 
After my traumatic first touch with the reality of displacement, I returned to the hotel 
where I stayed in Kitgum – the nicest one in town. Despite the comfort of a hot shower 
and the imported chocolate I had waiting for me at the hotel, the only thing I could think 
of at the time was that I needed to get out. Luckily there was no flight out of Kitgum for 
two days, for I am sure I would have run away had it been an option. Shock with the 
circumstances at the camp, anger with humankind for allowing such suffering, profound 
doubt in my own capacity to do any meaningful research in such overwhelming 
surroundings – the feelings came in torrents, as did the corresponding tears. Having 
heard me crying in my room, Evelyn, the young receptionist at the hotel, came knocking 
at the door to ask me what was wrong. At the time, her words gave me little comfort, 
but during the following days the words spurred in me a shame-filled resilience that 
pulled me through the rest of my fieldwork: “But think about us, we have lived in these 
camps all our lives.” 
In order to grant voice to the existential reality of displacement, I want to draw this 
description of disaster and intervention in northern Uganda to close with the words of a 
Ugandan poet, Oryema-Lalobo, who writes of an imaginary Lutum people: 
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Crowded in camps 
Herded like cows 
In a huge kraal 
Cramped all together 
In a foreign fashion 
Not of their choice  
 
The Lutum people 
Have no gardens 
Have no granaries 
Eat from charity 
Handed out 
By white men 
In deep silence. 
 
The Lutum people 
Are weary and tired  
  
(Oryema-Lalobo 1999: 2, quoted in Finnström 2003: 192) 
 
The Acholi people are certainly weary and tired. But it is not only the Acholi who are 
stranded in displacement camps who are weary and tired. I will return to this point in 
some depth at the closing of chapter 6.  
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2. Analysing development intervention 
The over-all aim of this chapter is to outline the theoretical framework of the study, and 
to introduce the central concepts used. The particular aim in section 2.1 is to discuss 
development intervention: its nature, its implications for development studies, and 
possibilities for analysing it. Norman Long’s (2004) social interface analysis will be 
introduced as an approach, elements of which are applied to analysis in this study. In 
chapters 3 and 4 the aim will then be to adapt the social interface approach to this 
particular study, by presenting transformed humanitarianism and the context of conflict 
in northern Uganda as a framework and arena into which development intervention in 
northern Uganda is embedded.  
Although theoretical, the notions discussed in this chapter are of great practical 
consequence. Abstract discourses on the transformation of humanitarianism, or the 
rearrangement of relations between development and security, may seem distant to the 
day to day reality in Kitgum, yet the ideas produced in such debates are constantly 
being tested and contested in the practical realities of humanitarian emergencies like 
that in northern Uganda. Even where unacknowledged, the echoes of these discourses 
can be identified both in the practices of organisations operating in the region, and in 
the opinions of those interviewed during fieldwork in Kitgum. From this follows one of 
the central arguments of this study, i.e. that the debates on humanitarianism, 
intervention, conflict and development, have had repercussions for intervention in 
northern Uganda; thus, also, as will be argued in detail later, 
humanitarian/developmental discourse has impacted on conflict in northern Uganda. 
The reverse is also true: the conflict and the ensuing humanitarian disaster in northern 
Uganda has affected discourses on intervention, humanitarianism and conflict.  
2.1 Development and intervention 
Intervention has experienced a similar fate as many other concepts in development: aid 
has been replaced with co-operation, and donors and recipients with development 
partners. Indeed, as Juhani Koponen (2004: 5) points out, “in development discourse, 
one does not hear much of intervention these days.” Thus when targeting my analysis at 
development intervention in northern Uganda, I have deliberately chosen a most 
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unpopular term as the core term of this study. There are two primary reasons for this 
choice. 
Although intervention has a nasty twang to it, “leaving a word unuttered does not undo 
a practice practiced” (Koponen 2004: 5). Based on my experience in Kitgum, I fully 
agree with Koponen’s argument. Despite pretty terms used in development rhetoric, 
much of what I observed in Kitgum was much better described by aid than by co-
operation, and donors and recipients were more truly donors and recipients than they 
were development partners. Analysis of the research material, and fieldwork conducted 
in Kitgum, showed intervention to be a much more descriptive term for the 
phenomenon under study than those that might possibly have replaced it, the most 
obvious of which would have been development assistance.  
The notion development assistance implies a double positive: development is something 
good, something that is worth striving for, while assistance refers to positive action on 
behalf of, or together with, another. Development assistance in northern Uganda would 
thus imply action taken on behalf of, or together with, civilians suffering in northern 
Uganda in order to alleviate their suffering. Although such action has certainly taken 
place, all action under the heading of development assistance has in fact not, if the 
terms are defined as above, “assisted” “development” in northern Uganda. This is the 
first reason for my preference of intervention over assistance.  
The second reason for the use of intervention as the core term in this study is that it is 
theoretically fruitful. It allows for a detailed analysis of the processes of cooperation 
and conflict that occur in encounters between the international developmental regime, 
the organisations and individuals belonging to it, and the displaced people and the 
broader social context in northern Uganda. Also, the notion of intervention draws us to 
a fundamental question of development studies, which is, what is development? 
2.2. Methodological developmentalism 
Koponen (2004) suggests that intervention forms the third dimension of the modern 
notion of development, the first dimension being development as a goal, and the second, 
development as a process leading to this goal. In this notion, both the goal and the 
process are seen as implicitly good – logically therefore the third dimension, 
intervention, is also desirable and good. Development as we know it is thus impossible 
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without intervention. Understanding development thus has major consequences for 
research: 
What makes this [modern] notion [of development], and the awareness and analysis of 
it, of crucial importance is that it provides the intellectual and moral underpinning for 
those ideas, discourses, ways of action, institutions and other structures that have grown 
up to further development during the last fifty years or so – to support all the closely 
interconnected discourse and activity we now undertake in the name of development. 
(Koponen 2004: 6) 
Koponen refers to this “complex of discourse and action” (ibid.) as developmentalism. 
It is this notion of development as an interventionist process, and the idea that a system 
of developmentalism is grounded upon this notion, that underpins this study. It is also 
the assumption inherent to this notion – that development and development intervention 
are, by nature, unquestionably good – that this study questions.  
On embarking to Kitgum, my hypothesis was that besides the implicit good, 
development intervention has also had unintended negative impacts in northern Uganda, 
and further, that intervention has impacted specifically on conflict in the region. Though 
not realising it at the time, I thus launched into a study of what I have since learned to 
call, in Koponen’s terms, the dual nature of development intervention: “Development 
intervention is by its nature both planned and unplanned, and commonly has both 
intended and unintended effects. In our research we should take both these sides equally 
seriously if we wish to understand what happens on the ground” (ibid: 12). 
It must be acknowledged that during my fieldwork I did not take both sides of 
intervention in northern Uganda equally seriously, as demanded by Koponen. As 
already discussed in the introduction, practical limitations as well as my wish to conduct 
research on an issue that was not already receiving extensive coverage, led me to 
concentrate my efforts during fieldwork onto understanding the unintended and 
negative effects of intervention. Despite its shortcomings, I would however propose that 
this study is an attempt at “methodological developmentalism”, which Koponen 
suggests as a way to rethink development studies: “The focus [of development studies] 
should… be on the methodological examination of how the developmentalist complex 
is actually working and what it is producing” (ibid: 12). 
Something similar is referred to by Duffield (2001), who argues that development 
studies has failed to sufficiently analyse the dynamics of the international hierarchy of 
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concern. In his view, research should attempt to understand where the developmentalist 
complex does and does not engage, and what guides this engagement. This study 
proposes some preliminary answers to these questions regarding the humanitarian 
regime’s engagement – and lack of engagement – in northern Uganda.  
2.3. Social interface analysis  
To rethink development studies as suggested by Koponen or Duffield requires new tools 
with which to analyse the interventionist nature of development and the interventions 
produced in the name of development. One such tool is the notion of social interface, as 
used in Norman Long’s (2004) actor-oriented analysis of development. Some aspects of 
Long’s approach, particularly his use of the notion of social interface, are useful for the 
analysis of intervention in northern Uganda. Long’s concepts will be applied rather 
loosely in this study, as a more rigid adoption of his methodology would have required, 
among other things, a very different approach to field research. 
Long calls for development research to adopt an explicit epistemological standpoint, i.e. 
to acknowledge “the existence of ‘multiple social realities’ [and to focus] on the 
lifeworlds and interlocking ‘projects’ of actors” (ibid: 25). Such a standpoint is at odds 
with how development intervention is generally conceived by both researchers and 
practitioners, as intervention “is still often visualised as a discrete set of activities that 
takes place within a defined time-space setting involving the interaction between so-
called ‘intervening’ parties and ‘target’ or ‘recipient’ groups” (ibid.). Long’s proposed 
alternative for such a view underpins this study:  
Development interventions are always part of a chain or flow of events located within 
the broader framework of the activities of the state, international bodies and the actions 
of the different interest groups operative in civil society. They are also linked to 
previous interventions, have consequences for future ones, and more often than not are 
a focus for intra- and inter-institutional struggles… Consequently, intervention 
processes cannot be confined to specific spaces and functions delimited by official 
policies and plans… Intervention processes are thus shaped by both collective and 
personal memories of state-civic society relations, local initiatives and inter-institutional 
struggles. (Long 2004: 25–27) 
In Long’s view, the most fruitful way to analyse development intervention thus defined 
is through the notion of social interface, which “explores how discrepancies of social 
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interest, cultural interpretation, knowledge and power are mediated and perpetuated or 
transformed at critical points of linkage or confrontation” (ibid: 16). These social 
interfaces “typically occur at points where different, and often conflicting, lifeworlds or 
social fields intersect; or, more concretely, in social situations or arenas in which 
interactions become oriented around problems of bridging, accommodating, segregating 
or contesting social, evaluative and cognitive standpoints” (ibid: 28, emphasis added). I 
suggest that the northern Ugandan conflict and humanitarian emergency complex can be 
conceptualised as such a social arena. This broad-scale arena again is part of larger 
arenas such as the East African region or the system of developmentalism. On the other 
hand it also encompasses smaller arenas, such as the humanitarian and development 
community in Kitgum, or the arena formed by intervening organisations and the 
population of a particular displacement camp in Kitgum.  
One of the key elements of a social interface perspective is that it focuses attention to 
processes of knowledge and power in intervention situations. All actors engaged in the 
intervention process are seen as surrounded by ideological, institutional and power 
frameworks. At the interface, what meet are not only actors, be they individuals or 
organisations, but all the frameworks surrounding these actors. As a result, the interface 
is inevitably a site for conflict, incompatibility and negotiation (Long 2004: 29). 
Knowledge is a key to these processes of conflict and negotiation, as development 
intervention “entails the interplay or confrontation of ‘expert’ versus ‘lay’ forms of 
knowledge, belief and value” (ibid: 30). Long argues that it is in the nature of 
intervention, even where framed in the language of participatory development, to carry 
with it implicit hierarchies of power, in which powerful intervening outsiders are 
posited against powerless objects of intervention (ibid: 31–32).  
From the centrality of knowledge to the social interface perspective arises also the 
centrality of discourse. The discourses that come to meet at the interface vary 
enormously in character. For instance, in northern Uganda influential discourses 
constructing the studied reality can be seen to range from professional humanitarian and 
development discourses to various local, ethnic, national, political, cultural, and 
religious discourses. As this multitude of discourses comes to meet at the interface, 
there emerge struggles over influence. In the process, particularly those discourses that 
are by nature more dominant, are challenged, endorsed or transformed (Long 2004: 31). 
Of particular interest for this study are the discourses on peace, conflict, development 
and emergency that arise in the context of northern Uganda. Among these discourses, 
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some claim a dominant status, for instance, what Finnström (2003) refers to as the 
official discourse concerning the LRA-conflict. 
A crucial theoretical foundation for this study is that development intervention has 
profound effects on social arenas, and that as Nordstrom (2001) notes, these effects are 
particularly accentuated when intervention occurs in a conflict situation: 
 The cultures each player brings to a war zone helps shape the very notions of what war 
is, what future political systems are possible, what peace is tolerable. The compendium 
of state and extra-state transactions configures the shape and character of the country, 
and the ways in which people, as a society, meet their basic needs. An “internal war” is 
a very “interstate” fact and international construction. It is a cultural hybrid. It is here 
we can most clearly see the intersections of local actors and transnational actualities, 
and cultural orientations are the product – created in the interactions of actors in the 
larger world of meaning and action. (Nordstrom 2001: 226–227) 
In addition to fruitful theoretical concepts, social interface analysis provides a bridge for 
this study between macro level theories of development and intervention and the micro 
level of relief and development activities in Kitgum. As seen in this study, development 
intervention is not a clear-cut mechanistic process or project with clearly defined 
boundaries. Rather, it is linked to previous interventions and embedded in arenas, 
frameworks and discourses ranging from the local to the international. Such a view of 
intervention suggests not only that the frameworks surrounding intervention affect 
intervention, but also that interventions affect the institutional frameworks and domains 
of knowledge and power in which they are embedded. Thus while the focus of a study 
may be on a particular social interface (such as that in northern Uganda), analysis must 
also take account of the broader arenas and frameworks surrounding these interfaces 
(Long 2004: 28).  
Part II introduces the theoretical, historical and political frameworks that surround 
conflict and intervention northern Uganda. It is suggested in chapter three that 
transformed humanitarianism is a framework of discourse and practice that is central to 
analysing intervention in northern Uganda. In chapter four I will analyse the arena for 
intervention in the region, i.e. the historical and political context of conflict. Once these 
frameworks and arenas have been analysed, it will be possible, in part III, to provide a 
contextualised analysis of the interactions of development intervention and conflict in 
northern Uganda.  
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 CONTEXT OF INTERVENTION IN NORTHERN UGANDA 
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3. Transformed humanitarianism 
The transformation of humanitarianism can be understood as a reaction to changes in 
the operating environment for humanitarian action in the post Cold War period. 
Particularly, transformed humanitarianism can be understood as a reaction to the 
increased complexity of the ‘new wars’ of this era (to be discussed further in section 
3.1). In this study, ‘transformed humanitarianism’ refers both to transformations in the 
ethics, policies and practices of humanitarianism in the post Cold War era, and to the 
theoretical, academic and practitioner debates surrounding these transformations (see 
for instance Barnett 2005, Bradbury 1998, Duffield 2001, Kaldor 1999). In this sense, 
what I refer to as transformed humanitarianism can be compared to Koponen’s (2004) 
notion of developmentalism, in that the new or transformed humanitarianism is not only 
“a project designed to transform the world”, as Barnett (2005: 733) describes 
humanitarianism after the Cold War, but an entire “complex of discourse and action” 
(Koponen 2004: 6). Adopting a social interface perspective, transformed 
humanitarianism is conceptualised as a framework into which the interaction of 
development intervention and conflict in northern Uganda is embedded.  
The following analysis of transformed humanitarianism is framed by Koponen’s (ibid.) 
notion of a “complex of discourse and action”. I suggest that the discourse of 
transformed humanitarianism is underpinned by the redefinition of the relationships 
between development and security (section 3.1), and between relief and development 
(section 3.2). After drawing together the core of transformed humanitarianism in section 
3.3, I will turn to action in the transformed humanitarianism complex, by tracing some 
of the practical manifestations of the transformation: expansion (section 3.4) and 
institutionalisation (section 3.5). 
Transformed humanitarianism is not an uncontested and solid conceptual whole: indeed, 
the new ideas and practices in the field of humanitarianism and development in the post 
Cold War era have given rise to fierce criticism. Central points of this criticism will be 
raised throughout the following chapter. It should be pointed out that this study does not 
attempt to provide a comprehensive introduction to the broad field of debate 
surrounding the transformation of humanitarianism.4 Rather, such themes in the 
                                                
4 The themes under discussion here have roots in some of the most central concepts of social 
science, such as development and conflict. The discussed transformation of humanitarianism is 
currently ongoing, as is the debate in academia over the precise nature of this transformation. 
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discussion have been selected that have been deemed relevant for analysing the case of 
northern Uganda. The selected discussions also provide conceptual tools with which to 
analyse the research material, and allow for the situation in northern Uganda to be 
drawn into a broader theoretical framework.  
3.1. The merging of development and security 
As the Cold War ended, humanitarian actors, politicians and academics alike were faced 
with an increasingly complex world. The dichotomies of the Cold War were replaced by 
new types of wars, in which it was often extremely difficult to say who exactly is 
fighting who and why. A common characteristic of these ‘new wars’ is that violence 
was specifically targeted at civilians, the violence being amply facilitated by the 
availability of weapons left over by the Cold War.5 As a result, not only conflicts, but 
also the adjacent humanitarian crises, were seen to be more complex than ever before 
(Callaghy et al. 2001, Duffield 2001, Kaldor 2001).  
In this context, it was considered imperative that humanitarianism be broadened in order 
to enable it to respond to the challenges posed by the new “complex political 
emergencies” (Barnett 2005, Degnbol-Martinussen & Engberg-Pedersen 2003).6 
Because the new wars no longer had clear frontlines between which humanitarians 
could position themselves as “neutral”, humanitarianism was particularly challenged to 
redefine its stance on neutrality (Duffield 2001: 80). In the operating environments 
created by new wars, humanitarian actors themselves became more vulnerable to 
violence than had previously been the case. As a result, the relations between 
humanitarian actors and both public and private security forces were renegotiated. 
While some actors, particularly the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 
and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), retained their strict stance on neutrality, the use 
of military or private security forces for the protection of relief activities became 
commonplace (See IASC 2001). 
                                                                                                                                          
For general accounts of the transformation of humanitarianism, see particularly Barnett 2005, 
Duffield 2001, and Hendrickson 1998. 
5 The conflict in northern Uganda can also be perceived of as such a ‘new war’, as will be 
discussed in detail in chapter three.  
6 Degnbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen (2003: 205) define a complex political emergency 
as an “emergency with political origins and multi-sectoral effects within nation-states and 
across borders, and involving multi-dimensional international responses.” 
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Duffield (2005) has noted that in descriptions of the new wars, an implicit dichotomy is 
created between the wars of the global North, and the wars of the underdeveloped 
margins of the global political system. Conflict in the peripheries is seen to arise from a 
failure of development, and from a regression to barbarity and irrationality (Bradbury 
1998, Kaldor 2001). New wars are seen as primarily confined to weak or failing states. 
Although in reality conflicts are increasingly networked in nature, they are commonly 
explained as stemming from the internal pathologies of these failed, and importantly, 
underdeveloped states. Duffield (2001) argues that the ultimate threat to stability in the 
post Cold War era is thus seen to be under-development, the tackling of which has 
become a security concern. This new conceptualisation is captured in the notion of 
wider or human security. 
In order to promote so-called wider human security, new modes of operation were 
created in the first part of the 1990s to enable engagement in the midst of the new wars. 
An explicit redefining of national sovereignty became necessary: the sovereignty of 
such peripheral states which caused a security threat to the global North became 
conditional on their promoting development and protecting human rights. People living 
amidst crises and disasters were now seen to have a right to humanitarian assistance, 
and the (so-called) international community was charged with the responsibility to 
provide that assistance, if and when national governments were incapable or unwilling 
to do so (Duffield 2001). The responsibility to protect and provide was already a 
elemental part of human rights and humanitarian thinking – what was new in this era 
that these principles were seen to belong to a much broader range of actors. This was 
given rise to by the complex humanitarian emergencies of the 1990s, and the unforeseen 
extent of media (particularly television) coverage they received (Suhrke 2002). 
The new moral imperatives and policy conceptualisations were epitomised in the 
creation of UN-led system-wide operations, in which developmental, humanitarian and 
military activities were integrated under a common mission. System-wide operations 
were underpinned by the principle of negotiated access, which came to be the guiding 
principal of the international humanitarian regime for the first half of the 1990s 
(Duffield 2001). The doctrinal change that facilitated the principle of negotiated access 
also facilitated the rise of the notion of internal protection, which was launched by the 
UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) as a comprehensive solution to the 
humanitarian crisis created by the Balkan war (Suhrke 2002). In what was argued to be 
a more effective and humane method for the populations concerned, yet what Suhrke 
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notes critics saw mainly as a method to restrict refugee flows to Western Europe, 
humanitarian actors attempted to protect and assist victims of conflict within the conflict 
area. Through the 1990s and the beginning of the 21st Century, the notion and practices 
of “internal protection” have been systematised, and the mandate of the UNHCR has 
been broadened to include internally displaced populations (Weiss 2003). 
Duffield (2001) analyses the radically altered conceptions of development and security 
as part of the creation of a new mode of global liberal governance. At the core of this 
governance model is the perception that relief, development and security are interlinked. 
As intervening in one without addressing the others is seen as fruitless, an unforeseen 
breadth of intervention into borderland societies has been implicitly legitimised. This 
all-encompassing intervention is given to new humanitarianism, or as I call it in this 
study, transformed humanitarianism. The radicalised development agenda put forth by 
the linking of relief, development and security offered humanitarian and development 
organisations with possibilities to reinvent themselves into newly emerging aid niches: 
post-conflict reconstruction and peace building on the one hand, and the niche provided 
for by the relief–development continuum on the other (Suhrke 2002: 31). It is to this 
continuum that we now turn.  
3.2. The relief–development continuum  
In addition to the context of the new wars, the rise of transformed humanitarianism can 
be related to the discrediting of conventional development that began in the 1980s. 
According to Degnbol-Martinussen & Engberg-Pedersen (2003: 199) it was 
symptomatic of this discrediting and of the anti-state atmosphere of the 1980’s that 
funding that had originally gone to state-led bilateral development projects was 
increasingly directed to non-governmental organisations, which as a result grew in 
number and in size. As the developmentalist project became increasingly questioned, 
funding also began to be moved into humanitarian assistance and away from classical 
development projects, which were now condemned for corruption and for failing to 
create substantial changes in developing countries. 
While the developmentalist notions of previous decades came under fierce criticism, 
traditional relief assistance came under fire for its failure to nurture long-term 
development. Due to the explicit wish of neutrality-oriented humanitarianism to steer 
clear of questions of legitimacy, much of humanitarian action had focused on providing 
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immediate life-saving assistance, while disregarding capacity-building (Barrow & 
Jennings 2001: 13). After the mid-1980’s disillusionment with the tendency towards 
“spoon-feeding” spread, and humanitarian discourse became filtered with concerned 
talk of aid nurturing a “dependency syndrome” among recipients of relief (Degnbol-
Martinussen &Engberg-Pedersen 2003:199).  
It was this niche that the notion of a relief–development continuum hit spot-on in the 
mid-1990s. The continuum model seemed to provide answers to the dilemmas in both 
the relief and the development industries, by encouraging “organisations from both ends 
of the spectrum to take on new tasks to ensure a smooth transition from one to the 
other” (Suhrke 2002: 21). The discussion on linking relief and development, and shifts 
in donors’ funding priorities, led to a two-way movement in the 1990s. On one hand, 
humanitarian organisations, which had previously been involved mainly in short-term 
relief, began to incorporate long-term development objectives into their work, and to 
focus on building local capacity in order to decrease the vulnerability of assisted 
populations to future emergencies (Degnbol-Martinussen &Engberg-Pedersen 2003: 
200, Juma & Suhrke 2002). On the other hand, NGOs that had previously been 
occupied with long-term development projects in non-crisis situations moved more into 
the sphere of humanitarian relief (Barrow & Jennings 2001). 
The continuum model has been seen to provide many important improvements to the 
field of emergency relief, yet it has also been criticised on a number of accounts. On a 
critical note, Bradbury (1998) has pointed out that the emphasis on a relief–
development continuum in acute crisis situations, and the related mantra of “local 
solutions to local problems”, (ibid: 328) has intensified the internalisation of Africa’s 
crises. In the name of sustainable development, emergency relief is withdrawn in 
situations in which the affected populations are simply incapable of providing for their 
own basic needs, so that implicitly, “blame for the causes of conflict, of poverty, or 
marginalisation [is] laid at the feet of the poor and marginalised” (ibid: 335). This, 
Bradbury argues, epitomises the normalising of crisis in Africa. While talking the talk 
of transformed humanitarianism – of the virtues of adopting a holistic approach to crises 
– the international community has in fact agreed to accommodate high levels of human 
suffering in geopolitically insignificant crisis regions in Africa.  
In order to provide a synthesis of discourse in transformed humanitarianism; on the 
relief–development continuum and the merging of security and development; I will in 
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section 3.3 sketch out what I consider to be the core of transformed humanitarianism, 
before turning to action in the transformed humanitarianism complex in sections 3.4 
and 3.5. 
3.3. The core of transformed humanitarianism 
I suggest that the notion of transformed humanitarianism can be most clearly 
conceptualised through the notion of complex political emergencies. For the purposes of 
this study, complex political emergencies (including that in northern Uganda) can be 
conceptualised as situations in which three sets of problems or challenges occur 
simultaneously and in connection to one another in a specific location:7 1) a violent 
conflict, 2) general extreme underdevelopment (e.g. poverty, ill health, lack of 
education) and 3) an acute emergency situation (e.g. destroyed physical and 
administrative infrastructure, population displacement, emergency levels of 
malnutrition) (figure 1).  
   
conflict  security 
 à intervention à 
under-development  emergency development relief
  
Figure 1. Model of a complex political emergency and its transformation 
   
This ideal-type model of a complex emergency calls for three types of interventions, 
each aiming to transform the three corners of the triangle: conflict is to be replaced with 
security, under-development with development, and the emergency is to be relieved so 
as to return to a state of “normalcy”. Means to achieve security can range from armed 
military intervention to peace-building and conflict resolution. General under-
development can be addressed through a broad range of developmental activities (e.g. 
macroeconomic reforms, microfinance, government- and NGO-led development 
                                                
7 This does not mean to say that the reasons for such emergencies are in any way internalised to 
the specific arena in which the emergencies are in practice “played out”. To the contrary, as was 
mentioned in section 3.1, and as will be shown for the case of northern Uganda in chapter four, 
complex political emergencies are inseparably linked to regional and global dynamics and 
networks.  
△ 
 
△
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projects). Thirdly, the emergency is tackled through relief assistance. The complex 
political emergency is thus replaced with a radically transformed social reality (see 
figure 1). 
At the core of the transformation of humanitarianism is the perception that all three 
corners of this triangle are inseparably interrelated. It is the task of global liberal 
governance, epitomised in transformed humanitarianism, to address and transform all 
three corners of social reality in complex political emergencies. I will return to analyse 
this model in light of the northern Ugandan case in chapter seven. Now we will turn to 
how transformed humanitarianism has manifested in practice.  
3.4. Expansion and competition in the humanitarian regime 
Beginning from the early 1990s, the humanitarian field expanded rapidly: funding 
increased, the number of organisations involved in humanitarian action increased, the 
number of people employed by these organisations increased, and the field became 
increasingly bureaucratised and standardised. Indeed, as Barnett (2005: 729) puts it, “in 
the 1990s humanitarianism became a field.” These changes are a defining aspect of 
transformed humanitarianism. 
Substantial changes in funding for aid began already in the 1980s. Encouraged by an 
increase of funding to non-state actors in development, the NGO sector entered a stage 
of rapid growth, which culminated in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War (Barrow 
& Jennings 2001). Also since the 1980s, official budgets for humanitarian assistance 
have grown markedly (Suhrke 2002). Barnett (2005) has pointed out that as official 
funding for humanitarian assistance has increased, organisations have become 
increasingly vulnerable to external control through subtle coordination mechanisms. He 
argues that the marked shift from multilateral humanitarian funding to bilateral and 
earmarked humanitarian assistance since the 1980s implies that “state interests, rather 
than the humanitarian principle of relief based on need, increasingly drives funding 
decisions” (ibid: 731).  
Part of the transformation of humanitarianism has been the transformation of the 
humanitarian profession. While the number of people employed by the humanitarian 
enterprise has grown, contracts have generally become shorter. Suhrke (2002) notes that 
this is a significant change from the golden era of development projects, when 
humanitarians and development expatriates often lived in the “field” for long periods of 
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time, becoming familiar with the culture and language of that country. Although 
humanitarian workers today may have extensive training in humanitarian action, they 
are often not familiar with the specific contexts in which they work. From a social 
interface perspective it is clear that this has consequences for how interventions interact 
with the intervened contexts.  
As the humanitarian system expanded, “the power of presence became a major source 
of rivalry” (Suhrke 2002: 21), leading some to suggest that in the current system, 
“humanitarian organizations are rewarded for being seen rather than for saving lives ” 
(Barnett 2005: 732). All in all, the moral ideals of humanitarianism have been under the 
increasing pressure of less grand realities. The drive for institutional survival pushes 
organisations to focus on work that is geopolitically relevant in the eyes of the Northern 
donor community, or glamorous and interesting from the perspective of international 
media. The pressures created by the need to be seen, and the need to show measurable 
results, have been seen to have led to the erosion of humanitarian principles (Barnett 
2005). This debate has been particularly heated around the humanitarian principles of 
neutrality and independence, which critics say are undermined when security and 
development objectives are merged, and when military and humanitarian actors are 
engaged in close cooperation (Hendrickson 1998). 
3.5. Standardisation and consequentialist ethics 
Transformed humanitarianism is embodied not only in the expansion of the 
humanitarian enterprise, but in the institutionalisation that has followed this expansion. 
Indeed, the 1990s and the beginning of the 21st Century have been characterised by the 
proliferation of various standardisation and coordination mechanisms for both 
humanitarian and development assistance. Among the most important such 
developments have been the creation of the United Nations Office for the Coordination 
of Humanitarian Affairs in 1997, and on the other hand, the launching of the Sphere 
Project, in which NGOs and the ICRC and Red Cross / Red Crescent societies have set 
minimum standards for humanitarian assistance (Suhrke 2002, The Sphere Project 
2004).  
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This institutionalisation, particularly the creation of guidelines and codes of conduct for 
humanitarian assistance, can be understood from a number of perspectives.8 First, 
standardisation has in part been a natural reaction to the growing number of actors in the 
field. Improved coordination mechanisms became necessary as crisis areas were flooded 
by unforeseen numbers of actors, particularly as their mandates were not as clear-cut as 
were those of older, more established humanitarian actors (Barnett 2005). 
Second, institutionalisation has been a reaction to demands for quantifiable results. 
After the perceived failure of conventional development models in the 1980s, donors 
increasingly expected to see immediate and tangible results. Ironically, while the long-
term sustainability of traditional relief was at this time also being questioned, the 
demand for immediately measurable effects implicitly discouraged agencies from taking 
risks and implementing more long-term projects (Suhrke 2002: 34).  
Third, standardisation and coordination can be seen as ways in which the humanitarian 
regime has adapted to and aimed to control the increased complexity of the 
environments in which humanitarian action is implemented (Anderson 1999, Duffield 
2001). Engagement in conflict situations and the fact that in the new wars humanitarians 
were themselves being targeted by fighting parties, called for common principles on 
best practice to be developed. Fourth, institutionalisation has been a reaction to criticism 
concerning the unintended impacts of aid – criticism that is partly due to 
humanitarianism’s engagement in increasingly complex operating environments 
(Anderson 1999, Barnett 2005, Duffield 2001). 
In the course of the 1990’s, excitement over the possibilities offered by the new notions 
of the relief–development–security triangle were rapidly replaced by fears that the new 
humanitarianism was becoming a fig leaf for the lack of political engagement. Such 
fears were heightened in the aftermaths of the crises in Yugoslavia and Rwanda, where 
not only did the international community fail to protect victims of conflict, but 
humanitarian aid also became deeply entangled with the realities of war (Suhrke 2002: 
27–31). 
                                                
8 See for instance the Inter-Agency Standing Committee’s “Use of Military or Armed Escorts for 
Humanitarian Convoys Discussion Paper on Non-Binding Guidelines” (IASC 2001), “Saving 
Lives Together: A Framework for Improving Security Arrangements Among IGOs, NGOs and 
UN in the Field” (IASC 2006), “The Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief” (ICRC 1995), and “Guiding Principles on 
Internal Displacement” (UNOCHA 2002). 
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Partially in response to such fears and the entanglement of aid with conflict, various 
toolkits have been developed with which to analyse the negative impacts of 
humanitarian and development assistance. The most influential has been the “Do No 
Harm” approach pioneered by Mary B. Anderson (1999). Though the idea that aid could 
induce conflict can be seen as a consequence of humanitarianism’s engagement with 
new wars, the idea is also one of the predecessors of the very essence of transformed 
humanitarianism: since it is believed that aid can contribute to conflict, it logically 
follows that aid can also contribute to peace. The belief in the peace-inducing capacity 
of development intervention is one of the fundamental building blocks of how relations 
of security and development are conceptualised in the 21st Century (Duffield 2001). 
On a critical note, it has been argued that the obsession with quantifiable results and the 
idea of “Do No Harm” have led to the adoption of consequentialist ethics in place of 
previous ethical frameworks: humanitarian assistance is no longer granted on the basis 
of immediate need, but can be withheld on the basis of fears of immediate or long-term 
negative effects (Barnett 2005, Duffield 2001). As Duffield (2005) notes, aid to all 
societies in conflict has become conditional. Transformed humanitarianism has turned a 
full 180 degrees from the principle-driven humanitarianism of the immediate post Cold 
War era: civilians amid conflict are no longer perceived to have an unconditional right 
to humanitarian assistance – nor is the international community laden with a 
responsibility to assist. Instead, the rights of individuals and populations are 
subordinated to other considerations. Although it may arguably be in the interests of 
affected populations that assistance is at times withheld in order to avoid long-term 
negative impacts, it is possible that in fact the true reasons for the withholding of aid lie 
in the realm of the security or other political interests of the donor community 
(Hendrickson 1998). 
Questions have also been raised regarding what the standardised tools for the planning 
and evaluation of humanitarian assistance actually measure.  
[C]an such nonquantifiable values as compassion be operationalised when attempting to 
determine the effectiveness of humanitarian action? Is it possible to quantify… the fear 
and anxiety among people in desperate situations? If they are omitted from the model, 
the model might redefine how humanitarian agencies think about impact, downgrading 
basic ethical motives in favour of measurable outcomes. If the measurable variables are 
no longer dependent on the subjective needs of the “beneficiaries”, will they even be 
consulted? (Barnett 2005: 733) 
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The focus of standardising tools in transformed humanitarianism is centred on the 
practical implementation of humanitarian assistance. Yet some of the most important 
long-term impacts of development intervention, such as intervention’s impact on the 
collective identities of intervened populations, cannot be quantified by universally 
standardised models, as will be argued in chapter six. It is perhaps unrealistic to assume 
or demand that a machine as massive and complex as the humanitarian enterprise of the 
21st Century could possibly be capable of reflecting on such impacts. Yet it is 
reasonable to ask whether the populations targeted by humanitarian assistance really 
benefit from the trading of context-specificity and long-term commitment for increased 
operational capacity, efficiency and standardisation.9 
Operational capacity, efficiency and standardisation are characteristics which are 
perhaps most naturally associated with the military. Indeed it could be said that part of 
the merging of security and development in transformed humanitarianism (see section 
3.1) has been that the language, logic, and operational systems of humanitarianism have 
become increasingly similar to those of the military. The need to develop the military 
capacity of so-called “rapid deployment forces” has been a core element of Western 
security political discussion and practice in recent years. In parallel, I find it 
illuminating to think of the practical manifestation of transformed humanitarianism as 
“rapid deployment humanitarianism”. 
Conclusion 
This study is an attempt at methodological developmentalism: it aims to understand 
what the developmentalist complex in northern Uganda is producing. The notion of 
social interface frames this analysis, and from it is derived the view that development 
intervention in northern Uganda is embedded in the framework of transformed 
humanitarianism, and in multiple arenas ranging from the local to the global. These 
arenas, i.e. the context of conflict in northern Uganda, will be introduced in chapter 
four.  
                                                
9 On the other hand, it must be noted that many humanitarian actors, both 
organisations and individuals, have not adapted to the pressures of transformed 
humanitarianism, nor can they be characterised as ignorant of the critical questions 
brought up in this discussion.  
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The understanding that intervention impacts on conflict is an inherent part of 
transformed humanitarianism. Each corner of the relief–development–security triangle, 
which is taken as a representation of social reality in complex political emergencies, 
affects the others. Thus it is impossible for any type of intervention in a complex 
political emergency not to affect conflict. This realisation has led the humanitarian 
community to develop tools with which it is believed the negative, conflict-inducing 
impacts of intervention can be controlled and minimised. The development of such 
tools is part of the over-all drive towards standardisation and institutionalisation in the 
humanitarian regime. 
In order for humanitarianism to launch into action as quickly and effectively as possible 
in the face of crisis, the procedures with which negative unintended impacts are 
assessed and minimised must be non-context-specific and rapidly adjustable to any 
crisis situation. Although the “Do No harm” approach (Anderson 1999) for instance 
emphasises the importance of local knowledge, it is against the very nature of ”rapid 
deployment humanitarianism” to be interested in local specificities. I argue that 
standardisation in humanitarianism, including the creation of package toolkits for 
conflict impact assessment and minimisation, enforce the appearance of local contexts 
as mechanical entities that react to interventions in predictable and controllable ways. In 
the following chapters, based on an analysis of the interactions of development 
intervention and conflict in northern Uganda, I will suggest that this appearance is 
misled and false.  
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4. The context of conflict in northern Uganda 
The conflict in northern Uganda between the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and the 
Ugandan government can be conceptualised in a number of ways: as a product of 
Ugandan history, as a side-product of the conflict between Uganda and Sudan, or as a 
crazy millenarian rebel war with no intelligible cause. But the LRA conflict cannot be 
understood without examination of all its dimensions: historical, regional, ethno- and 
geopolitical as well as religious and spiritual. Explaining the northern Ugandan conflict 
is, however, not the purpose of this study.10  
The aim of this chapter is to look at “important historical, colonial and political 
developments that have preceded the current situation in Acholiland” (Finnström 2003: 
36) particularly insofar as they are relevant for understanding the interaction of 
development intervention and conflict in northern Uganda. To use Long’s (2004) term, 
the historical and political context of conflict in northern Uganda is the arena in which 
development intervention in northern Uganda is embedded. Intervention cannot be 
separated from this arena: rather, intervention in northern Uganda is deeply entangled 
with the context of conflict. In this context, it can be argued that to perceive intervention 
as neutral, means to risk missing chances for development to further peace, while 
increasing the risk that well-meant interventions in fact promote conflict (Anderson 
1999). Allen (2006), Finnström (2003, 2006b) and Leopold (2001) argue that many 
humanitarian and development workers in Acholiland are unfamiliar with (or 
uninterested in) the history and broader context of the LRA conflict. I also noted this in 
my fieldwork, and will later argue that this ignorance has affected the ways in which 
development intervention has been carried out in the conflict-affected areas in northern 
Uganda. 
Reports on the conflict in northern Uganda often begin with a sterile historical timeline 
that traces the highs and lows of violence in the area, listing dates for the beginnings 
and ends of failed peace talks. Such an approach lends itself to simplistic 
(mis)understandings of the situation, turning events into curiosities ripped from their 
contexts and stripped free of their deeper meanings. With these words of warning in 
mind, I will begin this chapter by drawing an outline of the history of the LRA conflict 
                                                
10 Analyses of the immediate and root causes of the conflict have been given in a number of 
studies, of which Behrend (1999), Branch (2007), Finnström (2003, 2006a), Otunnu (2002), 
Prunier (2004) and Van Acker (2004) are the primary sources for this chapter.  
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in Uganda by beginning at the roots of the war, in colonial Uganda. While looking into 
the history of the conflict, I will draw attention to the parallels between historical 
interventions in northern Uganda and interventions in the 21st Century. 
After the historical context has been described, it will be intersected with an analysis of 
the geopolitical layers of the conflict system. For the sake of conceptual clarity, I follow 
Prunier’s (2004: 363) aim to “sort out what belongs to global geopolitical trends as 
opposed to what emerges from the local ethnopolitical situation”. It should, however, be 
constantly kept in mind that in new wars and complex humanitarian emergencies, it is 
artificial to separate the local from the global intersect, since these intersect in myriad 
ways (Callaghy et al. 2001, Nordstrom 2004).  
4.1. Historical roots of the conflict 
Finnström (2006a: 202) recognises two strands in the debate regarding where the LRA-
conflict arises. In the first strand, Yoweri Museveni’s takeover and the subsequent wish 
of Northern Ugandan’s to regain power is seen as the root of the conflict. This strand of 
thinking often goes together with arguments of ethnicity as a fundamental element of 
war in the North. The second strand is a contextualised version of the first: the conflict 
is understood as stemming from a history of northern Uganda’s structural position in 
Uganda.  
4.1.1. Colonial era 
Following either strand of thought, the conflict can be conceptualised as a chapter of a 
history reaching back to the colonial era, during which the groundwork for the 
ethnopolitical and correspondingly, the socioeconomic structure of Uganda was laid 
down (Otunnu 2002). In 1862, John Hanning Speke became the first British explorer to 
reach the area that what was later codified by colonial authorities under the name of 
Acholiland (now Gulu, Kitgum and Pader districts). A few years later, stations were 
established in the area by another explorer, Samuel Baker. Finnström sees Baker’s and 
Speke’s travelogues “as a sad prelude to the violence committed today in Acholiland” 
(2003: 85). The events described in the explorers’ notes were elemental to the creation 
of a conflict environment in northern Uganda that has changed through the years, and 
persisted to this day.  
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Acholiland was included in the Ugandan Protectorate (which was formed in 1894) in 
1989 (Finnström 2003: 91). The explorers of the nineteenth century, and later, British 
colonial authorities, described the Acholi as a ‘fighting race’ with ‘warlike instincts’ 
(Lloyd 1907, quoted in Finnström 2006a). Ironically, the Acholi were the ones to be 
denoted warlike – not the colonialists, nor the Baganda, whose kingdom had attained 
political supremacy in the region due to their overwhelming military capacity 
(Finnström 2003: 116). The label the Acholis had been given was put to practice at the 
beginning of the First World War, when numerous Acholi men were recruited to the 
King’s African Rifles. Throughout the colonial period, Northern Ugandans were mainly 
trained as soldiers, while people from southern and central Uganda were recruited and 
educated for the civil service (Finnström 2003: 96, Otunnu 2002).11  
Throughout the process of colonisation “Europeans spoke for Africans… it was a one-
sided appropriation of meaning, dictated by imperial agents” (Finnström 2003: 84). The 
colonialists decided what the Acholi were like, what they were good at (= war) and 
what they wanted (= organised government under the direction of Britain). Justification 
for the right to do so was deep-rooted, exemplified by the British translating the name 
by which they were called, wazungu, as “white or wise men” (Speke 1864, quoted in 
Finnström 2003: 89). At the very centre of the white man’s “wisdom” was his 
knowledge of development, a knowledge that was enforced upon local leaders that were 
recruited as agents for Britain’s system of decentralised despotism (Mamdani 1996).12 
The words of an Acholi chief almost 60 years ago reverberates with themes that were 
repeatedly brought up in my fieldwork interviews: 
“You see we must rule by fear… The people are lazy, they do not realise what good 
things the Government is doing for them. How can Acholi progress unless we grow 
cotton, pay our taxes and dig latrines, as the Government wants us to do?” (Girling 
1960, as quoted in Finnström 2003: 68) 
                                                
11 On a very different note, Branch (2007: 109) cites sources that indicate that the Acholi were in 
fact the second largest ethnic group in colonial Uganda’s civil service. While Branch does not 
deny that the Acholi were “vastly overrepresented in the military and police both pre- and 
post-independence” (2007: 123), the fact that they also had a large presence in the civil service is 
important, since it highlights post-independence resentment towards the North in other parts of 
Uganda. According to Branch (2007: 109), the Acholi had the highest employment rate of all 
Ugandan peoples during the colonial era. This statement is in stark contradiction with the 
picture often given, for instance, in a number of my fieldwork interviews, of the general ill 
treatment of northern Uganda during the colonial era.  
12 I find Mamdani’s term, though less politically correct, more accurate than the traditional 
indirect rule. 
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In August 2006, cotton-growing schemes were being encouraged for the benefit of the 
displaced Acholi by development interveners, and many of the humanitarian personnel I 
interviewed spoke of the displaced population’s laziness and unwillingness to take part 
in development projects. The difference between the colonial system of indirect rule and 
the system in northern Uganda in the 21st century is not so much in the nature of the 
regime, but its composition. Now local leaders are incorporated into the northern 
Ugandan branch of the international humanitarian regime, which is headed by the 
Government of Uganda in cooperation with International Financial Organisations (IFI), 
donor countries, the United Nations, and international development and humanitarian 
organisations. Although today community ownership and participation are emphasised 
as key elements of development intervention, such rhetorical emphases do not 
automatically materialise into reality, and they do not outweigh the contradicting 
attitudes and power relations that are constructed through intervention processes.  
The violence inherent in the process of colonisation and colonial rule “was legitimated 
morally, in terms of a civilising project” (Finnström 2003: 90). Today’s directly and 
structurally violent interventions in northern Uganda are legitimised on similar 
premises. The Ugandan army’s actions, promoted as civilian protection measures, are 
also an effort to put the LRA, who are characterised as crazy, uncivilised Northern 
Ugandans, into order. Similarly, development intervention, which I argue in this study 
inadvertently contributes to the reinforcement of a structure of conflict in northern 
Uganda, does so based on humanitarian principles, while aiming and claiming to 
develop Acholiland.  
Britain’s violent methods of colonisation, coupled with colonial policies, had a massive 
impact on Uganda, with long-term consequences for the country and its people (Allen 
2006, Finnström 2003, Otunnu 2002).13 During the colonial era society was militarised 
particularly in northern Uganda, ethnic divisions were highlighted, and socioeconomic 
divides were drawn throughout the country along ethnic and regional lines. Colonialism 
did not create ethnicity; instead, to use Finnström’s (2003: 52) terms, it ‘reified’ or 
‘codified’ existing identities, particularly at the boundaries between different ethnic 
groups. Ethnicity, which had been a relative and flexible attribute, became more rigid 
and thus more prone to be turned into a source of conflict.  
                                                
13 See particularly Finnström 2003 for a thorough account.  
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The colonial authorities’ understanding of ethnicity was partially based on what they 
saw and how they understood it, but partially ethnicity was also purposefully moulded 
in order to achieve particular goals. As part of typical colonial divide-and-rule tactics 
(Van Acker 2004: 341), the colonial government needed hierarchical structures and 
divisions through which it could control its Ugandan protectorate: “The colonial view 
that northerners were ‘martial’ people was simply racist hogwash; the simple truth was 
that northern peasants were put in uniform to crush the resistance of the southern 
peasantry” (Mamdani 1983: 117). Unsurprisingly, these historical sentiments are 
mirrored today in the widespread suspicions among the Acholi that the Government of 
Uganda has allowed for the conflict to continue in order to subordinate northern 
Ugandans under the control of southerners (Branch 2007, Finnström 2003).14 
4.1.2. Conflict in independent Uganda 
Uganda gained independence from Britain in 1962. The king of Buganda, the Kabaka, 
was instated as the first president, with Milton Obote as the Prime Minister. Obote, who 
was from Lango, a sub-region bordering Acholiland, seized power in 1966. In the 
middle of the Cold War, Obote’s gradual leaning to the political left worried the West, 
particularly Israel and Britain, both of which had a hand in assisting the takeover of the 
General Idi Amin in 1971 (Finnström 2003, Otunnu 2002).  
The socioeconomic and ethnic divisions that were exacerbated during the colonial 
period were reified even further after Uganda gained independence, particularly through 
the multiparty system that was introduced at independence (Allen 2006: 28). During 
independence the militarization of Ugandan society continued, a point Van Acker 
(2004: 338) sees as one of the root causes of the conflict in Acholiland. The myth that 
people from northern Uganda were more militaristic than other Ugandans continued to 
be turned into lived reality by way of the recruitment policies of independent Uganda’s 
                                                
14 Finnström (2003) argues that scholars studying Uganda have not sufficiently questioned 
ethnic stereotypes like that of the Acholi as warlike. On the contrary, research has often tended 
to reinforce such stereotypes. As the view of Acholi as warlike is one of the factors belying a 20-
year-long conflict that has caused massive human suffering, Finnström’s finding is surprising 
and in some way even disappointing. To me, the case speaks of how difficult it is, even for 
academia, to question realities that are presented by powerful actors such as the Ugandan 
government as unquestionable. In my mind it also raises questions of how autonomous 
academia is, and can be, in a context of conflict. For instance, Finnström’s views on the conflict 
and the role of humanitarian assistance in it, were not in line with the views of the Ugandan 
government, many aid agency representatives, or as Finnström (2003: 96) describes, 
representatives of the Swedish embassy in Uganda. One can’t help but wonder how many 
research permits are granted to scholars with such critical views.  
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leaders. According to Allen and Finnström, Milton Obote, who ruled the country in 
1966-1971 and again in 1980-85 (terms commonly referred to as Obote I and Obote II), 
favoured the northern Langi, and to a lesser degree, the Acholi. Idi Amin, who ruled 
from 1971 to 1979, recruited mainly in the West Nile, and particularly from his own 
ethnic group, the Kakwa. Although during Museveni’s reign people from all parts of the 
country have been conscripted, the top positions in the Uganda People’s Defence Force 
(UPDF) are predominantly in the hands of people from Museveni’s tribe, the Bahima 
(Allen 2006: 28–29, Finnström 2003: 96–97).  
During Amin’s notoriously violent reign, numerous Acholi army personnel, scholars, 
politicians and religious leaders were killed. In 1972 Amin ordered Acholi and Langi 
soldiers back to barracks, where they were massacred. Van Acker (2004) describes the 
betrayal as an episode that stands out among those that have had a lasting effect on 
Acholi collective memory. The event was called to the Acholis’ mind in 1986 when a 
similar order was given by the newly self-instated president Yoweri Museveni (Allen 
2006, Branch 2007). 
4.1.3. Obote II and the Bush War 
As violence increased during Obote’s second term in power, discontent grew in many 
parts of the country. In 1981 Yoweri Museveni and the National Resistance 
Movement/Army (NRM/A) rose against Obote in a guerrilla war that was later named 
the Bush War. During the war, which was fought mainly in an area north of Kampala 
called the Luwero triangle, Obote’s United National Liberation Army (UNLA) soldiers, 
the majority of whom were Lango and Acholi, subjected accused NRM/A supporters to 
horrendous violence. Partly due to this violence, the NRM/A received extensive support 
in Central Uganda from civilians who were tired with Obote’s violent exclusionary 
politics. Obote engaged in ethnic propaganda to aid his war: groups that were accused 
of supporting Museveni were persecuted, which led to increasing support for the 
NRM/A. Animosity between the fighting parties was deliberately incited by both sides. 
During the Bush War, most Central Ugandans viewed the war as a war against 
Northerners, and not as the war for democracy that Museveni claimed he was fighting 
(Finnström 2003: 108), and after the takeover, Museveni’s administration “engaged in 
active anti-northern propaganda” (Otunnu 2002).  
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Branch (2007) calls attention to this shift in political rhetoric during the Bush War. In 
order to gain support among the peasantry in Luwero, Museveni had to create a political 
programme and rhetoric that surpassed ethnic tensions that existed between groups in 
the region. Museveni’s promise of democratisation at the grassroots was coupled with 
his promise of revolution at the national level. This second promise came to be framed 
in terms of a conflict between the “Nilotic” north and the “Bantu” south of Uganda 
(ibid: 131). The fact that most of Obote’s soldiers in Luwero were from northern 
Uganda was perhaps more vital to cementing this view among the peasantry than actual 
active propaganda by Museveni. In any case, Southerners’ resentment towards 
Northerners intensified during the Bush War, and the brunt of this resentment was 
channelled specifically at the Acholi (ibid: 141).  
Resentment towards the Acholi was bolstered in 1985, when acting upon the anger of 
Acholi UNLA soldiers who felt they were being subjected to the worst of the fighting in 
Luwero, two senior Acholi officers in the Ugandan army ousted Obote. Tito Okello, 
who led the new government, attempted to bring together the different armed groups in 
the country in order to commence a process of national reconciliation. Okello’s aim to 
include pro-Amin groups in negotiations created mistrust, and weakened the already 
vulnerable new government. A peace deal was struck between Okello and the NRM/A 
under the leadership of Kenyan president Daniel Arap Moi. Museveni ignored the peace 
agreement, continued fighting, and eventually captured Kampala in 1986. (See Allen 
2006, Branch 2007, Finnström 2003).  
The forsaken peace deal, which northern Ugandans commonly refer to as the Nairobi 
Peace Jokes, became a central element of the Acholi’s collective mistrust towards 
Museveni (Allen 2006, Behrend 1999, Van Acker 2004). Many people I spoke with in 
Uganda referred to the Nairobi peace talks as a reason for their mistrust in the success 
of any peace talks between the LRA and the government. “Museveni has stepped back 
on a peace agreement before. What’s going to stop him from doing it again?” was the 
typical argument. The “peace jokes” -title has been designated to each of the attempted 
peace talk processes, and has commonly been used in public discussion about the peace 
talks held under the leadership of the Southern Sudanese government, which began in 
the Southern Sudanese city of Juba in July 2006. (See for instance the New Vision and 
the Daily Monitor in June–August 2006). 
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4.1.4. Consolidating the NRM/A regime 
A number of rebel groups sprung up in different parts of Uganda in response to the 
takeover of Yoweri Museveni and the NRM/A in 1986. Instead of ending conflict, the 
NRM/A takeover caused conflict to relocate: “The battle zone shifted location, from 
central Uganda towards the north and the country’s other peripheries” (Finnström 2003: 
103). Up to 27 anti-Museveni rebel groups within are reported to have sprung up in the 
first two years of the takeover (Bond and Vincent 2002, quoted in Finnström 2006a). 
The most notable of these, all originating in the North, were the People’s Democratic 
Army (UPDA), the Holy Spirit Movement/Army (HSM/A) lead by Alice Lakwena, and 
later, Joseph Kony’s Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). I will discuss these in more detail 
in the chapter on conflict within Acholi, because although directed also at Museveni’s 
regime, the rebel movements cannot be understood without considering internal conflict 
in Acholiland. 
Why so many armed groups rose to resist Museveni’s NRM/A has much to do with 
Ugandan ethnopolitics. Museveni was the first president since 1966 who was not from 
the northern regions. Many of those who were accustomed to power were hard put to 
accept their loss of it, although Otunnu (2002) claims the Acholi “largely came to terms 
with the NRA victory” and turned to violence only after the NRM/A started it’s attack 
on Acholi. Overall, Museveni inherited a country riveted with ethnic and socioeconomic 
divisions; divisions his NRM/A had had a part in exacerbating. Uganda was traumatised 
by decades of violence, and the country was still seething with conflict. A triggering 
factor for discontent was the fresh memory of the Nairobi peace talks, which 
Northerners considered to have been a blatant betrayal. Cultural and existential factors 
also influenced emerging conflict – these I will return to in the discussion on the 
HSM/A and the LRA.  
Museveni’s effort to consolidate the new regime was a two-pronged process that 
combined military force with external consolidation through donor support (see section 
4.5). A few months after seizing power, Museveni sent his army to northern Uganda. 
The NRM/A soldiers, who during the Bush War had been considered a well-disciplined 
force, changed approach on arrival to the region from where most of their former army 
enemies had originated. Wanton violence towards civilians ensued, and the army was 
accused of stealing Acholi cattle. The NRM/A’s cattle raids acted as a prelude to an 
intensification of cattle raiding in Acholi by neighbouring Karamajong pastoralists 
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(Allen 2006, Finnström 2003). Interpretations differ concerning whether the NRA was 
acting intentionally in paving the way for Karamajong raids. For instance Ogenga 
(2002) finds it likely that the NRA was deliberately acting to undermine Acholi 
livelihoods. This was also argued by a number of the Acholi relief and development 
workers I interviewed in Kitgum.  
Whether or not Museveni’s deliberate intention at the time was to undermine the 
prospects of the Acholi people, the violence with which Museveni’s soldiers confronted 
the Acholi after the 1986 coup, coupled with the cattle raids and the violence the 
Ugandan army has committed against civilians since that time, has ensured that most 
Acholis deeply mistrust Museveni and his army (Branch 2007).  
4.2. Conflict within Acholi  
The local aspect of the conflict in northern Uganda is misrepresented in the literature in 
two different ways. Some situate the conflict exclusively within Acholiland, claiming 
there’s nothing anyone else can do about it – that it’s an Acholi problem that only the 
Acholi can solve. Another misrepresentation takes place when the national and even 
international aspects of the conflict are recognised, but the local aspect is portrayed in a 
simplified and often distorted manner. From the point of view of conflict resolution or 
development intervention in the conflict, both misrepresentations are potentially 
harmful.  
The LRA has over the years repeatedly claimed that it is fighting for the Acholi people. 
This claim is often countered by arguing that as long as the LRA is targeting Acholi 
civilians it cannot be considered to be their legitimate representative. This was also the 
view of most of the internally displaced women I interviewed in Kitgum. Yet if the 
debate over the validity of the LRA’s claims is taken no further, it is inconclusive and 
rather useless, particularly since there has been a varying amount of local support for 
the rebels throughout the conflict (Branch 2003, Finnström 2006a). Saying, as the head 
of an INGO in Uganda told me, that “there’s nothing else to it, they’re just crazy”, is no 
more helpful. A much deeper analysis is needed, and is provided for particularly by the 
extensive ethnographic accounts of Acholi lifeworlds by Behrend (1999) and Finnström 
(2003, 2006a).  
A number of issues within Acholi society can be evoked to explain the evolution of 
conflict in the region. These include questions of leadership, spiritual cleansing, 
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generational issues as well as social integration. When Museveni’s NRM/A replaced 
Milton Obote’s mainly Langi and Acholi UNLA in 1986, numerous young Acholi 
soldiers retreated to their home region in the North. Many of them had been in the army 
for a long time, and few had the skills, or the will, to go back to civilian life (Van Acker 
2004). The Acholi were aware of the atrocities committed by UNLA soldiers in the 
counterinsurgency war in Luwero, and the evil spirit, or cen, that was believed to have 
come upon the Acholi soldiers through the uncleansed killings, made it difficult for the 
community to reintegrate the former soldiers (Behrend 1999, Finnström 2006a).  
Van Acker places the blame for this on the traditional leaders of Acholi, who 
“demonstrated little imagination in dealing with the crisis” and were “unable to appease 
and exorcise the cen” (2004: 344). Branch (2007) analyses the creation and evolution of 
political authority in Acholiland through the colonial and independence era, and shows 
how Van Acker’s statement is misleading in its simplicity. Indeed, the whole question 
of who in fact held so-called “traditional authority” in Acholiland was unclear in 1986, 
and continues to be so today, since interventions from the colonial state, the Obote, 
Amin, and NRM governments, and the humanitarian regime and international civil 
society have affected formations of power in Acholiland, undermining some authorities 
while bolstering and even inventing others (see also section 6.3).  
In any case, in 1986 the unoccupied former soldiers, with little experience of social 
belonging, had a strong feeling of economic and political marginalisation within 
Uganda. These ‘internal strangers’ (Van Acker 2004: 348) of Acholi society turned to 
rebel movements in search for meaning and belonging.15 Finnström (2003: 110) shows 
how people in the region came to differentiate between two dimensions of war, and 
correspondingly, two types of armed groups: the initial political war and groups like the 
UPDA, and the subsequent movements engaging also (although not solely) the spiritual, 
like Alice Lakwena’s Holy Spirit Movement/Army (HSM/A). As to which of the 
underlying reasons for rebellion were the most important, sources disagree. Finnström’s 
young Acholi informants, for instance, place marginalisation at the heart of rebellion in 
northern Uganda (2003: 112). In this view, the spiritual aspects of conflict, although 
relevant and not to be slighted, should be seen as a vehicle of social discontent.   
It was the HSM/A that eventually gained the widest group of followers, and the most 
media attention – worldwide. Behrend, focusing on the cosmological, describes the 
                                                
15 For an account on the numerous rebel movements active in northern Uganda during the 
period, see Finnström 2003 and Van Acker 2004. 
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HSM/A’s war as “a consequence of preceding wars. Its war was a war against a war, 
one attempting to cope with the never-ending cycle of violence and retaliation. 
Although itself generating violence, despair and death, the HSM/A nevertheless tried to 
end this cycle of violence and to heal not only individuals but also society” (Behrend 
1998: 247). Alice Lakwena’s promise of spiritual cleansing to the soldiers infected by 
cen was readily accepted, yet support for the HSM/A rebels was not based solely on 
want of a spiritual battle. The HSM/A war, which engaged spiritual forces to the 
battlefield by to some extent replacing guns and bullet-proof vests with magical sticks 
and ointments, gained support particularly in those areas “where the NRA’s arrival had 
been interpreted as an occupation instead of a liberation” (Branch 2007: 161). This 
fundamental descriptor of the HSM/A was also to become Alice Lakwena’s downfall, 
since she lost grassroots support upon moving to areas of intense NRM/A support, 
being finally conquered just kilometres from Kampala in 1987.  
As Alice Lakwena’s HSM/A fell, the political space the rebels had vacated was quickly 
occupied by the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), led by Joseph Kony. The LRA came to 
merge the two types of war in Acholi: the politically and the spiritually motivated. This 
occurred not only metaphorically, but concretely in the sense that after their defeat, 
fighters from both the UPDA and the HSM/A were merged into the LRA. The political 
motivations of the LRA conflict have to do both with a search and struggle for authority 
within Acholi society, as well as for recognition of the Acholi on a the national level 
(Finnström 2003).  
Understanding the political dynamics within Acholiland is crucial to understanding the 
LRA conflict and why it has lasted for so long. Yet the political aspects of the conflict 
are generally blatantly simplified in accounts of the conflict, or simply ignored or 
nullified (Finnström 2003). As Branch (2007: 41–42) writes, “the Western academic 
and policy communities have decided that the LRA, due to its extreme violence and its 
violence against children, has forfeited its privilege to be considered a genuine political 
force.” This decision has been greatly promoted by national and international media 
accounts of the conflict, which systematically underline the barbarity and insanity of the 
LRA, thus also systematically overlooking any possible logic behind LRA violence. 
Both Branch and Finnström, however, show, that LRA violence has primarily not been 
wanton and random, but has often been specifically targeted at armed forces and 
civilians seen as political enemies. The LRA’s attacks have also been coupled with both 
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verbal political statements and written manifestos, the existence of which the Ugandan 
government has repeatedly denied (Finnström 2003).16  
Alongside the political, Finnström (Finnström 2006a: 205) also persuasively argues the 
importance of the cosmological as an element of conflict within Acholi. Particularly, 
war blessings and curses carry great meaning. For instance, a central contested question 
concerning the conflict, one which has great bearing on peace mediation and 
reconciliation efforts, is whether the LRA has been given a warfare blessing by Acholi 
elders.17 
Behrend (1998: 249) describes the HSM/A’s war as having been a mirror image of the 
conflict external to Acholi: “The war against an external, alien enemy was thus turned 
inward, leading to an increase in tensions and conflict in Acholi which might otherwise 
have remained latent.” The pattern has been reproduced ever since. The conflict in 
northern Uganda has set the Acholi people in an impossible situation: siding with one 
party means opposing the other, but refusing to take a side is not an option. Being 
neutral is impossible. Not only are the Acholi stuck between the rebels and the 
government; both of which are sensitive to any signs of siding with the other; the 
Acholi people are also forced against one another in a vicious cycle of mistrust 
(Finnström 2003: 125, Finnström 2006a: 209). It is a cycle into which intervention in 
northern Uganda is unavoidably enmeshed, and which intervention can exacerbate 
despite its pronounced aim to do the opposite. 
4.3. Conflict within Uganda 
Despite some extreme comments on the LRA conflict being an exclusively Acholi 
problem, generally it is recognised that the conflict cannot be understood outside the 
broader framework of Ugandan political history. In this chapter, unequal regional 
development, party politics, and ethnicity will be evoked to explain the conflict, while 
                                                
16 The political agenda of the LRA is carefully analysed by Finnström, who produces copies of a 
number of the LRA’s written statements in his study (2003). Here it is interesting to note that 
my interviews with development workers in Kitgum seemed to show that the government’s 
attempts to nullify the LRA’s political agenda have been very successful. I was repeatedly told 
that the LRA has no political agenda whatsoever, and that “it is only in the last six months that 
they [the rebels] have spoken of any political objectives” (Interview in Kitgum, 10 August 2006). 
17 For a comprehensive analysis of Acholi warfare blessings and curses, see Finnström  (2006a). 
A number of theories and rumours circulate in Acholiland concerning which types of blessings 
and curses have been performed, when and by whom, and whether these blessings/curses are 
“valid”. These questions also weigh heavily in the Juba peace process.  
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keeping in mind that “the complexity of social realities will always challenge [such] 
neat categorisations” (Finnström 2003: 79).  
4.3.1. Regional inequality and marginalisation  
In addition to a regional divide between the underdeveloped or marginalised northern 
and eastern Uganda, and a more affluent southern and western Uganda, there is a clear 
divide in Uganda between its rich and poor population. This divide has deepened as 
Uganda’s national economy has grown. Prunier (2004: 371) sees social marginalisation 
as one of the prime motivators of the rebel activity spurred by Museveni’s coming to 
power.  
Accordingly, Prunier (2004: 383) argues that “[t]he LRA is a product of Acholi 
alienation since 1986”. In its political manifestos, and again during the recent round of 
peace talks, the LRA has evoked the marginalisation of the Acholi people as a reason 
for its war against the government.18 Although it can be argued that the LRA is not in a 
position to talk on behalf of the Acholi people, their references to marginalisation have 
resonance in facts proving that marginalised position of northern Uganda. This 
marginalisation has been further entrenched by the conflict. 
Violent conflict and insecurity have long plagued northern Uganda… The results have 
been gross violations of human rights, especially those of women and children, 
destruction of infrastructure, paralysis in economic activity, and a general social and 
cultural breakdown. As a result the northern region remains the poorest area of 
Uganda… With the failure to achieve peace impeding the restoration of service 
delivery, the region’s human development lags significantly behind the national 
average. (Nannyonjo 2005: 473, emphasis added) 
Has marginalisation caused the conflict, or has the conflict caused marginalisation? The 
question of causality lies at the very centre of the political debate surrounding the 
conflict. The question goes hand in hand with the apportioning of blame: some blame 
the Acholi for their own plight, while a majority of the Acholi blame Museveni’s 
government for a deliberate undermining of Acholi wellbeing (Branch 2006, Finnström 
2003).  
As the Acholi lost most of their cattle at the hands of the NRA and the Karamojong, 
land gained importance as the core property of the people. A profound worry over the 
                                                
18 See for instance New Vision and Monitor articles in June–August 2006.  
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loss of that land has reigned ever since, a worry accentuated particularly in those areas 
in which displacement has been forced on the people by the government. During my 
fieldwork, as we drove to the more remote displacement camps in Kitgum district, my 
local Acholi co-workers pointed out to me the mango trees visible here and there amidst 
the deserted fields we drove through. I was told that each mango tree showed the place 
where a house had been – a house burned down by the UPDF in the name of counter-
insurgency. To the Acholi, the burning of homesteads signalled a threat of eventually 
also losing the land on which those homes had been built.  
Displacement and the government’s apparent disinterest in ending the conflict has given 
rise to rumours, some rather fantastic, of officially planned and coordinated land 
grabbing (see for instance Levine 2006). Whether or not the rumours have any truth to 
them, it is clear that there is huge mistrust among the Acholi towards Museveni. 
Throughout the conflict, many Acholi in Uganda and in the diaspora have claimed that 
the true objective of the Ugandan government’s strategy in Acholiland is to diminish 
the Acholi people’s physical, economical, social and psychological capacity for 
development. The ferocity of the UPDF’s counter-insurgency campaign and the army’s 
apparent unwillingness to protect civilians from LRA attacks, have given credence to 
such doubts. Similarly, the government’s refusal to call the situation in northern Uganda 
an emergency and it’s systematic down-playing of the humanitarian crisis in the area (to 
be discussed in chapter five), has led many, also among those I interviewed in Kitgum, 
to wonder whether in fact the government really even wants to ease the Acholi peoples’ 
plight.  
Indeed, the government-led counterinsurgency has been vicious: the displaced people's 
camps themselves were created through a government campaign of displacement, 
including bombing and burning down entire villages. Those in the camps cannot leave 
because the UPDF kills any civilian found outside them. The government does not 
protect the camps, so those in the camps are easy targets for the predation of the LRA – 
and often of underpaid, undisciplined UPDF soldiers. The failure to provide food, 
medicine, decent housing, and protection, in direct contravention of the Geneva 
Conventions, has led many Acholi to see the camps not as "protected villages" (the 
government's euphemism), but as a calculated effort to destroy the Acholi as an ethnic 
group-as genocide. (Branch 2004) 
Accusations of genocide have been heard from, and in, high places. Former UN Under-
Secretary General and Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict Olara A. 
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Otunnu, who was awarded the Sydney Peace Prize Lecture in 2005, has stated in public 
speeches that the systematic dehumanisation of northern Ugandan people through the 
Ugandan government’s policy of forced displacement can fairly only be referred to as 
genocide.19 In his articles and speeches on the situation in northern Uganda, Otunnu 
also refers to what Finnström terms the “official discourse” on the northern Ugandan 
conflict: “To the extent [northern Uganda] receives any attention, it is generally in the 
context of the bizarre and brutal Lord’s Resistance Army… That is where the awareness 
ends, however, and that’s just how the Ugandan government wants it” (Otunnu 2006b: 
45).  
4.3.2. Party politics and ethnicity 
The northern Ugandan conflict also relates to party politics. Museveni’s National 
Resistance Movement (NRM) has very little support in the country’s northern regions, 
whereas the main opposition party Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) is widely 
supported in both Local Council and national elections in Acholi. President Museveni 
has repeatedly appointed those NRM candidates who have lost elections at the Local 
Council V, i.e. district level, as Resident District Commissioners (interviews in Kitgum, 
August 2006).20 The LRA has also shown an interest in party politics, as was 
exemplified when the rebels called a unilateral ceasefire during the 1996 presidential 
and parliamentary elections (Branch 2007, Van Acker 2004: 337). In the elections, 
which were deemed not open and transparent, but a ‘step forward’ (Hauser 1999: 631), 
Museveni was reported to have received 74,2 percent of the vote; while some northern 
regions gave the opposition candidate up to 90 percent of the vote. Similarly in the 2006 
election, the majority of Acholis voted for the FDC’s presidential candidate, Kizza 
Bezigye (Uganda Electoral Commission 2007).21  
                                                
19 The Sydney Peace Prize Lecture is available online, see Olara 2006b. Otunnu gave a slightly 
altered version of this speech also at the World Council of Churches General Assembly in Porto 
Alegre in January 2006.  
20 The Local Council (LC) system is a five-tiered system of councils ranging from the village to 
the district level. The councils were initially referred to as resistance councils under Museveni’s 
no-party National Resistance Movement system. The highest position in the LC system is 
occupied by the locally elected chairman of the LCV (V refers to the highest, i.e. district level of 
the local council system). Resident District Commissioners (RDC), on the other hand, are 
representatives appointed by the President to represent the Government’s interests in the 
districts. For instance, in Kitgum in August 2006, the LC5’s and the RDC’s held rather different 
views on the decongestion of displacement camps. The power relations between the LC 
Chairmen and the RDCs are not clear-cut. 
21 In the three Acholi districts, votes between Besigye and Museveni divided as follows: Gulu 
82,4–13,2 percent, Kitgum 75,5–18,9 percent and Pader 77,3–17,6 percen (Uganda Electoral 
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Ethnicity has played and continues to play an integral part in Ugandan politics. 
However, Finnström (2003: 98) warns against reductionist conclusions. The question is 
not so much of ethnicity one-sidedly affecting or molding politics, but of a complex 
process to which politics and ethnicity are party – as at times are regional politics and 
neo-colonial interests, to name a few. In this process, ethnicity has been molded and 
played to further goals unrelated to ethnicity in itself. Ugandan political processes have, 
from the onset of post-colonial British exploration in Uganda, been inseparably linked 
to a broader, global, context. Based on this argument I strongly disagree with a claim I 
was presented with in many discussions during my fieldwork in Uganda: that the 
northern Ugandan conflict is an Acholi issue that can only be solved by the Acholi 
themselves.22 The whole notion of ethnicity in Uganda should be placed under closer 
scrutiny than is generally done in popular reports on the northern Ugandan conflict.  
Allen (2006: 28) writes that “there is a politicized divide between the groups of the 
north-west, the north, the south-west and the south, as well as between the old 
kingdoms, notably that of Buganda, and the rest of the country.” Branch (2007) argues 
that this political divide, which is to a great extent based on the regional ethnic identities 
of a “Nilotic” north and a “Bantu” south, was created after the colonial era, during 
which more limited ethnic categories such as “Acholi” had been invented and 
consolidated. Rather, the North-South divide was brought into national politics by 
Obote, in a “mis-guided and counterproductive… attempt to undo the legacy of indirect 
rule within the context of the bifurcated state” (ibid: 125). These regional ethnic 
identities were, according to Branch, only turned into grounds for political action during 
the Bush War of Museveni. Indeed, prior to this stage, ethnic categories other than 
“Northern” and “Southern” prevailed. An oft-repeated notion in accounts of Ugandan 
history is that of a Uganda “governed by the North” until Museveni’s rise to power. Yet 
“from the perspective of the north, the idea of a coherent “north” dominating Uganda 
for 25 years is inconceivable. Indeed, since Amin’s coup, the north had been ravaged by 
violence between the northerners themselves” (Branch 2007: 135). 
Explanations of the conflict which ground themselves in ethnicity should also be 
questioned because as Finnström (2003: 79) argues, even in situations of armed conflict 
in which social categorisations become extremely codified, these categories will 
                                                                                                                                          
Commission 2007). Support for Besigye in Gulu was higher than in any other district in 
Uganda.  
22 The claim is typical for war propaganda that evokes images of ethnicity in order to blur 
underlying political realities (Anderson 1999). 
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continue to be surpassed by exchanges on the local level, and, I would add, on an 
individual level. Despite the fact that particularly government-owned media in Uganda 
has a tendency to characterise people from northern Uganda as embodying certain 
negative qualities, not all Ugandans agree with these stereotypes. The apartment 
complex I lived in in Kampala is a case in point. The staff were all good friends with 
each other; Samuel the night guard was from West Nile (like Idi Amin), the 
housekeeper Julie was from Lango (like Obote), and the head housekeeper Esther was 
Muganda (as the Kabaka) from near Kampala. One day while sharing a cup of tea I 
ventured to ask Esther what she thought of northern Uganda, where I hadn’t yet at the 
time visited. 
-Are people from the North different? 
-Yes, they are so black! 
-Right [laughter]. But are there other differences? 
-Oh, other difference. They have good heart! 
-Oh, you mean they are healthy, or are they kind? 
-Yes, they are kind. They have much better heart than us [the Baganda]. 
-Oh! I’ve heard some say they are angry? 
-Yes, some. Not all have good heart. You know, when you go up [to the North], you 
will see they are very tired people. Have no food, no place to sleep. So maybe some kill, 
they kill because they are fed up.  
In conclusion I wish to stress how important it would be, particularly for researchers 
and development interveners, to avoid reductionist conclusions about conflict in 
northern Uganda. Reductionist explanations, such as the ethnicity paradigm, serve to 
over-simplify the causes of conflict, thus reducing the scope for official peace 
processes. Simplistic images of the conflict in northern Uganda rigidify ethnic and other 
group boundaries, and dishonour individual attempts to look beyond prejudice and 
conflict.  
4.4. Northern Uganda within a regional conflict complex  
The northern Ugandan conflict is inseparably related to a broader regional conflict 
context, particularly the conflict between Sudan and Uganda, which has been fought 
through proxies in the countries’ borderland as well as in Zaire/Congo. According to 
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Prunier (2004) one of the main reasons belying the animosity between Sudan and 
Uganda has to do with the fault lines between Islam and Christianity as well as Arabism 
and Africa. However, despite fundamental differences between the two countries, and 
civil conflict in both, there was little cross-border interference between them until the 
1980’s. It was in the early 1980’s that Khartoum started looking for avenues through 
which to weaken Museveni’s power in Uganda and more broadly in the region. Prunier 
sees the underlying aims of Khartoum’s politics being the Islamization, and more 
importantly, the Arabization of the Great Lakes region. In Khartoum, Museveni was 
seen as standing in the way of the fulfilment of both goals (ibid: 382).  
On top of these aspects of cultural and religious conflict was the question of the Sudan 
People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), an anti-Khartoum rebel movement 
lead by Colonel John Garang. Khartoum was certain Museveni was aiding Garang, a 
claim that is contested in the literature. Otunnu (2002) says the SPLM/A was as an 
informal ally to Museveni already in 1986 when it attacked Acholi refugees in South 
Sudan in 1986, while Prunier (2004: 364) suggests Museveni only started aiding 
SPLM/A in 1993. Whichever the case, it was in 1993 that the government in Khartoum 
formed an alliance with the LRA, providing military aid in exchange for anti-Museveni 
rebel activities and the symbolic conversion of some LRA rebels to Islam (ibid). As the 
LRA’s scope of operations broadened, there was a need for a larger group of armed 
members. With Khartoum’s support, and through an aggressive increase in abductions, 
the LRA was transformed from a rag-tag group of some 300 fighters in 1993 to a 
fighting force of over 2000 in mid-1994 (Allen 2006). Correspondingly, conditions for 
civilians in northern Uganda worsened drastically.  
Violence jumped to a new level in 1995, when the Sudanese army attacked a camp of 
Sudanese refugees on Ugandan territory, and Uganda retaliated by hitting strongly 
against the LRA in Sudan. Diplomatic relations between Uganda and Sudan were 
severed, as neither government admitted to supporting rebel groups in the other’s 
territory. Ugandan military expenditure skyrocketed, and eventually Uganda had to pull 
out of its demobilization program started with the World Bank in 1994. Sudan was 
hoping that a strong LRA would keep Uganda from joining the war in Zaire full force, 
but as Prunier (2004: 374) notes, the “LRA was more a terrorist outfit than a regular 
guerrilla army, and in the midst of the war it simply continued attacking villages in 
Acholi and murdering civilians.” Contrary to Khartoum’s plans, the LRA’s increased 
attacks against the civilian population in northern Uganda only convinced Museveni to 
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take further action in Zaire. In 1994 the Zairean flank of the Sudan-Uganda conflict 
exploded into the massive destruction and human suffering of the multinational war 
fought on Zairean/Congolese ground. 
In 1999 the severed diplomatic relations of Uganda and Sudan were restored in an 
agreement facilitated by the America Carter Centre. Although Ugandan support for the 
SPLM/A and Sudanese support for the LRA decreased, it did not cease entirely. 
Support for the rebels continued until January 2005, when a peace agreement was 
reached between the SPLM/A and the Sudanese government, and South Sudan received 
partial autonomy (Allen 2006).  
When the Southern Sudanese John Garang, who had only weeks earlier been appointed 
the vice president of Sudan, was killed in a helicopter borrowed from president 
Museveni in July 2005, fears abounded that the brand new peace agreement would 
crumble. Allen (2006: 192) however argues that South Sudan’s new leader, Salva Kiir, 
was in fact more willing and better equipped to lead the region to peace than his 
predecessor. As the conflict between North and South Sudan subsided, and the SPLM/A 
became a recognised political power, Ugandan support for the SPLM/A became public 
and less problematic. As a consequence of the peace deal, Khartoum’s support for the 
LRA was virtually cut off, and it became more difficult for the rebels to use South 
Sudan as a base. Already in late 2004 the core group of rebels, lead by Joseph Kony, 
were pushed into Garamba national park in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). 
These developments contributed to the possibility of renewed peace talks between the 
LRA and the Ugandan government, which commenced under the leadership of the 
Government of South Sudan in July 2006 (See Allen 2006, Finnström 2006c).  
4.5. International context of the LRA war 
The LRA can be seen as one pawn in the “great chess game” (a term used to describe 
the conflict to me by a development worker in Kitgum) between Sudan and Uganda, 
and more broadly, in a global political setting. After Museveni took over power in 
Uganda, Khartoum began supporting a number of rebel movements in Uganda, many of 
which represented a radical and, in some cases, militant interpretation of Islam. It is in 
this context that Uganda became and has continued to be an important ally for the US 
government against Sudan’s Islamic regime. In the Northern Uganda Crisis Response 
Act (US Congress 2004), it is expressed that the United States should “make clear that 
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the relationship between the Government of Sudan and the Government of the United 
States cannot improve unless no credible evidence indicates that authorities of the 
Government of Sudan are providing support to the Lord's Resistance Army.” 
The allegiance between president Museveni and the United States was formalised after 
the terrorist attacks on the 11th of September 2001. At the request of the Ugandan 
government, the LRA was added onto the United States’ Terrorist Exclusion List, 
whereby Museveni’s approach to the northern Ugandan conflict was legitimised as a 
necessary element of the war against terrorism (Finnström 2003, Finnström 2006b, 
Prunier 2004). The repercussions of this legitimisation will be discussed in more depth 
in chapter five. 
4.5.1. Donor relations: a multitude of perceptions 
Since 1987, Museveni’s Uganda has been given a partially undeserved spot in donor 
limelight. It is beyond doubt that Museveni has exceeded expectations in that he 
managed to bring peace to such large portions to Uganda after the troubled times of 
Amin and Obote, and that he managed to turn around the economical disaster Uganda 
was in. Indeed, the extent of the Ugandan government’s success looks different 
according to one’s point of view. Thus it is not truthful to say that all commentators, 
donors and researchers alike, were wrong in heralding Uganda’s success under 
Museveni’s leadership. Instead I will argue that it is fair to say that many saw, or chose 
to see, a limited version of reality in Uganda.  
For instance Callaghy has characterised Uganda, “under the remarkable leadership of 
Yoweri Museveni” as having become “one of the major indications of hope for Africa” 
(2001: 128), whereas scholars I will quote later in this chapter argue that Uganda’s 
“golden boy” -status is grounded in profound illusion. Primarily, however, Allen 
(2006:27) finds that even scholars who are generally critical of African states have aired 
views on Uganda that can be characterised as blatantly optimistic. All in all the view 
given of Uganda by donors is not at all clear (Hauser 1999), and neither is that given by 
academia. Descriptions of Uganda range between “stable and evolving in the right 
direction”, to a country with “partly free” elections, to a “non-democracy”, and most 
confusingly, all these categorisations can even be found within the covers of a single 
book (Van de Walle 2001:  236, 245, 251).  
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As the evidence in this chapter will show, the creation of the international community’s 
overly positive view on Uganda has required that a number of irregularities have been 
swept under the carpet. Mishandled economic reform, corruption, human rights abuse, 
unequal development, as well as fierce internal conflict, have been overlooked. The 
picture of the northern Ugandan conflict has been particularly prone to mishandling and 
even manipulation for the benefit of Museveni and his western supporters (Branch 
2007, Finnström 2003). Allen (2006: 27) writes that “the apparent invigoration of the 
Ugandan state is viewed as so important as to render any local inadequacies relatively 
unimportant.” From the macro-perspective of international donor relations, it seems, 
humanitarian disasters like that in northern Uganda fall within the range of an 
acceptable amount of disorder and suffering in the peripheries of the world system 
(Bradbury 1998, see section 3.2).  
Donor policies towards Uganda can be suggested to have had at least four sets of effects 
which are relevant to this study (Hauser 1999, Mwenda & Tangri 2005): 1) Substantial 
development assistance has enabled Museveni to finance patronage, and legitimised 
Museveni’s policies concerning northern Uganda. 2) Failure to scrutinise the use of aid 
has lead to rampant corruption in the civil service and in the Uganda People’s Defence 
Force (UPDF). 3) Failure to put a check on corruption in the UPDF has increased the 
inefficiency of the army. 4) Excessive emphasis on formal democratic institutions as a 
vehicle for democratisation, and lack of emphasis on addressing divisive policies, have 
undermined pressure for the Ugandan government to strive for national reconciliation 
and to promote a lasting solution for the conflict in northern Uganda. 
4.5.2. Economic reforms 
Collaboration between Museveni and the donor community already began in 1987, 
when Museveni, a year after seizing power, turned away from his pronounced mixed 
economy program that was meant to combine socialist and capitalist elements, and 
turned to the IMF and World Bank for assistance. The NRM/A was in a tight situation 
with few options: Uganda’s economy was faltering, numerous rebel movements were 
undermining the NRM/A’s hold on the country, and with little to show in terms of 
national development, the regime was having a hard time consolidating itself in the eyes 
of an impoverished population with decades of experience with violent conflict. The 
support of International Financial Institutions (IFIs) was crucial for the survival of the 
NRM/A, yet not simply because it provided the economy with a fix and boost, but also 
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because it financed NRM/A’s patronage politics (Hauser 1999, Mwenda & Tangri 
2005). 
The stated objective of donor-sponsored reforms in Uganda was to diminish public 
sector spending and to thus lessen possibilities for state patronage. Initial monetary 
reform was carried out in 1987, but the bulk of reforms have taken place since 1991, 
including downsizing of the public administration, decentralization and military 
demobilisation. A donor-funded and IFI-organised debt-reduction strategy has been in 
place in Uganda since 1991. Between 1993 and 1997 the country’s debt service ratio 
fell from 54 percent to 18 percent. 23 In mid-1997, Uganda’s total debt burden was still 
62 percent of its GDP, and 294 percent of its foreign export (Callaghy 2001). 
As part of the reorganisation of Ugandan debt to international creditors, the Uganda 
Multilateral Debt Fund (UMDF) was created through the active involvement of a 
number of donors (e.g. Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and 
Swizterland). According to Callaghy (2001: 130), “the UMDF succeeded because it 
increased the ownership and management of Uganda’s debt strategy by the Museveni 
government.” Through the success of the UMDF, Uganda became a role model for 
other countries in Africa, and later for the HIPC (Heavily Indebted Poor Countries 
Initiative) scheme in general (ibid: 131). When the HIPC was about to be delayed, 
Uganda lobbied actively for its adoption, and large INGOs backed Uganda in its request 
for the initiative. In Oxfam International’s press release the delay of the HIPC scheme 
was objected to as follows: “This decision will hurt the poor people in Uganda… The 
decision also sends the wrong signals to those other countries undertaking painful 
economic reforms. If Uganda, which is seen as the jewel in the economic reform crown, 
is so shoddily treated what incentive is there for other countries?” (Forsyth 1997, quoted 
in Callaghy 2001: 135).  
Uganda eventually became the first country to be accepted under both HIPC I (in April 
1998) and the later HIPC II. Under the second HIPC initiative, Uganda has been granted 
debt relief of about 55 million dollars annually for the next thirty years, in addition to 
the 45 million promised by HIPC I (ibid.). When the Consultative Group in March 2001 
pledged 2,5 billion dollars to Uganda’s Poverty Eradication Plan, it criticised the 
government for official corruption and for its military involvement in DRC (Callaghy 
                                                
23 “The debt service ratio is the ratio of debt service payments made by or due from a country to 
that country’s export earnings” (OECD 2004). 
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2001: 142). Callaghy does not mention whether the government at the time received any 
criticism for the on-going conflict in northern Uganda. 
Although partial success in the reforms did lead Uganda onto a track of improving 
economic performance, the reforms were not necessarily carried out in as sustainable a 
manner as the IFIs and the Ugandan government would prefer to make it appear. There 
is great variance in views over the success of the reforms: Van de Walle (2001) claims 
Uganda to be one of the few countries with any progress in civil service reform, 
whereas Mwenda & Tangri argue that “contrary to the initial intentions of the IFIs, the 
size and cost of Uganda’s public sector has not been reduced” (2005: 457).  
Uganda belongs to the small group of countries in Africa that has enjoyed a growing 
economy, the economy having grown at an average rate of 5 percent per year after the 
1987 monetary reform (Prunier 2004). Yet although Ugandan performance measures 
well in macro-economical terms, the policies prescribed by IFIs have left a huge 
number of people in poverty. Of the entire population of Uganda, 96,4 percent live on 
less than two dollars a day (UNDP 2003).24 Uganda can also be described as a highly 
corrupt country with an inefficient civil service, an overspending military, and a 
questionable record of human rights and democracy (Hauser 1999). In addition, it is not 
apparent that the economy has grown specifically because of the IFI-lead economic 
reforms. Reno (2000: 21) argues that the “stabilisation” of the Ugandan economy 
during the 1990’s was in large part due to a massive increase in Uganda’s gold exports. 
Donors, although aware of what was happening, decided to turn a blind eye on the fact 
that no notable increase in Uganda’s gold production accompanied its increasing export, 
as most of the gold originated from the war-torn region of the eastern Democratic 
Republic of Congo. 
Callaghy evaluates the Ugandan situation differently: 
Uganda is a case in which a proactive African response to decline created halfway 
houses of representation and capacity building via better transgovernance. Unlike other 
types of networks discussed in this volume, there is nothing very shadowy about the 
networks and connections that helped achieve this result. They have helped to make 
Museveni’s Uganda stronger while increasing creditor country and international 
financial institution accountability by intensifying global-local interactions. Uganda 
succeeded because it was perceived by the major actors in the debt regime to be doing 
what was expected of it. (2001: 144, emphasis added) 
                                                
24 UNDP Human Development Reports after the year 2003 do not have this figure for Uganda.  
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To a certain extent, there is nothing wrong with Callaghy’s characterisation of the 
relationship between Uganda and the creditor/donor community. Museveni’s hold over 
Uganda has become stronger, and the credibility of IFIs has grown. Indeed, “Uganda 
succeeded because it was perceived by the major actors in the debt regime to be doing 
what was expected of it” (ibid.), but is there indeed nothing “shadowy about the 
networks” (ibid.) that incorporate illicit flows of gold from an area of intense conflict, 
and assist in strengthening a regime engaged in violent conflict and human rights 
violations on its own ground? Callaghy is not ignoring these questions, since as noted 
by Christian Aid (2004: 35), “[in World Bank reports] Uganda is never mentioned as a 
country in conflict.” Callaghy’s article was written at a time when according to Reno 
(2000), the matter of Uganda’s illegal involvement in DRC, and the associated export of 
gold, were already common knowledge, which is why I find it highly surprising that 
Callaghy chooses to ignore this question. His ignorance of the situation in northern 
Uganda (the conflict is not mentioned once in the entire article) is perhaps more 
understandable in light of the fact that his article was written before the UPDF’s 
Operation Iron Fist, after which the western donor coimmunity became more aware of 
the situation in northern Uganda (see section 5.1).  
The poor implementation of reforms in Uganda was for a long time almost entirely 
overlooked by the IFIs and the donor community. This makes sense when taken in the 
context of Mwenda and Tangri’s claim (2005) that donor and IFI interests have been the 
principle grounds upon which reform and aid policy for Uganda have been 
formulated.25 Between 1989 and 1994 bilateral aid to Uganda almost doubled, despite 
the country’s increasingly grim track record for military and public administration 
spending (Hauser 1999: 626). Little more than slightly worried comments from here 
and there (by, for example, the World Bank, see Mwenda & Tangri 2004) arose until 
2003. Until then the IFIs’ and donors’ monitoring of the reform process and the auditing 
of given financial aid had been seriously insufficient, as was confirmed by many of the 
international staff I interviewed in Kitgum.26  
                                                
25 It is perhaps interesting to note that at the time the article was published, Mwenda was the 
political editor of the Monitor, the main opposition-minded English newspaper in Uganda. 
26 The development workers I interviewed in Kitgum who saw donor monitoring as having 
been insufficient earlier did not see the situation as having changed. Donor monitoring was still 
seen as insufficient or virtually nonexistent, a fact that had some of the development workers in 
Kitgum immensely frustrated, as in an interview on August 11th 2006: “Last year there was 
somebody from [a donor agency] visiting, so I brought her to the government hospital. She was 
shocked by the conditions. They were giving a billion Ugandan shillings only for health in 
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After years in the limelight, Uganda has recently received a share of criticism. Partially 
criticism has been directed at the way Museveni has dealt with the situation in the LRA-
affected areas, and more generally, Uganda’s economic performance and its level of 
human rights and democracy have been re-evaluated. In 2005, Britain for the first time 
withdrew some of its promised aid to Uganda, referring to problems in governance. The 
shift came, perhaps, too late:  
Donor reforms initiated under structural adjustment have not, in fact, resulted in a 
smaller state or in fewer public resources. On the contrary, large amounts of donor aid 
have enabled the Movement leadership to erect an expansive and expensive government 
bureaucracy and political system, which have permitted Uganda’s leaders to rely on 
state patronage and the distribution of public resources to maintain themselves in 
power. (Mwenda and Tangri 2005: 464) 
Important to explaining why donors and IFIs have overlooked such developments is the 
fact that the main architects and funding parties of the “Ugandan miracle” also have a 
stake in how their policies and aid dollars in Uganda are perceived to have succeeded. 
Branch, (2007), Mwenda and Tangri (2005) and Reno (2000) suggest that a main reason 
for why Uganda has been heralded as a showcase of economic recovery in Africa, has 
been that the IFI’s have needed such a showcase to prove that their policy prescriptions 
work. The following quote, from an article that evaluates the extent of Uganda’s much-
heralded success in confronting HIV and AIDS, can in my view be applied more 
generally to Ugandan development on a number of fronts.  
The notion of donor fatigue… combined with an overall reduction of development 
funds available to Africa, can produce political pressure to present an image of success 
to maintain funds… The international community might also feel under pressure to 
present successful examples of HIV-1 prevention, especially in view of the high-profile 
nature of the problem… Such pressures can lead to the proliferation, and quiet 
acceptance, of statements of Ugandan success that are not, in fact, based on any 
conclusive evidence… The standard of proof for policy recommendations seems to 
have been lowered to provide the international community with the African success 
story it wants, or even needs. (Parkhurst 2002: 80) 
                                                                                                                                          
Kitgum. A billion! And I’m saying okay, you’re giving this money, but are you checking the 
accounts, have you ever come here and checked the books? Don’t worry she said, I’m gonna 
come tomorrow and check the books. She went the following day, the [person she needed to 
see] was not there, she went again the next day, again [the person] wasn’t there. And then she 
had to leave. And she said I promise I’m gonna come and search this thing. But she never came 
again.”  
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4.5.3. Military spending and failed states 
A central element of the reform package for Uganda has been to cut back on military 
spending. A demobilization program was started in 1994, with the aim of cutting the 
number of UPDF soldiers from 90 000 to 40 000 (Prunier 2004: 374). As the proxy war 
against Sudan accelerated in 1996, the demobilization program was reversed, and ever 
since then the UPDF has steered clear of set goals: the yearly costs of 100 000 strong 
UPDF was 42 million USD a year in 1991, and in 1996 the cost of keeping a military 
only half the size had risen to 88 million USD (Prunier 2004: 379). After the war with 
Sudan came to an end, Museveni has repeatedly used the LRA war as grounds for not 
complying with donor demands for aid cutbacks, and has blamed the continuation of 
war in the north on donor restrictions on the UPDF budget (Christian Aid 2004). 
Donors have been uncomfortable with Uganda’s military spending especially since 
under the HIPC initiative beneficiaries are supposed to keep their military spending at 
under 2 percent of GNP – a level Uganda has yet to achieve (Reno 2000, World Bank 
2007). Here it must be observed that Uganda’s donors have not shared a common 
approach to the military in Uganda. The United States has been substantially more 
supportive of Uganda’s military endeavours in both the DRC and Southern Sudan than 
other donors, and the US has also provided logistical support for military operations in 
northern Uganda (Allen 2006: 51, Branch 2007). This has been in line with the 
Northern Uganda Crisis Response Act, which urges “the Government of Uganda to 
improve the professionalism of Ugandan military personnel currently stationed in 
northern and eastern Uganda, with an emphasis on respect for human rights, 
accountability for abuses, and effective civilian protection” (US Congress 2004).  
Information about military operations in northern Uganda is very hard to find, and there 
is a substantial lack of transparency around the issue. Some of those I interviewed in 
Kitgum were clearly frustrated, and some seriously concerned about the obscurity of 
what was going on. Strictly off the record, I was told to “look into how some donors are 
bringing in the military [in northern Uganda]” (Interview in Kitgum, 16 August 2006). I 
was also informed of sightings of US marines in Pader district, and told that NGOs in 
Kitgum had no idea what the Marines were doing. Various informants and sources 
suggest that donor countries have had a hand in military operations in northern Uganda 
in some way or another, yet everything surrounding this question is very hush-hush. 
Any of the countries that were named in discussions do not have Uganda on their online 
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lists of countries in which they have troops of any kind. In a BBC News On-line article 
from March 23rd 2004 (quoted by Christian Aid 2004: 199) the head of US operations in 
Africa, General Charles Wald, comments on US assistance in the war against the LRA: 
“[i]t’s not just moral support… But some things need to be kept a bit more private.”  
On perspective to understanding donors’ willingness to allow Uganda’s high military 
expenditure is provided by Reno, who notes that “Uganda is not a “failed state”, but it 
borders several other states in which state institutions are very weak and in which 
disorder is a more pressing problem” (2000:  24). Despite the shortfalls of Museveni’s 
regime, it has been exceptionally stable, and as such, Uganda has been seen as a vital 
balancing force with regard to both Eastern and Central Africa. African leaders like 
Museveni, who have been capable of retaining such relative stability, have been seen as 
keys for “increasing political stability, economic growth, self-reliance and improved 
human rights [in Africa]” (Hauser 1999). As a stable, and in terms of economic 
adjustment a fairly compliant government, Museveni’s Uganda has been a much-needed 
ally for the West, particularly for the United States, in the fight against terrorism. 
Regional stability around Uganda is particularly interesting to donor countries also 
because of oil sources located in southern Sudan. Allen (2006: 51) and Van Acker 
(2004: 336) argue that the increased interest in South Sudan’s oil reserves can 
particularly be seen as a reason for the active involvement of the United States in 
peacemaking in the region. 
Van de Walle’s (2001) argues that legitimacy given to weak governments by the donor 
community compensates for the lack of these governments’ domestic legitimacy and 
suppresses internal pressures for change. I hold this to be true for Uganda on a national 
level, and specifically true for the case of northern Uganda.27 While realising that this 
argument is not exhaustive, I argue that the international community’s reluctance to 
criticise the Ugandan government, while continuing massive development aid to the 
country, and indirectly and directly legitimising Museveni’s policies concerning 
northern Uganda, has played a part in cementing the conflict situation, and has thus 
protracted the suffering of victims to the conflict. One of the NGO representatives I 
interviewed was absolutely certain that even the United Nations had been pressured into 
not taking action concerning northern Uganda earlier. Whether there is truth to this or 
                                                
27 As noted earlier (section  4.5.1) , Van de Walle does not himself characterise Uganda as a 
failed state, but rather uses Uganda as an example of unusual success in Africa. I however find 
that his theories of failed states in Africa are very much applicable to the Ugandan case.  
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not, northern Uganda’s case support the argument that relief and development funding 
decisions are based on something other than need (Barnett 2005, ICVA 2006a).  
A further important element of the international context of the northern Ugandan 
conflict, one that is important to explaining shifts in intervention during the time period 
under analysis in this study, is the role of the International Criminal Court (ICC). The 
ICC’s role has, however, been carefully analysed by Allen (2006) and Branch (2004, 
2007), and for this reason the ICC process will not be traced in detail in this study. 
Instead, those aspects of the process that are relevant to the research question will be 
introduced in section 5.3. 
Conclusions to part II 
The northern Ugandan conflict is a complex phenomenon, which cannot be sufficiently 
explained without analysis of a number of factors. In this chapter I have shown that the 
roots of the conflict lie in the colonial period, and that complex dynamics of politics, 
ethnicity and religion in independent Uganda underlie the animosity between the 
government of Uganda and the LRA. Similarly I have argued that the role of social 
organisation and spirituality within northern Uganda must be evoked to produce a 
comprehensive picture of conflict in the region.  
I have also shown that although fought in a limited geographical area, the LRA conflict 
is embedded in regional and international networks, among them the networks of 
donors, International Financial Institutions, and the so-called war against terrorism. It is 
into the midst of this complex reality that development intervention in northern Uganda 
is targeted, and into which it unavoidably becomes enmeshed.  
Section II has introduced transformed humanitarianism as a framework, and the 
historical and political context of conflict as an arena for intervention in northern 
Uganda. In section III it will thus be possible to provide a contextualised analysis of the 
interactions of development intervention and conflict in northern Uganda. In order for 
the interactions of development intervention and conflict in northern Uganda to be 
understood, both the “macro level” of conflict dynamics and donor policies, and the 
“micro level” of interactions between individuals and organisations on the ground must 
be analysed. Chapter five engages mainly with the macro level of conflict and 
intervention dynamics in northern Uganda, whereas in chapter six we will focus more 
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closely on Kitgum and on analysing the social interface of development intervention in 
the region. 
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PART III  
DEVELOPMENT INTERVENTION AND CONFLICT IN 
NORTHERN UGANDA 
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5. Dynamics of conflict and intervention, 2001–2006 
The history and broader context of conflict in northern Uganda has been outlined in 
chapter four. The aim of chapter five is to analyse the recent phases and shifts in the 
conflict that explain the change of scale in development intervention in the area between 
2003 and 2006. Section 5.1 will outline the escalation of the disaster and the increase in 
development intervention during this period. The reasons for the increase in assistance 
to northern Uganda are analysed further in section 5.2, whereas sections 5.3 and 5.4 
focus on the most recent substantial shifts in the conflict in northern Uganda: the issuing 
of warrants for LRA leaders by the International Criminal Court (ICC), and the 
beginning of a new round of peace talks in 2006. Section 5.4 will also introduce the 
situation as it was during the time of my fieldwork in Kitgum. In Section 5.5 I will 
elaborate on the contradictory role of donors in the northern Ugandan complex of 
conflict and humanitarian disaster.  
5.1. From Operation Iron Fist to increased humanitarian 
attention 
As was explained in chapter three, the conflict has waxed and waned over the years. 
The beginning of a build-up process to the present situation can be pinpointed to the 
aftermath of the terrorist attacks on New York in 2001 (figure 2). The US-lead “war on 
terrorism” embodied some of the changes in the international climate and the associated 
transformation of humanitarianism, as analysed in section 3.1. Immediately in the 
aftermath of the September 11th terrorist attacks, the LRA was added to the United 
State’s Terrorist Exclusion List at the request of the Ugandan government, and the 
National Islamic Front government in Khartoum was pressured to giving the Uganda 
People’s Defence Force (UPDF) permission to launch Operation Iron Fist against the 
LRA in Southern Sudan (Allen 2006, Christian Aid 2004).  
The inclusion of the LRA on the Terrorist Exclusion List gave international clout to 
Museveni’s government, affirming its no-negotiation stance with the LRA, and 
legitimising the Ugandan army’s military approach to the conflict in the country’s 
northern regions (Finnström 2003: 154–155). In May 2002 Uganda passed the Anti-
Terrorism Act, by which membership of terrorist organisations like the LRA was made 
a criminal offence. The Anti-terrorism Act thus completely undermined the Amnesty 
Act that had been passed in 2000 in an attempt to persuade rebels in different parts of 
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Figure 2. Evolution of conflict and intervention in northern Uganda, 2001–2006 
  
 
Core events and development of conflict and intervention in northern Uganda are 
presented in bold text, and arrows refer to suggested consequentiality between events 
and developments. The centre of attention in chapter five are the three 
events/developments that are emphasised by double-lined frames. It is suggested that 
developments presented in italics must be taken into account in order to explain the 
increase of development intervention to northern Uganda since Egeland’s statement.  
 
Uganda out of the bush and into peace negotiations. Peace processes in northern 
Uganda were hindered by the Anti-Terrorism Act, which practically branded all those 
attempting to gain contact with the LRA as rebel collaborators (Christian Aid 2004: 29). 
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5.1.1. Disaster escalates 
During Operation Iron Fist, which was launched in March 2002, an estimated 10 000 
UPDF soldiers effectively pushed the LRA from their bases in Southern Sudan into 
northern Uganda. The LRA was not, however, defeated. Instead the rebels reacted to the 
military campaign by attacking civilians more violently and in a broader area than ever 
before (see appendix 1).28 In response to the attacks, civilians began moving voluntarily 
to town centres and close to army detachments. During 2002 and 2003 the UPDF forced 
all remaining civilians in rural areas into displacement settlements, which were referred 
to by the government as “protected villages”. Forced displacement was more an anti-
insurgency tactic than the claimed protection measure it was argued to be (Allen 2006: 
52). From the point of view of civilian protection, Operation Iron Fist turned out to be a 
complete failure: displacement exposed civilians to further violence from both the LRA 
and the UPDF, and pushed the Acholi into atrocious living conditions (CSOPNU 2004, 
IDMC 2006: iii). The extent of the failure of the Operation has led critics like Allen 
(2006: 52) to question the military campaign’s true motives. At the very least, it can be 
said that Operation Iron Fist served Museveni’s need to have his army reoccupied after 
the end of its involvement in the Democratic Republic of Congo. 
Gradually, Operation Iron Fist and the escalating crisis began to receive more attention. 
The media relayed juicy stories of millenarian rebels, death, mutilation, displacement, 
and the large-scale abduction of children. Fitting such images of suffering into the 
cherished picture of Uganda’s success was not an easy process: there was a realisation 
that the country was “schizophrenic in terms of development... Uganda has been a 
golden baby of the donors for the last twenty years and now they are suddenly 
discovering that there are two million people in Uganda living in camps” (UN worker 
quoted in IDMC 2006: 31). Despite the limited success of Operation Iron Fist, there was 
an over-all feeling of optimism in 2003 about the prospects of the LRA war. The 
government claimed that the war was over, and expectations of international actors 
came to mirror the government’s claims (Allen 2006: 92). 
                                                
28 At this time LRA activities spread beyond Acholiland, to Apac, Lira, Katakwi, Soroti and 
Kumi districts. The first two districts are part of Lango subregion, whereas the others are part of 
Teso. (See map of Uganda, appendix 2) 
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5.1.2. Increased humanitarian assistance 
As it became clear to donors that despite the claims regarding the defeat of the LRA, 
there was still a humanitarian disaster to address, international pressure to address the 
crisis in northern Uganda increased on a number of fronts. Shortly after Jan Egeland’s 
2003 statement, the Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General on 
Internally displaced persons made a trip to northern Uganda, after which a list of 
recommendations was presented to the UN Commission on Human Rights in March 
2004 (AFM 2003, IDMC 2006). A few months earlier, the United States Congress had 
passed the Northern Uganda Crisis Response Act, in which the United States was called 
to increase resources for the assistance and protection of civilians (US Congress 
2004).29 In August 2004, the Office of the Prime Minister of Uganda reacted to the 
pressure by launching The National Policy for Internally Displaced Persons (The 
Republic of Uganda 2004).  
The launching of the policy was widely interpreted as an effort to appease donor 
pressures. Critics argued that as long as the government lacked commitment to its own 
policies, the effect of increased assistance could only be marginal at best (IDMC 2006: 
19). Despite a 92-percent increase of humanitarian assistance under the Consolidated 
Appeal Process (CAP) between 2003 and 2005 (see table 1 and chart 1), there was, 
however, no substantial change for the better in conditions in northern Uganda (IDMC 
2006: 19, UNOCHA 2007).  
In 2005 the World Health Organisation (WHO), in partnership with relief organisations 
and the Ugandan Ministry of Health, conducted a health and mortality survey in Gulu, 
Kitgum and Pader districts, in which it estimated the total internally displaced 
population at around 1,2 million. The study showed high excess mortality for the entire 
northern region, with almost 1000 excess deaths (deaths above the baseline mortality 
rate not attributable to the crisis) per week between January and July of that year. 
During the study period, almost 4000 people were reported to have died of violence, 
and almost 1200 people had been abducted and had not returned home, which meant 20 
killings and 6 abductions every day throughout the districts. Based on the rates of death 
and abductions, it was concluded that in all Acholi districts conflict was at a much more 
intense level than was generally being reported (WHO 2005).  
                                                
29 The act and other legislation in the United States concerning northern Uganda, as well as 
relevant United Nations resolutions, are listed at http://www.ugandacan.org/legislation.php. 
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Table 1: Humanitarian funding to the Uganda complex emergency* under the 
Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP), 2000–2007 
 CAP funds 
requested 
CAP funds 
received 
CAP 
covered  
Total 
humanitarian 
funding** 
2000 27 414 380 17 237 656 63 % 19 434 892 
2001 79 814 162 35 451 595 44 %  39 181 690 
2002 68 114 892 42 503 632 62 %  55 995 273 
2003 148 135 689 123 567 180 83 %  135 065 584 
2004 142 880 013 112 291 217 79 %  153 649 315 
2005 188 777 892 146 212 606 77 % 199 458 213 
2006 263 446 401 236 966 207 90 % 285 433 198 
2007 349 570 726 280 678 042 80 % 296 161 570 
 
* Under the CAP, the Uganda complex emergency includes the LRA-affected areas in northern 
Uganda as well as areas in North-Eastern Uganda that are affected by cattle rustling by Karamoja 
pastoralist.  
**Total humanitarian funding includes CAP funds and additional contributions outside of CAP, for 
instance, bilateral and Red Cross funds. (UNOCHA 2007) 
 
The report showed that conditions were particularly grave in Kitgum and Pader districts, 
which have received less attention throughout the crisis than Gulu. The crude mortality 
rates (CMR) for Gulu, Kitgum and Pader were 1.22, 1.91, and 1.86 respectively – well 
above the 0.9 CMR emergency threshold for Sub-Saharan Africa (The Sphere Project 
2004). Similarly, the under-5 mortality rates (U5MR) for these regions were 2.49, 4.04 
and 4.24. Among the entire surveyed population, 62,2 percent of all children under 5 
had been ill in the two weeks prior to answering (WHO 2005).  
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In some areas in northern Uganda, mortality rates were reported to be three times higher 
than those in Darfur, a comparison which highlights the inadequacy of the humanitarian 
response (ICVA 2006a: 2). The WHO report called for an immediate emergency 
response “far above and beyond the present output both in terms of quantity and 
quality” (2005: 38). The Ugandan Ministry of Health, having itself taken part in 
conducting the survey, responded by denouncing the findings as invalid. According to 
the survey’s coordinator, “[r]esearchers were warned not to disseminate the findings, 
and barred from submitting them for peer-review to a scientific journal” (Checchi 2006: 
9). Although the government was reluctant to acknowledge the report, its findings gave 
a boost to assistance (Allen 2006), as is evident in that between 2005 and 2006 
assistance under the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) increased by 62 percent (see 
table 1 and chart 1).  
In December 2005, the government of Canada and the UN secretary general suggested 
that the UN Security Council (UNSC) should “seize itself of the situation in northern 
Uganda” (IDMC 2006: iv). The Permanent Mission of Uganda to the UN protested, 
claiming that the situation was under control, and no international intervention would be 
necessary or useful (IDMC 2006). Despite the reservations, in January 2006, UNSC 
Resolution 1653 (UNSC 2006a) denounced violence by the LRA, and demanded 
countries in the region to fulfil their obligation to protect their civilian populations. The 
UNSC Resolution 1663 (UNSC 2006b) in March 2006 again condemned violence in the 
region. In Resolution 1653 the Security Council “Urge[d] the international community, 
non-governmental organizations and civil society to increase humanitarian assistance to 
civilians affected by displacements and violence from years of protracted conflicts in 
the Great Lakes region”, and indeed the resolutions did lead to a flurry of activity in the 
humanitarian community, and within the UN itself (IDMC 2006).  
As a response to the increased international pressure and the Security Council 
resolutions, in May 2006 Uganda set up a Joint Monitoring Mechanism (JMM), under 
which a Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC) was given responsibility for the 
implementation of the Emergency Plan for Humanitarian Interventions for the North 
(Joint Monitoring Committee 2006). The Plan explicitly refers to emergency 
humanitarian action in northern Uganda, thus in a sense implicitly admitting that the 
situation in the North actually is an emergency, although the government has to date 
refused to officially pronounce the North as an emergency. The plan takes a rather 
holistic approach to the situation, encompassing everything from conflict resolution and 
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human rights to return and reintegration. Yet the Joint Monitoring Mechanism has been 
criticised for lacking legitimacy and transparency, particularly since the conflict-
affected community was not consulted during the preparation of the Emergency Plan. 
Also, the JMM has created parallel structures to an already fragmented system of 
coordination.  
Although the situation for displaced civilians in northern Uganda has improved, the 
approach of multilateral agencies and donors to the situation has been criticised for a 
lack of sharpness. Representatives of NGOs and community organisations, including 
some of those I interviewed in Kitgum, have suggested that throughout the JMM and 
related humanitarian coordination processes, the “international community [has 
attempted] to appease the government instead of adopting a principled position 
regarding the humanitarian situation and the implementation of the government 
response plans” (IDMC 2006: vi). A moderate conclusion to be made on the situation is 
given in a report by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre: 
It is clear that the growing attention of the UN to the situation in northern Uganda… 
signals an important change in the overall context. It is also clear that the Joint 
Monitoring Mechanism, and the JMC which it provides for, were created in an ad hoc 
attempt to diffuse this growing international pressure. (IDMC 2006: vii, emphasis 
added) 
5.2. Reasons for interest increase 
It would be naïve to simply state that increased attention led to an increase in 
intervention. The crisis in northern Uganda was not a novelty in 2003 when Jan Egeland 
made his statement, although it is a fact that the scale of the war did increase after 2001, 
and particularly with Operation Iron Fist. Yet why Jan Egeland made such a strong 
statement on the situation in 2003, why media interest increased, and why there was a 
substantive shift in international humanitarian response to the situation, is not self-
evident. I suggest that reasons for the shift are to be located primarily outside of the 
immediate crisis in northern Uganda, in realms beyond that of human suffering and the 
humanitarian impulse. As the core of my argument, I quote Barnett (2005: 731): “If 
funding decisions were based solely on need, then places like Sudan, Congo, northern 
Uganda, and Angola would leapfrog to the top of the list. --- Funding is now a several-
tiered system, with the least fortunate getting the least attention”.  
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I have identified two important reasons behind the shift in intervention, which can be 
conceptualised of as a push and pull factor. The first of these has been the over-all 
adjustment of Uganda’s international relations since 2001, to which process belongs the 
donor community’s growing scepticism with the “Ugandan miracle”. As it has become 
apparent that the situation in northern Uganda is not under control, there has been an 
increasing sense among donors and the humanitarian community at large that 
“something has to be done”. This shift in impressions has acted as a push factor for 
increased intervention. The second relevant development, a pull factor for intervention 
in northern Uganda, has been the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
(CPA) in Sudan. 
5.2.1. Renegotiation of donor relations  
Previously, as has been discussed in section 4.5, donors had little interest in bringing 
attention to Uganda’s unsolved problems – to the contrary, “controversial issues have 
generally been brushed under the carpet” (Allen 2006: 27), to the benefit of both parties. 
The donor community has been able to protect the image of Uganda as proof of the 
success of donors’ development policy in Africa, whereas “Museveni has not been held 
accountable… despite donors providing a staggering 49-50percent of Uganda’s annual 
budget… Museveni has manipulated humanitarians to provide assistance to his own 
citizens while allowing government officials to siphon off aid money” (Paul 2006: 4). 
Changes in the international climate after 2001 forced the relationships between donors 
and the Museveni’s regime to be reorganised.  
The categorisation of LRA as a terrorist organisation fitted the Ugandan government’s 
goals perfectly, and a common sentiment has been that Museveni has “managed the 
War on Terror as skilfully as it has managed his donors” (Christian Aid 2004:  37). The 
war in northern Uganda was internationally recognised as a terrorist war, a picture 
endorsed and completed by national and international media imagery of the LRA as 
crazy millenarians with no legitimate grievances or cause (Finnström 2003). In this 
picture, underlying dimensions of conflict in Uganda are brushed aside. Instead, the 
Ugandan government and the UPDF are presented in a good light, as doing their best to 
protect innocent civilians from brutal, crazy terrorists. They are thus viewed as 
deserving of the international community’s sympathy and support. This characterisation 
can be seen to have mitigated the effects of donors’ simultaneous criticism towards the 
Ugandan government.  
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By 2003, however, the UK and the EU explicitly criticised Uganda’s military strategy in 
the North. Partially, the shift from predominantly lenient opinions concerning the 
military strategy to this critical stance can be attributed to the immensity of the 
humanitarian emergency caused by Operation Iron Fist. The resulting international 
outcries by civil society, NGOs and humanitarian actors can be seen to have forced 
donors to take a new stand on the situation. There were lives to be to saved – and faces.  
Yet Uganda was still a much-needed success story for the donors. It can be argued that 
the subtlety of criticism levelled towards both Ugandan economic reforms and its 
military and humanitarian performance in northern Uganda made it possible for donors 
and the humanitarian community to become more deeply involved in northern Uganda 
without the involvement implying strong critique of the Ugandan government. 
Ironically, even Jan Egeland’s outcry on behalf of Northern Ugandan civilians can be 
seen as a legitimisation of Museveni’s policy: Egeland’s blame is aimed at the world, 
which has forgotten northern Uganda – not at the Ugandan government, which has 
forgotten, or even caused, the plight of its own civilians.   
To suggest that the donors’ interest to preserve the image of Ugandan success is central 
to explaining the increase in humanitarian attention to northern Uganda is not to say that 
humanitarian and development actors have not been driven to Acholi also by 
compassion, or the humanitarian imperative. These values and motives are also real and 
relevant, yet it should be obvious that they do not provide an exhaustive explanation for 
the patterns of humanitarian and development engagement in northern Uganda.  
5.2.2. Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) 
On the ninth of January 2005, a peace agreement was signed between the government of 
Sudan and the SPLM/A, ending 21 years of civil war (UNMIS 2007). With the signing 
of the CPA, LRA rebels were practically denied refuge in South Sudan. The CPA 
became an important pull factor for development intervention in northern Uganda in 
two ways. First, settling the northern Ugandan situation became an issue of priority, 
since the LRA was seen as a major threat to the newly found and precarious peace in the 
region (Allen 2006). Second, peace in South Sudan increased prospects for peace in 
northern Uganda, thus increasing the donor community’s willingness to invest in the 
area (IDMC 2006).  
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The CPA increased hopes for a long-term peaceful resolution of the LRA war, and 
clarified one aspect of the complex conflict reality. The process can be described as the 
reversal of a phenomenon of which Finnström writes (2003: 151): “Complex civil wars 
in Africa ... are reported to be the expression of a new kind of barbarism, where … 
violent anarchy has replaced any political dimensions… [A]s the lived complexities 
thicken and ethnic stereotyping fails, the world press typically loses interest”. The 
partial resolution of the conflict’s regional dimension can be seen to have simplified the 
situation so as to make it more consumable for Western media. In an interview dealing 
with why some humanitarian emergencies are more forgotten than others, Jan Egeland 
suggests why this “psychological” factor was so important: “[In northern Uganda] 
they’re in an endless cycle of misery and people do not like endless cycles. They like a 
beginning, and they like an end” (Blake 200: 21, emphasis in original). As long as there 
was no end in sight to the crisis situation, people; by whom Egeland supposedly means 
Western news consumers, donor governments, and development organisations’ 
decision-makers; were not keen to fund humanitarian activities in the region. 
As noted in chapter four, Southern Sudan was in effect sealed off from the LRA after 
the signing of the CPA. An immediate effect of the decrease in LRA presence and 
activity in northern Uganda was that the operating environment for humanitarian action 
became more stable and secure. In this sense, the CPA enabled an increase in funding 
for development intervention in the area. (See Finnström (2003: 143) for more on how 
insecurity has been used as a reason for the withholding and withdrawing of funds at 
different stages in the conflict.) 
Recently the official truth, which most of the humanitarian and development workers I 
interviewed also believed, has been that whether or not the LRA would sign a peace 
agreement, there would be peace, or at least relative calm, in northern Uganda. Almost 
without exception, the agency staff I interviewed believed that as long as this relative 
calm persists, development funding to the area would increase, and would increase even 
further if a peace agreement was reached.  
Since the signing of the CPA, two substantial shifts in the northern Ugandan conflict 
have occurred that have had substantial repercussions for development intervention in 
the area: the issuing of ICC (International Criminal Court) warrants for top LRA leaders 
in October 2005, and the beginning of a new round of peace talks in July 2006 (see 
figure 2). 
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5.3. ICC warrants and attacks on humanitarians 
On the 7th of October 2005 the Ugandan defence minister made a public announcement 
in which he informed that the International Criminal Court (ICC) was to issue warrants 
for five top leaders of the LRA.30 The ICC Office of the Prosecutor had made an 
application for the warrants already in May that year, but the applications, and later the 
actual warrants, were sealed so as to ensure that sufficient measures for the protection of 
displaced people in northern Uganda would be in place by the time the warrants were 
publicly announced (Allen 2006: 183).  
According to Allen (ibid.) a number of humanitarian organisations in northern Uganda 
had been very outspoken in their objection to the ICC process. Organisations had aired 
fears that the ICC investigation and any charges pressed against the LRA would only 
serve to reignite violence in the area. Aid staff in the region not only feared increased 
violence towards the displaced population, but also violence towards aid agencies. As it 
turned out, perhaps because information of the warrants leaked out earlier than was 
proposed, the measures to ensure security were not sufficient. Allen argues that it seems 
likely that the ICC did not anticipate the immediate and long-term repercussions of its 
involvement in northern Uganda. Immediately after the issuing of the warrants, the 
LRA targeted aid agencies. In October 2005, in three separate ambushes, two local staff 
members of humanitarian organisations were killed and four injured. As a result, 
humanitarian agencies curtailed their operations. On the first of November 2005, UN 
operations resumed, but immediately after the resumption, attacks continued. Three aid 
workers were killed in attacks in South Sudan on November 2nd and 5th. A few days 
later, a tourist was killed in Murchison Falls National Park on the South-Western side of 
Gulu (Allen 2006). 
Allen finds it unclear whether the attacks were “the result of a coordinated strategy” 
(2006: 190). He quotes senior UPDF officers who claimed that the “attacks on 
expatriates were probably being made by groups of rebels who wanted to steal things, 
so that they would have something to live on when they surrender.” Yet it seems highly 
unlikely that such a number of incidents in the immediate wake of the ICC indictments 
                                                
30 The five leaders for whom arrest warrants were issued were Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Raska 
Lukwiya, Okot Odhiambo, Dominik Ongwen (in order according to rank when warrants 
issued). Raska Lukwiya was killed by the UPDF in August 2006, whereas Vincent Otti, who 
headed the peace team in Juba, was in October 2007 confirmed by the LRA to be dead (BBC 
2007). Presumably Otti was killed under orders from Kony over disputes within the LRA. 
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could be purely coincidental. Others, such as Finnström (2006c), place the attacks in a 
broader context: “The warrants provoked rebel attacks on international NGOs and 
Western individuals… When humanitarian organisations take over many of the 
functions of the Ugandan government, some will be perceived… as a parallel partner to 
the army.” The research team of the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre of 
Makerere University (IDMC), which was conducting research in the region during the 
time of the attacks, reported that among humanitarian actors on the ground, there was 
“widespread speculation that these [attacks] were a direct response by the LRA to the… 
[ICC] warrants” (2006: 14). 
According to Finnström (2003, 2006c) the LRA’s attacks on humanitarian agencies can 
be understood as a reaction to the internationalisation of the conflict. In this light it 
would seem that the LRA perceived the ICC warrants as the international community’s 
blessing for Museveni’s policy in northern Uganda. Since the ICC chief prosecutor was 
out of the LRA’s reach, the rebels protested against the international humanitarian 
regime in the only possible way they could – by attacking the regime’s representatives 
in Acholi. The LRA’s interpretation that the international community was, through the 
ICC, taking Museveni’s side, was in a sense very valid: although the ICC is 
theoretically responsible for assessing crimes by all conflict parties, thus including the 
UPDF, the ICC has not to date issued any warrants for UPDF soldiers for crimes 
committed against the civilian population in northern Uganda (Allen 2006).  
Since the attacks in 2005, the LRA has not attacked humanitarian agencies. It is difficult 
to say whether this is because of increased security measures taken by agencies, or 
because the LRA was not interested in curtailing humanitarian activities but in making a 
statement. The later option seems more likely in light of the fact that “the LRA has been 
less aggressive towards humanitarian staff than most modern rebel armies” (Checchi 
2006: 10), and considering the LRA’s extremely limited options for making itself heard.  
In a letter distributed to local people in Gulu in December 1999, the LRA writes:  
Today several UN agencies… and NGOs… are masquerading as relief workers during 
trouble and times of war. But these organizations operate on a set agenda to deplete 
your natural resources. Those operating among you are actually the shield and spears 
for Museveni against you. (Signed by senior rebel commander Kollo Sam, translated 
from the Acholi original, quoted in Finnström 2003: 195–196) 
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After the attacks, Vincent Otti, the second in command of the LRA, has been reported 
to have “categorically denied that there was a policy of attacking aid workers” ((Allen 
2006: 190). Whether or not the attacks were coordinated and purposeful, they led to a 
fundamental change in the nature of intervention in northern Uganda, as UPDF escorts 
were mobilised to protect the delivery of humanitarian assistance. All agencies except 
the ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross) and MSF (Médecins Sans 
Frontières) started to use armed escorts.  
5.4. Peace talks and intervention in July–August 2006 
The nature of the conflict changed again when a new round of peace talks was launched 
under the lead of the Government of South Sudan in July 2006. The effect of these talks 
on the scale and form of development intervention in northern Uganda was, at the time 
of fieldwork in August 2006, still uncertain. The overall impression of the talks was that 
because there was more international involvement and media coverage than previously, 
the talks were more likely to succeed than earlier peace processes (IDMC 2006: iii). Yet 
in Kitgum, the humanitarian and development community was in a state of limbo, as 
was the displaced population. Peace or war, decongestion of displacement camps into 
smaller camps or no, and relief or development – many questions were still in the 
process of being answered when I conducted fieldwork for this study.  
Opinions on the prospects of the talks varied immensely: some humanitarian workers 
were extremely cynical, whereas others were more optimistic. Optimism was largely 
due to the fact that the security situation had substantially improved from what it had 
been only six months previously, and there had been no fatal attacks by the rebels since 
2005. As a result, UPDF escorts for humanitarian assistance were gradually being 
drawn back. Since rebel activity had diminished and the majority of the rebels were in a 
camp in the distant Garamba National Park in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC), most of the development workers interviewed believed that there would be 
relative peace whether or not an official peace agreement was reached. 
Although the security situation had improved, the humanitarian crisis was still severe. 
Altogether 1,7 million people were estimated to be displaced in all the LRA-affected 
regions, of these 1,1 million in Acholi, of which 310 000 in Kitgum (UNOCHA 2006a). 
As security improved, people were moving closer to their homes in order to gain access 
to more farmland. Predominantly such spontaneous resettlement was occurring in 
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Lango and Teso districts, and population movement in Acholi districts including 
Kitgum was only gradually beginning (UNOCHA 2006a). In Kitgum the humanitarian 
community was challenged to address this movement to settlements outside established 
displacement camps. Many of the resettlement sites had serious inadequacies in terms of 
water, sanitation, health and education facilities. In addition, some of the locations to 
which people were moving had not been surveyed for mines and other unexploded 
ordinances. One of the topmost priorities of the humanitarian community in Kitgum in 
August 2006 was addressing a cholera epidemic in Kitgum and Pader districts, the 
persistence of which can be seen as evidence of the severe inadequacy of water and 
sanitation facilities in the region even after years of intense intervention (UNOCHA 
2006b). 
During my two and a half week stay in Kitgum I visited two camps (Palagek Gem and 
Lagoro) that had only recently received security clearance for access without armed 
escorts. Despite increased security and loosening travel restrictions, the evolving and 
unclear situation with the peace talks caused uncertainty among humanitarian staff. On 
August 12th 2006, while I was in Kitgum, Raska Lukwiya, one of the ICC-indicted LRA 
leaders, was killed in a village some twenty kilometres’ distance from Kitgum town 
(New Vision & Sunday Monitor, 13 August 2006). Though the news was, at least in 
public, received in a relaxed manner by many of the expatriates, locals I spoke with 
were profoundly worried that the event would lead to immediate retaliations by the 
LRA. None such action followed, however, as the majority of LRA troops had at this 
time moved to Garamba national park in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and only 
splinter groups were present in Kitgum.  
Yet for myself the violent death of a top rebel leader just kilometres from where I was 
staying made the reality of conflict seem more real, and the prospect of driving along 
roads that had only days earlier been deemed unsafe to travel without armed escort was 
daunting. Other newcomers – humanitarians who had worked in Kitgum only for a short 
time seemed similarly worried, yet both local and international staff who had lived and 
worked in the area during much worse times, seemed rather at peace with the current 
situation. Women interviewed in camps were not as reassured. Obviously, years of 
uncertainty could not be erased with one set of peace talks. Women in the camps told 
me that there had been talks before, and there was little hope that these new ones would 
turn out any differently. A profound sense of insecurity was constantly reignited by 
rebel sightings around displacement camps. Many humanitarian workers observed to me 
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that there were gaps between real and perceived security threats. In so saying, they 
seemed to me to imply that the displaced had a tendency to dramatise events. Although 
this might have been partially true, to me it also spoke of the casual insensitivity with 
which humanitarian workers could address the worries of the displaced. As it was, it 
was not the humanitarians’ homes that the rebels approached, nor their g-nuts (as 
Ugandans refer to groundnuts) that the rebels were picking.  
5.5. Uganda and its donors; partners in crime?  
The ICC, to which the Ugandan government has referred the LRA, is dedicated to 
ending impunity for the worst crimes against humanity, one of which is the unfounded 
forcible displacement of population. In this sense it is ironic that the system of 
population displacement to camps in northern Uganda would not have been possible 
without donor assistance. It must be granted to the donors and NGOs involved that they 
were not gleefully happy to become the main sources of funding for such a system. 
Allen (2006: 59) describes how in the middle of the 1990’s NGOs were in fact reluctant 
to start delivering food aid to the displacement camps. As the humanitarian disaster 
escalated, and as the Ugandan government refused to launch emergency measures in a 
situation that it refused to designate as a disaster, the humanitarian community was 
eventually drawn into a no-win situation: providing assistance to displacement camps 
implicitly legitimised Museveni’s policy, while refusing to provide assistance would 
most likely have led to a drastic deterioration of the living conditions of those displaced 
by the conflict. A number of those I interviewed in Kitgum were extremely frustrated 
with how the situation had evolved: 
The UN and the NGOs arrived here because the district wasn’t doing anything… the 
NGOs of course, being driven by humanitarian principles and whatever, intervened and 
began intervening in the camps and of course you know that created a cycle, and had a 
multiplier effect on the district, because they didn’t want to do it at the time, and now 
they are lazy and they’re saying, okay now there are the NGOs, let the NGOs do 
[everything]. (Interview in Kitgum, 16 August 2006) 
In explaining the entanglement of relief operations with the realities of war, Finnström 
(2003) describes how humanitarian organisations are stuck with implementing the 
government’s policy of forced encampment, and how “the Ugandan authorities continue 
to influence and even condition any relief or humanitarian activity by the various 
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international organizations, making the relief situation very intricate and by no means 
neutral” (ibid: 187). I described Finnström’s views to a number of the humanitarian and 
development workers I interviewed, and received varying responses. Others agreed 
whole-heartedly, yet Finnström’s views were also repeatedly refuted on two grounds. 
First of all, the displacement, though obviously also a counter-insurgency tactic, can be 
claimed to have been a necessary measure for the protection of the population. For 
instance, most of the women I interviewed in Kitgum told me they moved to the camps 
voluntarily because of rebel aggressions. (At two camps, Akwang and Kitgum Matidi, 
some told me they moved “when the government recommended it”). Second, strong 
government presence in the North, and the fact that relief organizations are 
implementing the Ugandan government’s policy was not seen as problematic by those 
who argued that precisely such relationships were needed and should have been 
nurtured by the Ugandan government and intervening agengcies. In fact, many argued 
that the problem was that the Ugandan government has not taken enough lead in the 
design and implementation of relief efforts in northern Uganda.  
How one conceptualises the question depends on where one assigns the northern 
Ugandan situation on a relief-development continuum, and correspondingly, on how 
development in general is conceptualised. Intricately related to this is also the question 
of neutrality. I will return to these questions in chapter six.  
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6. At the interface of intervention and conflict in Kitgum  
In this chapter I will attempt to analyse the interactions of development intervention and 
conflict in northern Uganda by focusing on interactions occurring “on the ground”, at 
the level of individuals and organisations operating in the conflict area, particularly in 
Kitgum. As was discussed in chapter two, I am theoretically inspired in this task by the 
notion of social interface, which “explores how discrepancies of social interest, cultural 
interpretation, knowledge and power are mediated and perpetuated or transformed at 
critical points of linkage or confrontation” (Long 2004: 16).  
The critical points of linkage and confrontation studied here are those that occur around 
development intervention in northern Uganda. Since social reality in the region is so 
markedly affected by the conflict between the LRA and the Ugandan government, I am 
particularly interested in studying whether and how development intervention has 
affected this conflict. As I noted in chapter one, both during fieldwork and in my 
subsequent analysis of the research material, I have focused my attention on 
development intervention’s unintended and/or negative impacts.  
My enquiry into these impacts is guided in part by some of the central elements of the 
transformation of humanitarianism which were discussed in chapter three: expansion 
and standardisation in the humanitarian enterprise (adapted to the northern Ugandan 
situation in section 6.1), the realigned relations between development and security, and 
the relief–development continuum (section 6.2). In other words, I will attempt to 
analyse whether and in what ways the transformation of humanitarianism is evident in 
northern Uganda. In section 6.3 I will discuss some of the more existential impacts of 
development intervention in northern Uganda, thus returning to questions brought up in 
section 1.5 concerning the ethics of intervention amid displacement and suffering. 
Through this analysis, it is my goal to provide a preliminary picture of how 
development intervention and conflict interact on the ground, i.e. at the interface, in 
northern Uganda. I acknowledge that further research would be required in order to 
provide a more elaborate understanding of these interactions – in this chapter I aim to 
point out some directions that such further research could take.  
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6.1. Transformed humanitarianism in practice: interpreting the 
situation in Kitgum 
In this section I will describe the interactions of development intervention and conflict 
in northern Uganda in light of the growth and standardisation of the humanitarian 
regime. The increase of humanitarian assistance for northern Uganda was traced in 
section 5.1.2 – here the aim is to describe some of the practical manifestations of this 
increase on the ground, particularly in Kitgum. 
6.1.1 Influx of actors, increased need for coordination  
When Jan Egeland visited here, all the NGOs were really needing for the UN agencies 
to come and have a presence. But now I think it would be better if they hadn’t come. 
They’re like elephants, stomping around all over the place. (Interview in Kitgum, 16 
August 2006) 
The above quote, taken from an interview with an NGO representative who had been in 
Kitgum already before Jan Egeland’s much-quoted statement, highlights the core points 
of criticism levelled particularly at UN organisations concerning their dealing with the 
humanitarian disaster in northern Uganda. Not only have they been criticised for 
arriving on the scene very late (the UN only seriously stepped up its presence starting in 
2006), but also for the quality of their ensuing work (IDMC 2006). Some of the NGO 
workers I interviewed in Kitgum for instance claimed that the staff the UN initially sent 
to the district were unusually inexperienced; some even described them as incompetent. 
(Some UN people in their turn criticised small NGOs for their unprofessional work). 
Similar criticism has also been targeted at others beside UN actors. Overall, despite a 
growth in the magnitude of the intervention, the relief effort in northern Uganda have 
been described as a fragmented patchwork that has been exceedingly project-driven and 
lacking in coordination  (ICVA 2006a).  
Coordination is a pervasive problem at all levels of humanitarian and development work 
in Uganda. The problems of coordination follow from and are compounded by an 
overall lack of common understanding and vision among interveners on what actually 
needs to be done about the crisis in northern Uganda (ICVA 2006a). Indeed, 
intervention in northern Uganda is grounded in a fundamental incoherence both 
concerning approaches to resolving the conflict, and concerning approaches to the 
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humanitarian situation (see sections 3.4 and 3.5. Section 6.3 will particularly discuss the 
relief–development dilemma in Kitgum).  
The patchwork-nature of the humanitarian response in northern Uganda is attributable 
to the fact that the increased interest shown to the crisis by the media and by major 
international actors attracted flocks of humanitarian and development actors to the area 
at an uncontrolled speed (see section 3.4 on the “power of presence”). Furthermore, 
these actors came from a variety of different backgrounds, and adopted very different 
approaches to their attempts at tackling the situation in northern Uganda. In 2004 there 
were hardly any development actors in Kitgum, whereas in July 2006, altogether 44 
organisations were listed as active in the district (UNOCHA 2006c).31 In addition to 
these 44 there were some organisations (local and international) that chose to work 
outside the coordination system and were thus not included in the list compiled by the 
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA).  
When the major influx of agencies to Kitgum began, there were hardly any coordination 
mechanisms in place (ICVA 2006a). Previously there had been no need for heavy 
bureaucracy, since actors were few in number, and coordination meetings could take 
place around one table in one NGO’s office.  Once the influx of agencies began, it took 
a long time for proper coordination mechanisms to be developed (interviews in Kitgum, 
August 2006).32 In August 2006, coordination in Kitgum centred on weekly one- or 
two-hour-long meetings at the UNOCHA office. These meetings were referred to in 
almost every interview as a sign of good coordination, but having myself attended one 
of the meetings, I was slightly sceptical as to how much they could actually achieve, 
and so were some of the NGO representatives I interviewed. Some considered the 
Tuesday morning meetings a bad joke, since effects of this so-called coordination were 
not visible on the ground: “We make plans to build a pit latrine. We consult the 
community, and decide on the location of the latrine. A week later we go to do the 
digging, simply to find that some other agency already made a latrine in the very same 
place ours was going to be” (Interview in Kitgum, 16 August 2006). My informant’s 
rather critical view of coordination in Kitgum confirms the findings of the Internal 
                                                
31 These included both international and local actors. Most local NGOs in the district were 
dependent on international funding, and many worked as implementing partners for large 
international organisations: their number had thus grown alongside the number of 
international actors. 
32 A fact that harshly contradicted a main guiding principle of humanitarian assistance, i.e. that 
coordination and the building of local capacities are to be priorities of relief assistance (ICRC 
1995). 
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Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) during fieldwork in October-November 2005 
(2006: 18). It seemed, however, that between the time of IDMC’s fieldwork and August 
2006, coordination had improved. Almost all of the development professionals I 
interviewed agreed that coordination had been insufficient during the scaling up of 
humanitarian activities in the district, and that the level of coordination had improved 
during the past year. (See also ICVA 2006a and ICVA 2006b) 
In terms of how intervention and conflict interact, one of the core consequences of the 
lack of coordination in northern Uganda has been that the humanitarian/development 
community has treated different Acholi districts unequally. Gulu has for years been the 
centre of attention, Kitgum has come in second, and a major response to the situation in 
Pader was only beginning at the time of fieldwork. It seemed that the inequality of 
humanitarian response was an issue also within Kitgum district, partly due to the fact 
that some camps were safer for humanitarian and development actors to visit than 
others. Some of the women’s groups I interviewed were very aware of what was being 
distributed in other camps, and resentful of why other camps were receiving more 
assistance than theirs although their needs were just as great.  
Through my interviews at displacement camps, I got the impression that it was 
challenging for the displaced to keep track of which organisations worked in their camp, 
and to differentiate between the different organisations and their various mandates. For 
instance, the Lutheran World Federation (LWF), which facilitated my visits to the 
displacement camps, was not listed by any of the women when asked which 
organisations worked at their camp, although all the camps I visited were ones in which 
the LWF was implementing water and sanitation and HIV and AIDS projects. I related 
my impressions of the displaced women’s bewilderment with the actions of intervening 
organisations to some of the NGO representatives I interviewed. Most headed off these 
remarks as unfounded, and explained to me that their organisation spent abundant time 
talking to people and making sure they were being understood.  
6.1.2. Economic impacts of intervention  
The relevance of development assistance as an element of conflict economies has been 
argued forcibly by Nordstrom (2001, 2004). She goes beyond the claim that 
humanitarian or development assistance merely affects conflict economies by arguing 
that in complex conflicts such as that in northern Uganda, the very foundations of 
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economy are undergirded by transactions which cross the borderline of formal and 
shadow economies and political realities (2001: 225). Nordstrom’s was not a view that 
was commonly embraced by the development professionals I interviewed in Kitgum. 
Two representatives of international NGOs argued that economy was a significant and 
seriously overlooked element of the conflict in northern Uganda, and that development 
assistance played an important role in the conflict economy on both the national and the 
local scale. Most of those I interviewed, however, either felt that the conflict economy 
had been sufficiently analysed, or argued that there in fact were no economical factors 
at play in the conflict.  
Indeed, there are limitations to the applicability of the conflict economy approach to 
explaining the prolongation of conflict. I suggest that what Leopold (2001: 104) argues 
for intervention in the north-western Ugandan district of Arua, holds true for LRA-
affected areas also: “The conflict…is not, in my view, understandable in such terms 
[economic gains or vested interests in the conflict]; the economic factor is simply one 
among many that must be considered and placed within the broader historical context.” 
Although only one among many factors to be considered, it does seem likely that when 
so many aid dollars are circulating as there are in Kitgum, some parties will have an 
interest in keeping the money flowing.  
The northern Ugandan conflict has had important economic repercussions for Uganda 
on a national level. First of all, in the sense that it has kept the national army occupied, 
and secondly, in that it has secured donor funding for the national budget (as discussed 
in section 4.5). The national army has not only been employed in fighting the rebels, but 
also in protecting humanitarian assistance, as will be discussed in section 6.2.1. Another 
link to national-level interests was suggested to me by informants in Kitgum according 
to whom the majority of relief food purchased by the World Food Programme (WFP) 
came from a company that was owned by president Museveni’s daughter.  
From the social interface perspective it is also important to analyse the economic 
aspects of intervention in Kitgum from the point of view of the local economy and 
population, rather than simply focus on whether intervention has, through the conflict 
economy, prolonged the war between the LRA and the Ugandan government. 
Intervention has indeed implied extensive direct and indirect economic inputs into the 
economy in Kitgum, many of which become apparent simply by walking through the 
town centre: vehicles are hired for agencies and for the use of military escorts, hundreds 
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of people are employed by development organisations, or as housekeepers and the like 
for expatriate humanitarians, NGO delegations, researchers and other visitors are 
accommodated and fed by hotels and restaurants, and local trade benefits from the 
extensive purchasing power of international organisations and their staff. Some of the 
economic impacts of intervention were really quite glaring, such as the shop off the 
main road of Kitgum town that specialised in luxuries like Italian coffee and imported 
cheese.33 Another significant economic (and also infrastructural and demographic) 
effect of intervention in northern Uganda has been that the population of previously 
predominately rural districts has become increasingly urbanised. The displacement 
camps in themselves can of course not be referred to as “urban settlements”, yet 
displacement in the area has led to the marked growth of trading centres and central 
cities like Kitgum (interviews in Kitgum, August 2006).  
Another issue that should be reflected on in terms of the economy is what will happen 
when agencies eventually withdraw from Kitgum. Leopold (2001) notes that the 
withdrawal of development agencies from Arua at the end of the 1990s had massive 
impacts on the local economy. The same is to be anticipated once the time comes for 
agencies to withdraw from Kitgum: who will hire trucks then, provide well-paid 
employment, crowd the only functioning internet café on the main street, stay at hotel 
Bomah, or buy the imported cheese and crackers sold at the munu store? Some of the 
humanitarian workers interviewed in Kitgum said that such questions were weighty 
enough to for instance cause “some guys to always make the security situation seem as 
bad as possible [so that NGOs would use escorts]” (interview in Kitgum, 10 August 
2006). 
6.1.3 Conceptualisations of the conflict  
As Nordstrom (2001: 226) notes, “the cultures each player brings to a war zone helps 
shape the very notions of what war is, what future political systems are possible, what 
peace is tolerable”. Particularly relevant to a social interface analysis of intervention in 
northern Uganda is the analysis of how intervening actors understand the context of 
conflict in the region. These conceptualisations affect relationships between interveners 
                                                
33 Leopold (2001) describes exactly such a shop in Arua, known locally as the mzungu shop, and 
providing humanitarian workers with products that were otherwise hard or impossible to get 
in the middle of a conflict zone. At the time of my fieldwork, the owner of the mzungu (in 
Acholi terms, munu) shop in Kitgum was, having received encouragement and advice from 
Italian NGO workers, contemplating starting up a pizzeria. This would indeed have 
dramatically increased the variety of courses available in the town’s restaurants. 
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and other actors – the army, local government representatives, the displaced population, 
and the LRA rebels. Also, interveners’ understandings of the situation frame reports to 
Northern funding agencies and the international media, which again has an effect on 
how much funding the crisis receives, and what type of response is implemented.  
Although from a social interface perspective it would be important to analyse the 
conceptualisations of all actors in northern Uganda, I will focus only on the perceptions 
of interveners.34 My interviews in Kitgum led me to agree with what both Allen (2006) 
and Finnström (2003) have argued for northern Uganda, that is, that the understanding 
of the conflict context, particularly by expatriate humanitarian and development 
workers in the region, is insufficient and in some cases non-existent. As I understood 
the situation during my brief stay in Kitgum, much of this lack of understanding was 
due to the fact that expatriates did not take any part in local social life. Finnström (ibid.) 
has even described how some staff members of international agencies had for instance 
been specifically instructed not to talk to the displaced during food handouts.  
Having myself come to northern Uganda with an extremely patchy understanding of the 
conflict, I was surprised to find that most of the expatriates (whether African, European 
or American) I spoke to about the conflict in Kitgum had even scantier knowledge of its 
background than I did. Allen (2006: 25) was similarly surprised during his fieldwork in 
northern Uganda when he realised how many humanitarian workers and journalists in 
the area had never heard of Alice Lakwena, the leader of the HSM/A rebellion (see 
section 4.2). Leopold (2001) notes for Arua, as I did in Kitgum, that none of the 
international staff he met had read “any of the published academic material on local 
history, though some of it was easily available… and of immediate relevance to their 
work” (ibid: 106).  
My findings, which in many regards closely mirror those of Leopold and Finnström, are 
well in sync with the characteristics of the humanitarian professional in transformed 
humanitarianism, described in sections 3.4 and 3.5. It is common for today’s 
humanitarians to have expertise in a limited technical field or in humanitarian 
management, and for this expertise to be the result of experience in a number of 
                                                
34 The views of displaced Acholi populations have been interpreted in detail by Finnström 
(2003), whereas I have not found a study that would have focused analysis on the views of 
representatives of the national or local government concerning the conflict and development 
intervention. Long (2004) points out that local authorities play a crucial role in how 
development interventions unfold, and it is indeed a great shortcoming of this and other 
studies on northern Uganda that the role and views of local authorities have not been 
systematically analysed.  
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emergencies in different parts of the world. Such professional expertise is also generally 
more valued than is the understanding of local realities (Leopold 2001). Under the logic 
of what I have termed rapid-deployment humanitarianism (see section 3.5), it is not 
considered problematic that most of the managerial staff, as in Kitgum, is employed on 
relatively short-term contracts, with little opportunity or incentive to become closely 
acquainted with local culture, religion or politics. 
Despite the fact that their knowledge was patchy and in some cases rather non-existent, 
almost all the humanitarian and development workers I interviewed were, however, 
eager to make rather all-knowing and absolute statements on the conflict. Few seemed 
interested to fill the gaps in their information, or to double-check views they openly 
admitted were based on unconfirmed rumours. As there is so little interaction between 
the international staff and local people, the misconceptions interveners have concerning 
the conflict are reinforced again and again. In the process, the discourses held by those 
with power become dominant, and misconceptions become unquestioned truths (see 
section 2.3, Long 2004).35  
Expatriate understanding of the local context is particularly lacking as concerns 
processes of reconciliation (see Finnström 2006a). It could of course be argued that for 
humanitarian or development professionals to carry out their work well does not require 
for them to be experts on the peace process, or on local reconciliation rituals. However, 
the claim lacks credibility if, as I argue in this study, development intervention and 
conflict unavoidably interact in myriad ways. Also, as it is characteristic of transformed 
humanitarianism to demand that intervention in fact contribute to peace building (see 
chapter 3), and in light of the fact that many of the relief and development agencies in 
Kitgum had peace-building components in their activities, it would seem reasonable that 
the organisations’ staff (expatriate bosses included) have at least an elementary 
understanding of issues concerning reconciliation.  
Why then are cultural and religious aspects of the conflict and of reconciliation 
disregarded? One reason is suggested by Barnett (2001: 62), who notes that when 
problems are defined as technical, outsiders are more likely to govern situations. 
Following this line of thought it could be suggested that interveners attempt to maintain 
                                                
35 One such misconception is that concerning the number of children abducted by the LRA, for 
which the rebels have become so notorious. Allen (2006: 63) notes that he was unable to find 
any evidence for the claim made, for instance, by the International Criminal Court, that over 85 
per cent of recruitment to the LRA consists of abducted children.  
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the appearance of technicality by focusing on issues within their range of expertise so as 
to bolster their authority at the interface. Yet rather than that relief workers would have 
been cynically uninterested in the local situation, it seemed to me that they were so 
occupied with other issues that there was little time left for them to contemplate 
dynamics of the peace process, not to mention Acholi history or cosmology. As a UN 
worker said to me when I questioned her about the complexities of the humanitarian 
response in Kitgum: “Okay. You see, when there’s a cholera epidemic, we need plastic 
sheets arrived yesterday” (Interview in Kitgum, 16 August 2006).  
All in all, Leopold’s comments on the situation in Arua are consistent with my 
experience in Kitgum: “Agency staff sometimes appeared to be obsessed with internal 
ideological issues rather than concerned about what was happening around them… 
Much of the discussion was orientated around the theoretical distinction between 
development and relief, and how to move between the two” (2001: 107). It is to the 
discussions on relief and development and security and development in Kitgum that we 
now turn.  
6.2. Negotiating relief, development and security in Kitgum 
In section 6.2 I will draw attention to some of the dynamics in the relations of relief, 
development and security in Kitgum. As discussed in section 3.3, relief, development 
and security are conceptualised as inseparably interrelated in transformed 
humanitarianism’s model of complex political emergencies. Questions concerning the 
neutrality of aid and the independence of intervening organisations are therefore tied 
both to issues of security (see section 3.1), and to the relief–development continuum 
(see section 3.2).  
6.2.1. Development intervention amid conflict in northern Uganda 
Operating in the midst of new wars such as that in northern Uganda has increased 
humanitarian actors’ vulnerability to violence (see section 3.1). As a result, the relations 
between humanitarian actors and security forces have been renegotiated under 
transformed humanitarianism. One of the classic principles of humanitarian assistance, 
which has also been set down in recent codes of conduct for relief and development 
assistance, is that relief and development assistance are to be impartial and neutral (see 
for instance ICRC 1995, and section 3.5 in this study). Working amid conflict poses 
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intervening agencies with particular challenges to maintaining these principles. These 
challenges were also apparent in Kitgum.  
The impartiality of aid was not self-evident to the displaced women I interviewed in the 
district. At one camp I was told that the World Food Programme’s (WFP) food rations 
were being cut down under orders from the Ugandan government, and at another camp 
women explained that NGOs made decisions on whom to help based on 
recommendations from the government. Similarly some of Finnström’s (2003) 
informants were under the impression that the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) had been sent to the camps by the Ugandan government.  
Many of the development and humanitarian workers I interviewed emphatically stressed 
the need for agencies to uphold neutrality, and would have agreed with the claim that 
“humanitarian principles of neutrality and impartiality are necessary to maintain the 
confidence of the [Ugandan] government (and other parties) about the NGOs’ 
humanitarian intentions” (ICVA 2006a: 10). Yet despite common goodwill, the reality 
was far from the principles, as is suggested by how a field office director of an 
international organisation responded to my question on the neutrality of intervention in 
northern Uganda: “Oh, we’re all in bed with the government!” (interview in Kitgum, 11 
August 2006). 
The neutrality of humanitarian and development assistance in northern Uganda was 
particularly challenged by the need to provide security for intervening actors. After the 
LRA rebels attacked development workers in October 2005 (see section 5.3), a number 
of humanitarian actors withdrew their operations, and before returning to the area, were 
forced to scale up procedures with which to ensure safe access to the displacement 
camps. For all other international actors except the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC) and Medécins Sans Frontièrers (MSF), the strategy of choice has been to 
rent trucks with which UPDF soldiers escorted agency staff to the displacement camps.  
Views varied in Kitgum on how the use of escorts affected the neutrality of intervening 
organisations. The use of escorts was not seen as a sign of lacking conflict sensitivity by 
most of those I interviewed, yet at the same time, many acknowledged the problems 
linked to using escorts. As a UN representative told me: 
Of course the NGOs have been conflict sensitive, [but] we have breached some of our 
fundamental principles by, you know, for instance, principle of neutrality and 
independence, those ones have been completely compromised by the mere fact that we 
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have been using military escorts. (Interview, Kitgum, 10/08/06) 
Many argued that using UPDF escorts was appropriate because as a representative of a 
UN organisation put it “the Government of Uganda has a responsibility to ensure 
humanitarian access, okay. In this context the UNDSS, which is the security department 
of the UN… has found that it is necessary and appropriate to use armed escorts in order 
to ensure the delivery of assistance” (Interview in Kitgum, 16 August 2006). When I 
asked an NGO worker whether he thought that using the escorts implied that the 
intervening organisations were siding with the government, he replied: “You are siding 
because your security is supposed to be guaranteed by the government”, after which he 
continued, laughing, “You cannot move with an escort of the LRA!” (Interview in 
Kitgum, 8 August 2006). The sardonic comment was of course true; the LRA does not 
provide armed escort services; yet the dilemma of taking sides cannot be brushed aside 
this simply (see for instance Anderson 1999, IASC 2001). 
Whatever the responsibilities of the Ugandan government to protect humanitarian 
assistance, the government is a party to conflict in northern Uganda, and it seems naïve 
to propose that using escorts provided by a conflict party has no unintended or negative 
impacts on the dynamics of conflict. Yet this was exactly what a number of those I 
interviewed in Kitgum argued. Others however; both in organisations which did and did 
not use escorts; were immensely critical of the use of escorts, and both the Ugandan 
government and the humanitarian community in northern Uganda were criticised for 
having given insufficient consideration to alternative strategies for the military escorts 
(see also CSOPNU 2004: 7). None of the displaced women I interviewed, however, 
criticised aid agencies for using military escorts. Rather it was argued that the escorts 
were needed to ensure that relief workers were safe, and to make sure that “the rebels 
don’t attack and take away the things they [aid organisations] are bringing to the 
camps” (Interview at Palabek Gem camp, 10 August 2006). 
A number of my informants referred to the risks included in using UPDF escorts. I was 
told that some organisations had learned from LRA returnees that the rebels had been 
specifically instructed not to attack the ICRC and MSF, because they did not use 
escorts. On the other hand, I was told that government officials had accused agencies 
that had not taken to using UPDF escorts of rebel collaboration. According to NGO 
staff I spoke with, such suspicions had particularly surrounded the ICRC, which does 
not use escorts, nor does it deny assistance to injured LRA rebels.  
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Some of those interviewed were also sceptical of the ability of the UPDF soldiers to 
actually provide humanitarian workers with any meaningful amount of security in the 
event of a rebel attack on a convoy. The story of what a senior development 
professional I spoke to in Kampala had personally experienced highlighted such doubts. 
A group of NGO staff had visited a remote displacement settlement in Gulu district. 
Driving to the location, the group had passed a group of UPDF soldiers parked by the 
road. Soon after, the driver, a local man, had said he felt there was something wrong, 
and suggested they turn back immediately. As they again approached the group of 
government soldiers, they noticed the soldiers had changed their attire, and were pulling 
on masks. The team had managed to tear their way through the impending roadblock, 
just in time to see guns being drawn. As the person who shared this experience with me 
understood the situation, they were about to be ambushed by a group of soldiers who 
would then have put the blame on the LRA. The story, though unverified, serves to 
highlight the complexities and challenges of operating within the complex reality of 
conflict in northern Uganda.   
6.2.2 Relief–development: a neat continuum or utter confusion? 
How should the situation in northern Uganda be defined? Is it a civil war, a war against 
terrorism, or a low-intensity conflict? Correspondingly, can the situation for civilians be 
described as an acute emergency, an emergency, a prolonged emergency, or not an 
emergency at all? Obviously different characterisations can and need to be used for 
different phases of the conflict and humanitarian crisis. But even at any one point in 
time it is extremely difficult to find consensus among actors on what the situation in 
northern Uganda actually is.  
The definition of the northern Ugandan situation has given rise to substantial debate 
between the Ugandan government and humanitarian actors because of the legal 
repercussions involved in defining the crisis. An Internal Displacement Monitoring 
Centre (IDMC) report notes that “[u]nder the Constitution [of Uganda], the government 
must declare a national disaster area in order to take emergency measure to protect and 
assist affected populations” (IDMC 2006: 10). Further it is noted that it is in fact against 
the Constitution of Uganda to place restrictions on people’s movements, as has been 
done for years in Acholiland, unless the region is officially declared a disaster area 
(ibid: 28).  
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Intervention in northern Uganda cannot be divided into clear-cut categories of relief and 
development (See for instance ICVA 2006a, ICVA 2006b, IDMC 2006, Refugee Law 
Project 2006). Rather, most assistance programs tend to incorporate both relief and 
development-type activities. Since agencies had no shared official interpretation of the 
situation and each was guided more by their own organisational policies and analyses of 
the field situation, there was a huge variety of program approaches in Kitgum. An 
example of the most radically differing approaches can be found between the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the US-based International 
Rescue Committee (IRC). While the ICRC handed out traditional relief items such as 
food, soap and blankets, the IRC ran a scheme that combined aid with both the military 
and the private sector. In the IRC economic development project, UPDF soldiers were 
detached to protect groups of displaced farmers to so that they could reach their 
otherwise out-of-bounds fields, on which they cultivated food for consumption on one 
half, and cotton to sell to a private multinational corporation on the other (interviews in 
Kitgum, August 2006, see also Locke 2006).  
One can of course argue that programs with different approaches can serve to fill gaps 
that have been left by others. However, based on my experience in Kitgum, the grim 
reality seemed to be that the lack of coordination and common vision had led to the 
fragmentation of relief and development efforts. It could also be seen that some of the 
approaches adopted by some actors threatened to undermine the viability of other 
approaches. This was expressed somewhat bitterly by those NGOs that promoted long-
term community participation as the key to project success: “The perception of many 
people in the camps has been to look at NGOs as people who give out hand-outs. [The 
camp residents] tend to have a different level of grading different NGO’s… Sometimes 
it’s very difficult for people to volunteer for programs that don’t seem to provide 
immediate tangible benefit” (Interview in Kitgum, 3 August 2006). 
Opinions surrounding the relief–development continuum varied enormously among 
those interviewed in Kitgum. Many held that the situation on the ground simply dictated 
the need for emergency relief and felt the emergency response had not been unduly 
prolonged. Some argued that it had been a mistake in the first place for actors to 
conceptualise the situation as an emergency:  
When some of the organisations came here, they were running around, setting up 
offices, screaming “emergency, emergency”, until they realised that it’s not… There are 
camps that have been here for the past ten years… I think not all the agencies 
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understood that, so they’re still treating the situation in the camps as an emergency, so 
they are not at all looking into what is going to happen after this emergency. They’re 
not looking at the consequences of what they do on the ground. (Interview in Kitgum, 
16 August 2006) 
While others said that there should have been a shift to development earlier, others 
criticised the intervention for having been too developmentalist all along (see ICVA 
2006 and IDMC for similar criticism). Generally it was seen that there was need for a 
gradual shift from emergency to development programming now that the conflict had 
reduced in intensity, and the displaced population was being decongested from the large 
displacement settlements into smaller “satellite” camps.  
Humanitarian assistance in general has been criticised for undermining local emergency 
preparedness and capacities for long-term development (Juma & Suhrke 2002). This 
discussion was also vibrant in Kitgum, where the exceptionally long duration of the 
conflict added complexity to the question. The problem with the argument that aid 
should build the capacity of local authorities in northern Uganda was that there were 
doubts about the sincerity of the national and local government’s commitment to end 
the war and substantially improve the living conditions of the Acholi: “That statement 
[that intervention has decreased pressure for the government to take a bigger role] takes 
into assumption that the government actually cares” (Interview in Kitgum, 8 August 
2006). I also asked the displaced women I met whether they thought the relief 
organisations being there to help them was causing the government to do less. Without 
fail the answers to this questions were the same: “No. The government wasn’t doing 
anything. If the NGOs hadn’t come, we would just have died” (Interview at Akwang 
camp, 4 August 2006).  
The Office of the Prime Minister, which according to the national IDP policy should 
head assistance and protection of internally displaced people, is generally found to be a 
weak ministry (IDMC 2006: 19). According to some of my informants, the problem 
was not so much that the ministry and local government lacked capacity or strength, but 
that they lacked the will to act upon the situation. In any case, the organisation and 
provision of humanitarian assistance has fallen on the shoulders of international actors, 
which most of those interviewed in Kitgum agreed had compounded the problems of 
government capacity. The situation is similarly problematic throughout African crisis 
zones: 
Aid agencies face real dilemmas here… To continue sustaining service provision would 
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weaken the obligations of local authorities to provide for their own populations. The 
problem is that agencies are not being transparent about these dilemmas. Clearly, 
response on the ground is being shaped by international aid policy. Yet agencies are not 
challenging this. Instead basic cuts in entitlements are being justified on the grounds of 
sustainability. (Bradbury 1998: 335) 
6.3. Power, authority and disempowerment at the interface 
In this section I aim to discuss some of the more existential aspects of the interactions of 
intervention and conflict in northern Uganda. I argue that intervention processes have 
impacted on the lifeworlds of the displaced in ways that have also had effects on 
conflict (see section 2.3). I suggest that intervention has interacted in subtle ways with 
culture, power, authority, tradition, religion, social organisation, and individual and 
social self-images. Anderson (1999: 55) refers to similar processes as “aid’s impact on 
conflict through implicit ethical messages”. These subtle processes can be 
conceptualised of as social change, the direction and shape of which is constantly 
negotiated by the different actors engaged at the interface.  
“Negotiated” is a key concept in this context. Social change is not poured onto the 
shoulders of a passive Acholi people, nor dictated by intervening government 
representatives or humanitarians: intervention does not order local contexts, but affects 
them (Latham 2001: 86). The displaced people are active negotiators in the processes of 
change discussed in this chapter, despite the fact that through displacement, they have 
been subjected into a position of collective structural vulnerability in which their power 
to negotiate and control their surroundings has been curtailed (Finnström 2003). 
I will first look at how intervention constitutes power, and how authority is negotiated 
at the interface. In section 6.3.1 I focus on how intervention has empowered certain 
actors, whereas in section 6.3.2 I will turn to the disempowering processes that occur at 
the interface. Last, in section 6.3.3 I will return specifically to questions I introduced in 
the discussion on the ethics of research and development intervention amidst 
displacement and suffering (section 1.5), and suggest reasons for why such impacts of 
intervention as are discussed here are generally disregarded by the humanitarian 
community in Kitgum.  
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6.3.1. Constructing power and authority through intervention 
The majority of the intervening actors discussed in this study – development 
organisations and humanitarian agencies – are by definition non-governmental. Barnett 
(2001: 48) notes that in intervention situations, such non-state actors become 
constitutors of order and authority. This is particularly so in situations like that in 
northern Uganda where state order is contested by a number of actors: the LRA rebels, 
some of the international and local NGOs (in terms of their fierce criticism of the 
government) and a majority of the population (in terms of the lack of political support 
for the ruling party and president, see section 4.3.2).  
Development intervention in northern Uganda wields immense power: influence over 
the Ugandan government and local authorities; “muscle” associated to the abundance of 
material and human resources; power over the life and death of displaced people; and 
importantly, power granted by the moral cause and international legitimacy granted to 
intervention by the moral networks of humanitarianism and international law. This 
power is fundamentally undemocratic in nature, as the displaced, whose life the power 
is targeted at changing, have little or no control over how the power is used – over 
which development actors work among them, or what these actors do. Almost all the 
humanitarian and development workers I interviewed felt that there was insufficient 
consultation with and involvement of the displaced population both in formulating the 
broad policies and strategies of humanitarian assistance at the district level, and in the 
planning and monitoring of individual projects. In many district-level planning organs 
the displaced were not represented at all, which was in blatant contradiction of both the 
ICRC (1995) Code of Conduct and the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement 
(UNOCHA 2002). 
In a pattern that Kassimir (2001) finds common in many African conflict zones, many 
non-governmental actors in northern Uganda have used their power to intentionally 
affect local systems of authority by searching for and empowering (supposedly) 
authentic leaders for the crisis-affected people. In 1999, the Belgian government funded 
research into Acholi systems of chieftainship, as a result of which “Acholi ‘traditional 
chiefs’ were (re)instated and the Rwot [clan leader] of Payira [clan] in Gulu district was 
elected to become the Acholi Paramount Chief” (Allen 2006: 133). Similarly, the 
Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative (ARLPI) and Acholi traditional leaders’ 
associations, which have played substantial roles in defining the form of the “traditional 
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justice” mechanisms that are now being employed in the peace process, are to a large 
extent the product of international funding (ibid.).  
Intervening development actors also affect the constitution of authority at the 
community level in that NGOs select or authorise communities to select community 
representatives for various projects: as members of water user committees or as 
treasurers for saving schemes, for instance (interviews in Kitgum, August 2006). A 
study by the Refugee Law Project (RLP 2006) found that programs designed to provide 
income-generating activities for the displaced “effectively discriminate against those 
IDPs [internally displaced people] who are unable to read, fill out, and photocopy forms 
as well as pay registration fees.” Similarly, at least a scarce understanding of English 
was required for many project responsibilities (interviews in Kitgum, August 2006). 
According to my findings in Kitgum, the fact that there de facto were few people in the 
camps who filled all the requirements intervening agencies had for assisting staff or 
volunteers, had led to a situation in which the same people were used by different 
organisations. There was thus an implicit tendency for intervening agencies to select 
and repeatedly privilege those who were already privileged – not necessarily those who 
were trusted or respected – as representatives of the displaced community (Kassimir 
2001: 100).  
6.3.2. Intervention that disempowers 
According to Long (2004), hierarchies of power are always present in development 
interventions, including those that posit so-called participatory approaches. Even in 
these approaches, in which the hierarchies of power are supposedly reversed in favour 
of the “intervened”, the basic set-up depicts an image of a powerful intervening outsider 
and a less powerful object of participatory intervention. This notion underlies the 
analysis in this section, where I attempt to understand how the displaced are 
disempowered at the interface, where intervention interacts with the social constructs of 
displacement, inequality, dependency and vulnerability. I argue that it is not the 
intention of development intervention to disempower – to uphold displacement and 
inequality, or to deepen dependency and vulnerability. Rather, most of these processes 
are unacknowledged by those who take part in them.  
One of the fundamental aims of relief–development continuum thinking has been to 
avoid the creation of dependency through aid (see section 3.2). According to a number 
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of the relief and development workers I interviewed in Kitgum, this aim had not been 
reached. Instead, it was argued that intervention in northern Uganda had in fact created 
dependency and eroded local capacities. It is a fact that most of the population in 
Kitgum was dependent on relief food and that to myself as a passer-by many camp 
residents seemed idle, withdrawn and passive. Yet the question I wish to ask is, did they 
really have a choice? With limited or no access to farmland, and with no way of earning 
an income, there was not much else the displaced could do. 
It has become something of a trend in development discourse for aid agencies to take 
and be granted by researchers responsibility for the creation of dependency (Bradbury 
1998). The trend reflects the extent of the power and influence interveners are willing to 
ascribe themselves: intervention is implicitly credited with the capacity to incapacitate 
and paralyse the intervened individuals and societies (Finnström 2006b). In the same 
vein, Cooper (2001: 33) notes that there is a general tendency for humanitarians to 
experience “frustration and anger at the recipients of humanitarian assistance for not 
performing prescribed roles and a willingness to label people who [do not] act as 
desired as backward, lazy, and otherwise peculiar”.  
The trend Bradbury (1998) describes was also evident in Kitgum, where interviewed 
development workers told me numerous examples of the dependency syndrome.36 For 
instance, I was told of a man who enlisted himself to two trainings on the same day and 
went back and forth between the trainings all day in order to get the free lunch and 
refreshments and money promised to all the participants. As I understood it, the 
function of such stories was to explain to me how dependent the displaced had become, 
and how they took advantage of the intervening agencies. Although certainly a valid 
point, (and although I understand the development workers’ frustration with such 
situations), it is also possible to interpret such cases in other terms – as examples of the 
creative coping strategies the displaced have come up with in the face of a situation in 
which their individual agency is seriously constricted (Finnström 2003: 190). 
                                                
36 The interviewed relief/development worker’s opinions on dependency varied enormously. 
Some argued that dependency had become deep-rooted: “People have become lazy [laughter], 
yeah of course you can drink [alcohol] the whole day, then at the end of the month World Food 
Programme trucks zoom in and you get your ration” (Interview in Kitgum, 2 August 2006). 
Others, however, argued that dependency was not a problem, and that the Acholi would return 
to self-sufficiency as soon as circumstances permitted: “the Acholi have not lost initiative. The 
only limitation they have is [insufficient] access to market” (Interview in Kitgum, 8 August 
2006).  
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Alongside dependency, vulnerability was an issue that often came up in my interviews 
with representatives of intervening organisations in Kitgum. Before discussing how 
displacement has increased the entire affected population’s vulnerability, I will 
comment on development interventions that targeted specific vulnerabilities. In Kitgum, 
groups that were identified as particularly vulnerable included orphans, widows, those 
with HIV and AIDS, and former rebel abductees. Although these groups were indeed 
often in need of special assistance, it has been argued that vulnerability-targeted 
interventions may in fact increase vulnerability (Refugee Law Project 2006). Some of 
those interviewed in Kitgum also drew attention to this point, and I was told specific 
examples of the unintended impacts of targeting vulnerability: 
There are cases… where returnees have been given blankets, mattresses, all those kind 
of support from reception centres… And they go back home when they are really good-
looking, you know, looking enriched. And then here is somebody who has been in the 
community for all those years, you have never been abducted, you never get the 
opportunity to be reintegrated, he doesn’t have a blanket, he doesn’t have a mattress, 
and he starts wishing I wish I was abducted… Sometimes what we give out makes 
people so much vulnerable in terms that they would wish to be that kind of person [who 
gets assistance], which is not the best thing to do. (Interview in Kitgum, 8 August 2006) 
Similarly I heard of cases in which women who had been struggling to feed their 
families had deliberately become infected with HIV so as to be entitled to larger 
portions of food. Although such cases were probably not very common, they did 
highlight how targeted intervention could indeed increase the vulnerability of certain 
individuals. On a broader scale, such interventions can also be seen to threaten social 
cohesion and to weaken the coping strategies of entire communities, and in so doing, 
increase the vulnerability of all the displaced (Refugee Law Project 2006).  
The vulnerability of the LRA-affected populations in northern Uganda is, however, 
structured in a much more comprehensive manner than only through individual 
interventions. In his analysis of displacement in Acholiland, Finnström (2003: 191) 
talks of “a displacement regime that undermines the agency and individual subjectivities 
of the displaced people, and ultimately even takes their lives.” This regime is 
constructed by a number of actors: the Ugandan government, the UPDF, humanitarian 
and development agencies, donors, and International Financial Institutions (see 
particularly section 5.5). According to Finnström (2003) the inherent feature of the 
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displacement regime is violence: direct or open violence by armed groups (the LRA, 
local defence units and the UPDF), as well as indirect or structural violence.  
It can be argued that humanitarian assistance has inadvertently invited violence to the 
displacement camps. There is evidence that the LRA has kept close track of aid delivery 
to the camps, and many raids have occurred immediately after the departure of 
humanitarian actors (Allen 2006: 65, Finnström 2003: 213). The structural violence of 
intervention again is evident for instance in that assistance has given incentives for 
people to remain in or move to the congested displacement camps, as women displaced 
to the outskirts of Kitgum town suggested to me: “We are under the town council, so 
the NGOs don’t like working with us, they don’t help us so much, as much as we have 
problems. They like to work with the people in the camp” (Interview in a community 
near Kitgum town, 4 August 2006).  
Complicity in the displacement regime occurs not only in the sense that aid agencies 
have legitimised the government’s policy of forced displacement (see section 5.5). It 
also occurs when humanitarian or development workers interact with the displaced in 
ways that humiliate or degrade the displaced. Indeed, I find that the displacement 
regime is in part constructed on the acceptance of certain structural inequalities – at the 
top of the hierarchy is the humanitarian muno. The displaced women I interviewed in 
Kitgum made a clear distinction between NGOs they commended for their work, and 
those with which they had had trouble, for instance, the staff of which had treated the 
displaced disrespectfully. Two women’s groups told me that residents of their camp had 
experienced physical and verbal abuse by Acholi volunteers of the World Food 
Programme (WFP) during distributions. One of the six groups of women I talked to in 
the camps also complained that NGOs had at times given people “rotten food” 
(interview in Palabek Gem camp 10 August 2006, see also Finnström 2003: 260).  
The implicit superiority of expatriate humanitarians in comparison to all other actors 
engaged at the interface was also evident in that the offices of international NGOs and 
other humanitarian actors in Kitgum were generally bigger, better equipped, and in 
every measure more grand than the offices of local authorities. Leopold (2001) 
describes a more radical example of the implicit greater worth of expatriates from the 
north-western Ugandan district of Arua. At a time when the security situation in the 
region deteriorated and humanitarian actors feared that roads were being planted with 
landmines, an international NGO in Arua received orders from its headquarters that 
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staff was always to use two cars when moving around the district. Only local staff was 
allowed in the first car, while expatriates were permitted to travel only in the second.  
The first car was to carry only local staff, while foreigners were to travel in the second. 
Although Leopold’s example is not from the conflict–intervention complex analysed in 
this study, I find it to be worth quoting as a telling example of the inequalities inherent 
in much humanitarian practice.37  
Although I found it understandable and sensible (as did all the women I interviewed on 
the topic in displacement camps) that NGOs adopted strict security procedures in 
Kitgum, and that most of them had taken to using UPDF escorts at times of increased 
insecurity, these procedures could be seen to convey a similar message as the policy 
prescribed to the NGO in Arua. Finnström (2003: 206) describes how during times of 
high LRA activity, relief agencies generally dumped food to the camps as quickly as 
possible and hurried off. Even at the time when I was in Kitgum, when most camps in 
the district had been deemed safe to visit without military escorts, MSF was to my 
knowledge the only intervening actor that had a permanent presence in any of the 
camps. Each time we packed ourselves into the car and drove off from the camps in the 
early afternoon, it seemed to me that we were passing a voiceless message to the packs 
of children crowding around our car (as in the picture from Palabek Gem displacement 
camp on page 69): We have to leave now, its not safe for us to stay. But it’s safe enough 
for you.  
6.3.3. Present in body but not in mind or heart?  
Finnström, having undertaken substantial fieldwork among the displaced people in 
Acholiland, describes the Acholi’s views of the visiting foreigners in rather harsh 
words. 
The muno especially is a rather depersonalized agent, who visits the camps only briefly 
and seldom engages in any dialogical communication or intersubjective endeavour with 
the displaced people, nor takes the time to listen to their stories, points of view and 
frustration. More, the visiting muno does not generally open his or her world to the 
Acholi. In the view of many Acholi, visiting foreigners remain a category of people 
rather than known individuals because they put little effort into establishing themselves 
as social beings in the local moral world. Such an attitude of distance keeping was quite 
                                                
37 Anderson (1999:  58) refers to this underlying ideology when she notes that implicitly, aid 
agencies are saying that “imported goods have a higher value than the lives of local people 
[when] radio equipment is evacuated but not local staff.”  
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strange in the eyes of my informants, but still the norm in much humanitarian work. 
(Finnström 2003: 233) 
I believe it is clear that if the munu in Kitgum were to act less like the depersonalized 
agents Finnström describes, the voice of the displaced would be more heard, and 
intervention could serve more to empower, rather than disempower the displaced. Yet in 
practice the lifeworlds of the displaced and humanitarian and development professionals 
in Kitgum remained strictly segregated. Finnström argues that this segregation, and the 
maintaining of emotional distance, is the humanitarian organisation’s “naïve way of 
keeping the image of neutrality alive” (Finnström 2003: 234). One simple but effective 
method of retaining the distance between the displaced and the humanitarians is that the 
displaced are systematically referred to using the acronym “IDP” (internally displaced 
person), a term I for this very reason refrain from using in this study (ibid: 182).  
Yet reflecting on my own experience in Kitgum, I must say I do not fully agree with 
Finnström’s analysis of the reasons for the social barrier between the displaced and the 
munu, i.e. that it is merely a “naïve way of keeping the image of neutrality alive” (ibid: 
234). The ideal of a humanitarian who engages in dialogical communication with the 
displaced, and “opens his or her world to the Acholi” (ibid) was one that I myself did 
not come near to reaching during my few weeks in Kitgum. After intense days of work 
in the displacement camps and agency offices, with my mind swirling with information 
and questions on both my research and the extent of the displaced peoples’ suffering, I 
did not have the energy to ”establish myself as a social being” (ibid) much anywhere 
other than in my hotel room. All my extra time was spent either sipping cold drinks in 
the hotel garden, sharing thoughts on northern Uganda or international bestsellers with 
researchers and humanitarians, or in the refuge of my comfortable room, where I was 
blessed with a hot shower, a pile of entertaining books, and one piece of Belgian 
chocolate a day.  
A further reason for the separation of the lifeworlds of the displaced and intervening 
actors, and for the apparent neglect of the existential aspects of suffering in northern 
Uganda (see section 1.5), is suggested by reflection of my experiences in Kitgum. 
During my fieldwork, I felt disappointed that my research assistant Pamella was rather 
reluctant to engage in discussions on issues that interested me – on the experiences of 
the women we interviewed, and on conflict and intervention in northern Uganda in 
general. Over a year later it was kindly suggested to me that the reasons behind her 
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apparent reluctance may well have been similar to those that drove me to take emotional 
cover in the comfort of my hotel room.  
Pamella, a year or two younger than myself, had herself experienced displacement, yet 
was now back among her own people as a well fed, highly educated and beautifully 
clothed young woman. Realising how emotionally overwhelming such a situation must 
have been for her led me to realise that the poem quoted in section 1.5, in which 
Oryema-Lalobo writes that the displaced people are weary and tired, is true not only for 
the displaced Acholi living in camps. The local Acholi staff members of NGOs or 
government organisations who work with the displaced are also weary and tired, as are 
many of the white men, particularly those humanitarian and development workers who 
have been in the region for a long time. Sadly it seems that for many, it is the separation 
of the lifeworlds of the intervening actors and the displaced that enables relief and 
development workers to stay. This explanation was also suggested to me by some of the 
displaced women I interviewed as a reason for their ill treatment: “Now if the NGOs are 
becoming rude to us in the camps, maybe it is because they are tired, because they 
started the [aid] distribution a long time ago” (Interview in Palabek Gem camp, 10 
August 2006).  
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7. Analysing interactions of development intervention 
and conflict 
The aim of this concluding chapter is to reflect on the research questions and tasks that 
were set out for this study in chapter one. First I will reflect on the analysis in the 
preceding two chapters, and draw together my core arguments on how intervention and 
conflict interact in the studied case. Second, I will analyse how humanitarian and 
development workers I interviewed in Kitgum perceived these interactions. This 
analysis will facilitate my return to some of the theoretical and methodological aims set 
for this study. Thus the third and final aim in this chapter is to reflect on what this study 
has to say about analysing interactions of development intervention and conflict, and 
assess the study’s success in providing an attempt in methodological developmentalism.  
7.1. Core arguments 
As the international response to the humanitarian disaster in northern Uganda has 
intensified, the interactions of development intervention and conflict have multiplied 
and become more and more complex. This is a core argument of this study. By the 
intensification of the international response I refer to a number of processes: intervening 
agencies and individuals have become more numerous, money and other assets 
circulating in the region have increased, the variety of approaches applied to 
intervention activities has multiplied. As a result, the number of actors vying for 
influence and power has grown, while the issues and assets over which power and 
influence may be used have increased and become more contested. All in all, as 
intervention has intensified, it could be said either that the interface has become more 
and more complex, or that the interfaces surrounding intervention have multiplied. As 
the interactions of development intervention and conflict have become more numerous 
and complex, it has also become increasingly difficult to pinpoint these interactions 
exactly.  
What follows from this argument is that as the intervention interface in northern Uganda 
has expanded and become more complex, the unintended (adverse, or negative) impacts 
of intervention have also increased. As I have pointed out throughout this study, I do 
not suggest that the impacts of intervention on conflict are straightforward or simple. 
Rather, I have argued that development intervention in any social arena becomes 
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unavoidably entangled within that arena, and engages in its transformation in multiple 
ways. Particularly I have argued in this study that development intervention has impacts 
on the economy, and on power, authority and discourse at the interface. 
When violent conflict is one of the defining aspects of the social arena into which 
intervention is geared, I maintain that intervention also affects conflict. By arguing that 
intervention has impacted on conflict in northern Uganda I do not mean only that 
intervention has impacted directly on the armed conflict between the Lord’s Resistance 
Army (LRA) and the Uganda People’s Defence force (UPDF). Impacting on conflict at 
any level, including the interpersonal or communal level, also affects conflict at other 
levels (see Finnström 2003). 
In my view the fact that such impacts have not been systematically analysed or steps 
taken to mitigate them (as I will discuss in detail in the following section), makes it all 
the more likely that unintended impacts have occurred. By arguing thus I do not suggest 
that intervention has not simultaneously had intended (or positive) impacts. 
Humanitarian relief and other types of development intervention have certainly played a 
vital role in sustaining the life of displaced people in northern Uganda. It is also 
possible that assistance has in some cases promoted peace, although such an idea was 
not suggested by any of the interviewed development or humanitarian workers.  
7.2. (Not) analysing conflict impacts in Kitgum 
For myself the most surprising finding of my fieldwork was that except in some very 
few exceptions, conflict impact assessment tools such as Mary B. Anderson’s (1999) 
“Do No Harm” had not been used (in planning, implementation or evaluation) by 
intervening organisations in Kitgum, nor had the question of whether or not intervention 
had impacts on the conflict been in any other way assessed.38 Furthermore, the head of 
the Kitgum office of UNOCHA, which carries the coordination role of humanitarian 
and development activities in the LRA-affected regions in northern Uganda, was not 
aware of any such assessment having been made.  
                                                
38 One organisation had had their staff trained in Do No Harm and were beginning to 
implement it to their work; one organisation viewed all its work as targeting either the reasons 
or the consequences of conflict; one of those interviewed mentioned that their organisation’s 
needs-assessment framework included assessing conflict-sensitivity; and the UNOCHA 
representative said he thought all actors’ interventions should contain “peace-building 
elements” (interviews in Kitgum, August 2006).  
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Yet I was even more surprised by the fact that many of those I interviewed were not 
even familiar with the concept of “Do No Harm” or conflict impact. Partially my 
surprise was of course due to the fact that my expectations of what humanitarian and 
development workers would know were based on absolutely no field experience, and to 
the fact that I had myself become emerged in ideas about the conflict impacts of 
intervention. I believe, however, that it would not have surprised me to find the concept 
unfamiliar at the scene of a natural catastrophe, but I am to this day surprised by how 
unfamiliar it was to development and humanitarian workers in a conflict zone.  
It was not always clear how “intervention’s impacts on conflict” or the “conflict impacts 
of intervention” were understood by those I interviewed. In this sense it was a problem 
for my fieldwork that although I had read material on aid amid conflict, I myself did not 
have a crystal-clear idea about what it was I was looking for, and did not have perfectly 
moulded definitions and questions prepared for my interviewees. Indeed, when I went 
to Kitgum, I thought I would be there to learn about conflict impacts from my 
interviewees. Instead, in many interviews I found myself having to explain in more and 
more simple terms what it was the whole concept of “conflict impact” meant. In one 
case I was in fact uncertain whether the person I had interviewed had at any point 
understood what I was talking about.  
Although my own performance as interviewer was far from outstanding, it was beyond 
doubt that many of those I interviewed saw “impacting on the conflict” extremely 
narrowly (compared to the view I follow in this study, inspired by the notion of social 
interface). An illuminating example of both of the unspecific nature of my questions, 
and of the narrowness of the views of some of those interviewed, is provided by this 
extract from one of my interviews in Kitgum:   
-Would you see your work as impacting on the conflict?  
-I don’t know.  
-Does your organisation involve itself in any kind of peace building initiatives or 
something of that sort?  
-Well… We don’t interact with the rebels, so that is a problem, it’s not easy. If we had 
access to them, we’d say yes, we’re impacting on the conflict, but we don’t have access 
to the other side of the coin. We are only talking with the camp residents and the 
soldiers, but we don’t talk with the rebels.  (Interview in Kitgum, 9 August 2006) 
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Interviewed agency employees in Kitgum can roughly be divided into three groups. 
There was a small group of those who were acutely aware of the complexity of the 
situation in which they were operating, and who were familiar with the concept of aid’s 
effects on conflict. These persons generally thought it would be useful for agencies to 
analyse the impacts their work had on the conflict. A second group were those who 
appeared to have very little understanding of the concept of conflict impacts. Most of 
these persons insisted that development aid had nothing whatsoever to do with conflict 
in northern Uganda. The third and largest group consisted of persons with very different 
views on many of the issues discussed in this study, for instance on applying a relief–
development continuum in Kitgum. They had, however, one common attribute, which 
was that they had not given serious (or any) thought to the question of whether 
development intervention interacts with conflict. 
-Do you believe there’s that type of impact [on the conflict]; does your organisation’s 
presence here, and the interventions you have, do they impact on the conflict in any 
kind of way, positive or negative? 
-I don’t know, I don’t know. I’ve never thought along that line. 
 (Interview in Kitgum, 15 August 2006) 
A common argument from agency personnel was that the situation in northern Uganda 
was so unique that guidelines on best practice amid conflict, and tools for analysing 
conflict impacts, were not applicable: 
You know the “Do No Harm” is applicable to real conflict, you know places where you 
have two parties which are fighting, having agendas, and the NGOs are in the middle. 
Now we are all kind of interrelated and involved, so it’s kind of difficult to understand 
who is on the right position and who is not. (Interview in Kitgum, 11 August 2006) 
Although I believe that the NGO representative was correct in arguing that all actors are 
“interrelated and involved” in conflict in northern Uganda, I would argue that this 
complexity does not justify brushing aside existing tools for assessing conflict impact. 
Rather, the complexity of the situation could be seen to demand that even more effort be 
put into assessing and mitigating the adverse unintended conflict impacts of 
intervention, using all possible tools. A few possible explanations for why development 
agencies in Kitgum had not taken up this challenge were suggested by my fieldwork in 
Kitgum. First of all, understanding of the conflict context among aid workers was 
limited. When the operating environment was a great unknown, it was difficult to 
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analyse the impacts of intervention on the operating environment.  Secondly, 
intervention impacts were not assessed because as I was told by one interviewed 
expatriate, “these are interesting questions, but no-one’s being paid, nor has the time, to 
ask them” (Interview in Kitgum, 16 August 2006).  
These suggestions are in fact contradictory with some of the central elements of 
transformed humanitarianism (as introduced in chapter three). It was suggested that 
there is almost an obsession in the humanitarian/development regime to analyse the 
negative impacts of aid, as evidenced by the “Do No Harm” -approach. It seems, in this 
sense, that northern Uganda, or at least Kitgum, was an exception to trends in 
transformed humanitarianism. In Kitgum, demands for long-term sustainability have not 
(in recent years at least) overridden the right of the displaced population to emergency 
relief. Nor have the unintended, conflict-inducing impacts of aid been used as a reason 
for the withdrawal of aid, since these impacts have not even been assessed.    
Yet even had “Do No Harm” been familiar to all the interviewed agency employees, or 
had all the agencies in Kitgum used some conflict impact assessment tool in planning, 
implementing and evaluating their activities, it is by no means clear that the subtle 
interactions of intervention and conflict that I have attempted to analyse in this study 
would have been recognised by intervening actors. As I have described in chapter three, 
there is a focus in transformed humanitarianism on the quantification and measurement 
of tangible results and impacts of intervention. Yet all the processes that take place at 
the social interface cannot be quantified, nor can the multiple impacts intervention has 
on local realities be captured by mechanistic tools for conflict-sensitive planning and 
assessment.  
As I argue in this study, intervention impacts on conflict because it is embedded in 
complex theoretical and normative frameworks (in this case, transformed 
humanitarianism), and because it becomes enmeshed in complex social arenas (the 
historical, ethnopolitical, geopolitical, cultural, religious etc. dimensions of conflict in 
northern Uganda). I argue that without knowledge and understanding of these 
frameworks and arenas, the interactions of development intervention and conflict 
cannot be meaningfully analysed.  
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7.3. From searching for impacts to sketching interactions 
The understanding that development intervention impacts on conflict is one of the 
underlying foundations of transformed humanitarianism. As was discussed in section 
3.3, development, relief and security are seen as mutually dependent, and it is argued 
that intervening in one of the three will unavoidably have impact on the others. 
Simultaneously it is argued that is impossible to promote development, for instance, 
without simultaneously promoting security, and vice versa. (See Duffield 2001)  
In the triangle model of a complex political emergency presented in section 3.3, 
intervention can be targeted at conflict, under-development or emergency, in order to 
transform reality. As I headed out to do my fieldwork, my aim was to analyse the 
effects of development intervention (including both developmental and relief activities) 
on conflict/security. As I proceeded deeper into an analysis of my research material, I 
realised that the problem with this model, and with my attempt to analyse the effects of 
development intervention on conflict, is that the triangle is a model, which only 
represents a crudely simplified vision of reality. In reality interventions are not always 
geared at one corner of the model. Interventions also exist which approach complex 
emergencies from a number of angles from “between” development and relief, from 
“between” relief and security, and from “between” security and development.  
This is particularly evident in transformed humanitarianism where intervention comes 
not only at different angles on the same level, but “three-dimensionally” from above (or 
below) the triangle. The aim of such intervention is to mould the entire reality – to 
transform entire societies (Duffield 2001). What this multiplicity of angles produces for 
the researcher and development intervener is increased confusion. It becomes 
increasingly difficult to track the impacts of intervention, or to even understand the 
reality into which interventions are geared. But precisely this is my point: if and when 
conflict reality is complex, it cannot and should not be forcefully simplified to fit simple 
models.  
What this realisation meant for this study was that it became more and more difficult to 
conceptualise and analyse the conflict impacts of intervention. While on the field it was 
my wish to come up with clear pointers. Results that I was expecting to find were 
perhaps something in the lines of: “intervention feeds into the conflict economy”; 
“intervention has reduced/inflamed conflict within communities” or, “the use of military 
escorts has provoked the LRA”. I do believe effects of this sort can be pinpointed in 
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northern Uganda, but as it turned out, things were not this simple. Try as I might, I 
could not produce a simple list of clear, tangible, recordable impacts of intervention on 
conflict. The reality in which intervention and conflict were occurring was simply too 
complex: relief, development, sustainability, power, authority, culture, war blessings 
and curses, regional conflict dynamics, donor relations, International Financial 
Institutions and their debt reduction strategies… It became impossible to collapse or 
reduce all these factors into a theoretical model with exhaustive explanatory power.  
It is this, not so much an analysis of the actual impacts of intervention on conflict that I 
wish to stand behind in this study. The reality of conflict in northern Uganda is difficult 
to conceptualise, it is difficult for practitioners to analyse and decide on the best model 
for intervention; and as I believe this study shows, it is also difficult to analyse the role 
and weight of intervention within this complex social reality. Yet developmentalism and 
humanitarianism (i.e. the tools, organisations, and individuals engaged in development 
intervention) have a tendency to reduce complex realities into simplified, seemingly 
governable models of reality. I suggest that it is this tendency and the practice of 
simplification that particularly lead to intervention having unintended impacts.  
One could ask, what’s the option? Some of those in Kitgum who realised how entangled 
their work was with conflict dynamics asked me what I would have interveners in 
northern Uganda do till the time they figure out their possible impacts on the conflict – 
clear out and let the displaced starve?  
It is not the aim of this study to provide a comprehensive answer to this question, but a 
few points may be made on the basis of my analysis. First, I suggest that research 
should contribute to analysing such questions. I believe this study shows that 
development studies can be applied to analysing the interactions of development 
intervention and conflict, and in so doing, engage in an “examination of how the 
developmentalist complex is actually working and what it is producing” (Koponen 
2004: 12).  
Secondly, I believe the unintended impacts of intervention in conflict situations could 
be mitigated, were actors more interested in and aware of the arenas and frameworks 
into which interventions are embedded. Local knowledge should particularly be 
engaged to guide intervention processes. Responsibility for such a shift in the interests 
and priorities of intervention cannot simply be delegated to individual humanitarian and 
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development workers. Rather, this shift would require a radical reassessment of 
discourse and practice in the entire developmentalist complex. 
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8. Final conclusions 
This study set out to analyse whether and how development intervention and conflict 
have interacted in crisis-affected regions in northern Uganda. Moreover, the study 
sought to explain why intervention in the region has increased markedly within recent 
years, and to analyse the effects of this increase. Koponen’s (2004) idea of intervention 
as the third aspect of the modern notion of development formed the basis for this 
analysis. Norman Long’s notion of social interface was loosely applied as a tool with 
which development intervention could be conceptualised and analysed. 
It was suggested that development intervention in northern Uganda is embedded in 
complex frameworks and arenas without the analysis of which understanding 
intervention’s interactions with local realities is impossible. Thus part II of the study 
presented transformed humanitarianism as a framework into which intervention is 
embedded. The historical, political and international context of the conflict between the 
Lord’s Resistance Army and the Government of Uganda was introduced as the arena of 
intervention, and it was shown that intervention cannot function in isolation from this 
arena, but becomes enmeshed in it in many ways.  
In part III the interactions of development intervention and conflict in northern Uganda 
were studied. The dynamics of conflict and intervention were first traced on a macro-
level, and it was shown that factors beyond the northern Ugandan scene must be evoked 
to explain the increase of intervention in recent years. Second, the interactions of 
intervention and conflict were analysed at a micro-level, with specific focus on how the 
situation in northern Uganda can be analysed within the framework of transformed 
humanitarianism. The analysis showed that intervention and conflict have indeed 
interacted in northern Uganda, and that such interactions are multifaceted and complex. 
Some of the challenges to analysing the interactions of conflict and development 
intervention were also discussed, and it was acknowledged that further research would 
be required in order for a comprehensive and elaborated analysis of the studied 
interactions to be produced. Finally, it was argued that such research is well suited to 
the field of development studies. 
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Appendix 2: Map of Kitgum district  
 
Source: UNOCHA 2006. Received at coordination meeting in Kitgum, 8 August 2006. Displacement 
camps visited: Lagoro 2, Kitgum Matidi 4, Palabek Gem 11, Akwang 16 and Labuje camp which not on 
the map because practically adjacent to Kitgum town. A World Health Organisation (WHO) report from 
2004 evaluates population of the camp at 14 000 people (http://www.who.int/disasters/repo/13963.pdf) 
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Appendix 3: Organisations interviewed in Kitgum 
 
Only those organisations whose representatives gave permission for official interviews 
are included in this list. In some of the larger organisations that had a number of large 
programs with separate heads, I interviewed more than one person. Such organisations 
whose staff asked not to be identified are excluded from the list entirely.  
 
Local actor: 
JPC  Justice and Peace Commission (of the Gulu Catholic Archdiocese, Kitgum 
office) 
 
International NGOs: 
ACET  Aids Care Education and Training (independent branch of UK-based NGO) 
ACORD Agency for Cooperation and Research in Development (Africa-led, 
international) 
AVSI Association of Volunteers in International Service (based in Italy) 
IRC International Rescue Committee (based in the US) 
LWF Lutheran World Federation  
MSF Médecins Sans Frontières (international, with separate country sections. In 
Kitgum, MSF programme run by MSF-Holland) 
NRC Norwegian Refugee Council 
 
Other humanitarian actor: 
ICRC  International Committee of the Red Cross 
 
UN organisations:  
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund 
UNOCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
WFP World Food Programme 
 
